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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three essays on the geography of finance. In the first essay, we study 
the relation between geographic dispersion and firm value. In the context of asset-sells, information 
asymmetry hypothesis and managerial alignment hypothesis offer opposite predictions on the market 
reaction to asset-sell announcements. Real estate investment trusts (REIT) firms provide an ideal setting 
to investigate these two competing but not mutually exclusive effects. We construct a unique panel data 
of more than 800,000 property-year observations and apply a two-stage sequential decision-making 
method to mitigate selection bias at both firm level and property level. We find that REIT firms tend to 
dispose of distant properties and there is a negative relation between distance and cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs, also known as cumulative prediction errors), consistent with managerial alignment 
hypothesis. Further, informational and social factors explain corporate decisions on asset sell-offs and 
the effect of social interactions only exists in less-populated areas. Together, these findings suggest a 
dominant role of managerial alignment effect. 
In the second essay, we analyze cross-state/MSA spillover effects of local capital scarcity. We 
propose a theoretical framework to capture the competition for scarce capital across state/MSA borders 
and calibrate its implications with spatial autoregressive (SAR) and spatial Durbin’s (SDM) models. Our 
application of spatial econometrics tools mitigates potential bias in estimation that arises due to the 
violation of Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which leads to indirect treatment effect 
(competition effect) on geographic neighbors. Overall, our findings suggest that negative spatial 
spillovers may arise due to competition for scarce capital, and the competition effect is amplified during 
local and national economic downturns. 
In the third essay, we introduce geographic variables and implement a novel econometric method.  
Chongyu Wang – University of Connecticut, 2017 
We test the hypothesis that geographic (state-level) macroeconomic factors and funding liquidity affect 
market liquidity. We find cross-state spillover effects for market liquidity. These spatial spillover effects 
have two implications. First, higher REIT market liquidity in neighboring states leads to decreased REIT 
market liquidity in a particular state. Second, there is also a spatial multiplier effect (less than 1) that 
diminishes the magnitudes of the total effect of state macroeconomic effects on funding liquidity. These 
results indicate that neighboring states compete for scarce capital, leading to negative effects on the 
growth trajectories across state borders. Such negative effects are more extreme during market 
downturns. 
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Essay 1 
Geographic Proximity and Managerial Alignment:  
Evidence from Asset Sell-offs by Real Estate Investment Trusts 
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1. Introduction 
 The relation between geographic dispersion and firm value has been extensively studied. 
However, two key hypotheses predict different outcomes. On the one hand, geographic proximity 
mitigates information asymmetry and improves firm performance (information asymmetry 
hypothesis; see John and Ofek, 1995; Lerner, 1995; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; Grinblatt 
and Keloharju, 2001; Peterson and Rajan, 2002; Giroud, 2013). On the other hand, Landier, Nair 
and Wulf (2009) suggest that social concerns could affect the conflict with shareholder wealth 
maximization when firms are more concerned about nearby operating assets due to reputational 
concern and the management of geographically dispersed firms align their interests better with 
nearby employees rather than with shareholders (managerial alignment hypothesis).  
Asset sales are considered as effective channels to examine the relation between 
geographic dispersion and corporate decision making (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002; Yang, 2008; 
Warusawitharana, 2008; Boot, 1992; Lang, Poulsen and Stulz, 1995; Kose, Sodjahin 2010). In the 
context of asset sales, information asymmetry effect predicts a positive relation between distant 
sales and post sell-off stock market reaction (measured by cumulative abnormal return, or CAR) 
while managerial alignment effect suggests a negative relation between distant sales and post sell-
off stock market reaction.1 In this study, we examine the asset sell-offs by equity real estate 
investment trusts (REITs), which provides an ideal setting to investigate the two competing but 
not mutually exclusive effects. REITs operate within a single asset class (because REITs must 
have at least 75%, of assets and income from real estate related assets), have similar dividend 
                                                          
1 Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is also known as the cumulative prediction error (CPE) used in Glascock, 
Davidson and Sirmans (1991). It is noted that although the two hypotheses generate opposite predictions, they are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. All else equal, if information asymmetry effect (managerial alignment effect) 
dominates, we should observe a positive (negative) reaction to distant sell-offs. 
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payout policies (because they are required to pay out 90% of taxable income as dividends), have 
high institutional ownership (see Chan, Erickson, and Wang, 2003), and have similar antitakeover 
provisions (because 5-50 rule and excess share provision). These features help mitigate the 
likelihood of alternative explanations to asset sell-offs such as changes in corporate strategy 
(Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992), financing needs (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995) and corporate 
governance (John and Sodjahin, 2010; John, Knyazeva and Knyazeva, 2011). 
Real estate is heterogeneous and illiquid with slow market mechanism (Ling and Archer, 
2013; Levitt and Syverson, 2008).  Based on the link between distance and information flows, soft 
information might play an important role in the real estate market as information on potential rental 
growth and local market conditions cannot be cheaply hardened.2 Managers might tend to dispose 
of distant properties and to keep the nearby properties because information in the real estate market 
is more costly to communicate to distant agents.  
Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) suggest that distance creates a potential distortion between 
managerial incentives and shareholder interests because managers react differently to economic 
shocks to underlying operating assets and business divisions through social interactions.3 For 
example, managers of geographically concentrated firms are more concerned about nearby 
operating assets due to reputational concern and about employees with whom they interact more 
frequently. When information is soft, personal interactions are important. More frequent social 
                                                          
2 This argument has its root in Petersen (2004), in which soft information is defined as information that is difficult to 
quantify. This implies that the cost of soft information, compared with that of hard information, is much higher for 
operating assets that are distant from the management (usually measured by firm headquarters). Bank lending related 
studies provide extensive discussions on the link between distance and information flows (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; 
Liberti, 2005; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Knyazeva and Knyazeva, 2012). As a result, small banks are found to 
have information advantage in lending to less transparent firms using soft information. 
3 In a different context of individual decisions, Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) find a relation between 
proximity and social interactions. 
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interactions with nearby employees and reputational concerns would likely affect a firm’s decision 
on asset allocation and disposition.  
The sources of uncertainty in the real estate sector mainly come from property type and 
location, both are considered as highly rigid and relatively permanent. This relative simplicity 
makes it a plausible benchmark to evaluate information asymmetry through geographic 
dispersion.4  To mitigate information asymmetry, market participants tend to purchase nearby 
properties (Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004) and REITs tend to be geographically focused 
(Cronquist, Hogfeldt, and Nilsson, 2001; Hartzell, Sun, and Titman, 2014). While this may be 
expected, our sample shows that REITs have a large dispersion of properties that are not close by 
conventional measurement. For example, the top-ten MSAs in our disposition sample were over 
860 miles (1,388 kilometers) from their REITs’ headquarters (HQs). 
We manually collect a sample of property sell-offs by REITs from 2003 to 2013 based on 
an extensive search of news articles. We are able to construct a panel sample of underlying 
properties with detailed information on type and location, taking sales, purchases, mergers and 
acquisitions into consideration. Constructing these data sets is not a trivial task as there are about 
36,528 underlying properties held by REITs and non-REIT firms in each year, adding to 840,150 
during the entire sample period and much of the information has to be hand collected and verified 
due to missing data, renovations and changes of usage.5 The sample of property-year observations 
                                                          
4 Some studies examine manufacturing industries (Edmans and Mann, 2015; Arnold, Hackbarth, and Puhan, 2015). 
We argue that real estate might be better suited in testing the information asymmetry effect because the production at 
plant locations could be quite dynamic, depending on firm’s strategy which is less observable.    
5 We include both to account for the property transactions and M&As between REITs and non-REIT firms. The total 
number of properties held by REITs from 2003-2013 is 344,010. 
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is merged with a comprehensive list of U.S. public equity REITs from 1993-2015 identified by 
NAREIT.6 
We start our analysis by investigating the impact of property-headquarter distance on 
investor reactions to property sell-offs by REITs. As a cluster of properties was sold in most of 
sell-off transactions, our distance proxies include mean and median distances from the properties 
being sold to the sell-off firm’s headquarter. By defining nearby (distant) sell-offs as distance 
below (above) median, our univariate analysis suggests that CARs of distant sell-offs are 
significantly lower. By controlling for firm-level characteristics, including fundamentals, sources 
of fund and use of fund, as well as deal-level characteristics in multivariate analyses, we find that 
positive reactions are associated with nearer property sales.7    
The sell-off decisions at firm-level are endogenous and subject to selection bias as firms 
are self-selected to be sellers. One commonly used approach to mitigate this concern is to construct 
a matched sample of non-sell-off firms by using propensity score matching to control for firm 
characteristics.  However, selection bias may also occur at property-level because assets being sold 
might be fundamentally different than those being held. We address this problem with a two-stage 
sequential decision making process. In the first stage, we estimate the likelihood of firm-level asset 
sell-offs.  In the second stage we estimate the likelihood of property-level sell-offs, conditional on 
firm-level sell-off decision. Our matched sample is constructed based on joint probabilities, which 
is the product of the firm-level sell-off probability and the property-level conditional probability. 
                                                          
6 A comprehensive list of U.S. equity REITs identified by NAREIT can be downloaded from Dr. S. McKay Price’s 
website: http://www.mckayprice.com/research.html. We construct our dataset in a similar manner to Feng, Price and 
Sirmans (2011). 
7 To be sure that this is not driven by outliers, we sort the data by quartiles: the positive reactions uniformly declined 
as distance increases. 
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This research design could help mitigate the double selection bias at both firm-level and property-
level. 
The univariate investigation of firm and property characteristics confirm that there is a 
large heterogeneity between sell-off firms and control firms. Within sell-off firms, the properties 
that being sold are quite different than those being held. We find consistent results with Landier et 
al (2009) that firms adopt a “pecking order” and are more likely to sell distant properties than 
nearby properties. Based on a matched sample controlling for both firm-level and property-level 
heterogeneity, we conclude that investors react more negatively to distant sales and managerial 
alignment effect dominates. Our results are robust to different discrete choice models (logit and 
probit), different matched samples (i.e. based on firm-level, and both firm-level and property-level 
only), different weights (by number of sell-off and by holding properties), and different model 
specifications.  
Population size might contain valuable information regarding the managerial alignment 
effect because of managerial visibility or scale of monitoring effect. Therefore, to further examine 
the role of social factors, we divide our matched sample into subsamples of large- and small-
population. Consistent with Landier et al. (2009), we find that social factors only affect post sell-
off stock performance of firms headquartered in less populated counties, where managers are more 
visible. 8  We also employ local (city or state-level) union power as a proxy for employee 
friendliness and find that REITs located in areas with high union power ex ante are more likely to 
adopt geographically focused strategy. 
                                                          
8 This confirms our prediction that managerial alignment effect and information asymmetry effect are not mutually 
exclusive. In less populated areas, managerial alignment effect dominates information asymmetry effect. 
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Lastly, market participants could be confident with negotiating deals from further distance 
because more observable settled deals are available to the market participants mitigate information 
concern. This possible link between market depth and distance would be driven by information 
asymmetry but could also predict a negative relation between market reaction to property sale and 
sell-off distance to HQs. We take advantage of our property-level dataset and find that there is 
virtually no relation between selloff distance and market depth. 
This study makes several important contributions. First, although the effects of information 
asymmetry have been extensively examined, the effects of managerial alignment have not. 
Information asymmetry hypothesis and managerial alignment hypothesis offer opposite 
predictions on the relation between geographic dispersion and firm value. The setting of REIT sell-
offs is uniquely suited in testing these two competing effects as real estate is a sector subject to 
high information asymmetry and soft information plays an important role when cash flows are 
driven by local market with high idiosyncratic risks and when information about the true value 
cannot be cheaply hardened. Although these two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, our 
findings favor managerial alignment effect, and complement Landier et al (2009)’s finding 
suggesting that the managerial decisions are crucial in determining the balance between 
shareholders and social concerns on reputation and employees.  
Second, our unique sample of asset sell-offs by REITs with detailed information on more 
than 800,000 property-year observations spanning a ten-year sample period provides us an 
opportunity to investigate the double endogeneity and selection bias problems at both firm-level 
and property-level using a sequential choice model. We believe this is the first study to address 
this issue in the literature of asset sales and the REIT literature. 
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Third, although prior studies in real estate suggest that REITs tend to be more property-
type focused and location-focused, and many find that more property-type focused REITs value 
more than property-type diversified firms, they fail to find that it is the case in location-focused 
firms (see, for example, Cronqvist, Hogfeldt, and Nilsson, 2001). Our findings propose a new 
perspective and suggest that one should take into consideration managerial alignment with 
shareholders’ benefit.   
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly discuss the 
relevant literature. In section 3, sample construction and variable measurement are described. In 
Section 4, empirical results that test the two effects’ implications are reported. Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
 This study is related to several strands of literature. First, information concern has long 
been recognized as an important driving force of individual and corporate decisions. The effect of 
information asymmetry have received much attention since Peterson (2004), which classified 
information sources into hard vis-a-vis soft information. He argues that information concern arises 
when soft information, which cannot be easily quantified and is personal, dominates in a particular 
market. For example, in the banking industry, credit decisions are made based upon information 
collected over time through frequent and personal contacts with the borrower (Petersen and Rajan, 
2002; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Knyazeva and Knyazeva, 2012). Since the term, “soft 
information”, is innovated by Petersen (2004), its existence and effect have been noticed and 
discussed in many prior studies. For instance, issues such as “Home Bias” and “Local Bias” have 
received a lot of attention in the finance literature (French and Poterba, 1991; Huberman, 2001; 
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Bodnaruk, 2009). A central argument of these studies is that investors tend to ignore diversification 
benefits and invest in the familiar.  
One may doubt if such facts still exist as technologies that facilitate information 
transmission become more mature nowadays. Based on the recent literature such as Bernile, 
Kumar and Sulaeman (2015), however, the hardening of information doesn’t fully resolve the 
“Home Bias” and “Local Bias”.9 One potential explanation is that certain components of soft 
information are heavily dependent on social interactions, which is personal and hard to quantify. 
This is especially true for the real estate industry, where assets are highly illiquid and information 
consideration is significant (Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004). 
Eichholtz, Holtermans and Yonder (2015, hereby EHY) and Liu, Gallimore and Wiley 
(2015, hereby LGW) are among the first to examine the role of investor proximity, or investors’ 
preference for local assets, in commercial real estate markets. 10  EHY’s thesis argues that 
geographic diversification presents no free lunch for office investors. That is, there is a tradeoff 
between risk reduction associated with diversification and lower rent in the presence of market 
frictions, i.e., information asymmetry. And office investors are segmented by geographic distance 
because they have difference preference for risk taking. 
LGW examine the same research question, but from a different perspective. To be specific, 
LGW examine the change, instead of the level, of office investors’ property holdings. That is, they 
look at acquisitions and dispositions of offices by local and nonlocal investors. Contrary to EHY, 
LGW document that nonlocal investors overpay (by about 14%) because of both information 
                                                          
9 Hardening of information refers to the question of whether information can be interpreted and coded into a numeric 
score (or scores) (Petersen, 2004, pp. 6). For a comprehensive review of possible consequences of the hardening of 
information on both financial markets and institutions, one can refer to Petersen (2004). 
10 Lambson (2004) examines buyer proximity in residential real estate markets. 
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asymmetry (measured by investor-property distance) and anchoring (measured by rent difference), 
and sell at a (7%) discount because of information asymmetry. The selloff discount is more severe 
when nonlocals sell to locals.11 
Second, our evidence suggests that social factors are important and shape corporate 
decisions (Wang, 2012; John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva, 2011). Introduced by geographical 
locations, these social factors affect firms’ operation and thus shareholder wealth. For instance, 
Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) argue that proximity to employees leads to misalignment of 
managerial incentives with shareholder objectives because managers interact more frequently with 
nearby employees. They find that in-state divestitures of a firm’s entities lead to positive and 
significant ex post stock performance when the firm’s headquarter is located in a less populated 
county. They give rise to the conflict of interest between stakeholders and shareholders, which is 
further explored in John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2011). In addition, the amount of population 
affects firm’s corporate governance through proximity to the firm’s headquarter because of larger 
pools of director talent. Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) find that population is positively 
correlated with local director pool and thus the monitoring effect on firm’s management. A recent 
paper by Ang, Jong, and Poel (2014) find that CEOs’ divestments of familiar segments generate 
1.2% higher abnormal returns and the greater returns are particularly pronounced for divestments 
of direct-experience segments by more entrenched CEOs. 
Finally, our study contributes to the mixed evidence found on diversification discount of 
listed firms. “Diversification discount” attracts a lot of attentions in the finance and real estate 
literature. It is defined as “the fact that the average diversified firm has been worth less than a 
                                                          
11 We don’t find a significant discount for REITs. 
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portfolio of comparable single-segment firms” (Lang and Stulz, 1994, pp. 36). Several 
explanations to diversification discount are proposed. First, firm-level diversification may provide 
more benefits to managers than it does to shareholders (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Second, internal 
capital markets in conglomerates transfer funds across divisions in a suboptimal manner (Lamont, 
1997; Whited, 2001). Third, diversified firms are less transparent and more difficult to analyze. 
Therefore, their underlying stocks are less liquid and have lower value.  
REITs provide a suitable laboratory to study the “diversification discount” issue because 
REITs are less heterogeneous than conventional firms and the underlying assets, real estate, are 
less opaque than other revenue generating assets. Capozza and Seguin (1999) note that a focused 
strategy is likely to be a “double-edged sword”. On the one hand, firms adopt focused strategy see 
their value increases due to the increased liquidity provided by increase in focus. On the other 
hand, focused strategy might cause variability in income stream of a focused firm and thus higher 
interest rates. And this phenomenon could be severe when a firm is highly levered or invested in 
illiquid assets such as real estate.  
The “diversification discount” on property type has been found in several recent studies 
such as Cronquist, Hogfeldt, and Nilsson (2001) and Ro and Ziobrowski (2012). However, 
evidence on the “diversification discount” on geographic dispersion of REITs’ underlying 
properties is mixed (Hartzell, Sun, and Titman, 2014). Moreover, failure to notice endogeneity 
issue and could potentially bias the results found in previous studies.12  
                                                          
12 For instance, Lamont and Polk (2001) argue that poor performers may be more likely to diversify in an attempt to 
increase value. Similarly, Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003) also notice that a weakness of the diversification 
literature in Real Estate is that there are few studies that examine the relation between shareholder wealth and events 
that significantly alter expectations regarding the firm’s level of diversification or focus. Such studies are required to 
address the possible problem of self-selection and endogeneity in the data similar to those that have been noted in the 
finance literature. Therefore, using well-specified self-selection models to capture ex-ante expectations on firms’ self-
selection process and to mitigate endogeneity issue is important. 
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3. Sample Construction and Variable Measurement 
3.1. Sample Construction 
3.1.1. Sell-off Events  
We search in Factiva to collect news announcements on property sales by REITs. Factiva 
applies Intelligent Indexing® in order to assign unique company codes to Dow Jones News Search 
(DJNS) articles that represent the companies that are the subject of the articles. Because of the 
Intelligent Indexing, Factiva is considered effective in identifying articles relevant to specific 
companies. By conducting rigours search in (1) Wall Street Journal, (2) Dow Jones Newswire and 
(3) Business Wires, we gather 1,271 articles on property sell-offs from January 1, 2003 to 
December 31, 2013 by all the US Equity REITs included in the FTSE National Association of 
Real Estate Investment Trusts  (NAREIT) US equity REIT Index.  
We follow Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2006) and focus on property sell-offs with total 
value greater than $20 million. For each property sale, we define an event date as the first trading 
day that the sell-off announcement appears in any of the three forth-mentioned publications if the 
announcement is made prior to 3:59 pm. If the announcement is made after 3:59 pm, we use the 
next trading day as the event date. Events are deleted if there are any other major corporate 
announcements during the event window. The sample selection process gives us 161 property sell-
offs. We delete 8 observations without property-level information. 154 sell-offs are used in our 
baseline regressions. 
3.1.2. REIT Underlying Properties 
We construct a comprehensive panel data of historical property holdings at REIT-property-
year level based on the SNL Financial database, Factiva news search on property acquisitions and 
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dispositions and on REITs mergers and acquisitions. Specifically, we start with the most current 
property holdings by all the REITs and track backward with historical property acquisitions and 
dispositions. To account for delisted and newly listed REITs, we follow Feng, Price and Sirmans 
(2011) and manually construct a comprehensive list of US public equity REITs identified by 
NAREIT from 1993-2015. Our sample is comprised of all equity REITs that are constituents of 
the FTSE NAREIT US equity REIT Index.13  
Our final sample includes 3,797 firm-year observations and 344,010 firm-property-year 
observations from 2003 to 2013. We further divide our sample into two groups, sell-off firms and 
non-sell-off firms. Our non-sell-off sample for testing the propensity of firm-level asset sell-offs 
includes all REIT-years except REITs that are in the sell-off sample. There are 100 firm-year and 
1,157 property-firm-year observations (3,697 firm-year and 332,853 property-firm-year 
observations) in the sell-off sample (non-sell-off sample).14  
3.1.3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) and Control Variables 
We compute CARs using CRSP value weighted market index, excess returns of small caps 
over big caps (SMB), excess returns of value over growth (HML), and momentum factor as 
systemic risk factor loadings. We follow Wiley (2013) and use an estimation period that includes 
one year of stock returns and ends 50 trading days before the event window. Event windows 
include (1) a trading day before the asset sale until the trading day (-1, 0), (2) the trading day when 
the asset sale occurs (0, 0), (3) the trading day when the asset sale occurs until the trading day after 
(0, +1), (4) the trading days before the asset sale until the trading day after (-1, +1), (5) five trading 
                                                          
13  The FTSE NAREIT US Real Estate index contains all Equity REITs not designated as Timber REITs or 
Infrastructure REITs. 
14  206 property-firm-year observations without information regarding remaining properties held by the sellers 
available are dropped from the full sample of 1,363 property-firm-year observations. 
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days before the asset sale until the trading day before (-5, -1), and (6) five trading days before the 
asset sale until five trading days after the asset sale (-5, +5).  
Data on deal sizes are verified manually by matching Factiva search results with EDGAR 
SEC filings. We obtain stock price data from CRSP and financial data from COMPUSTAT-CRSP 
Merged database, respectively. 
3.2. Distance Proxies 
We calculate a firm-property-year distance, dijt, for each underlying property j sold or held 
by firm i in year t. Firm-property distances need to be aggregated for each transaction as there are 
more than one underlying property for each REIT-year and multiple properties sold in a sell-off 
transaction. Firm-year distance is calculated by taking the arithmetic mean and median of all firm-
property distances for each firm-year or sell-off using the following expressions 
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖(𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡),                         (1)                                 
where dijt represents the firm-property distance in year t, n equals to the number of 
properties sold or held by firm i.  
4. Results 
4.1. Asset Sell-offs and Market Reactions 
Table 1 summarizes the annual frequency of property sell-offs, total value and average deal 
size from 2003 to 2013. There are 161 transactions with a total value of approximately $33 billion. 
The average deal size is $204 million. The number of sell-offs and the average deal size plummeted 
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around the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 and 2009. In unreported results, there are 68 
unique sellers (defined by their CRSP PERMNO), of which 32 appear only once and 17 appear 
more than three times.  
In Table 2, we divide our sample by property type and by their stated use of proceeds 
announced in the publications. The largest group by property type is office and industrial properties 
(41%). Most of the sell-off firms (45%) do not announce the use of sale proceeds. Among sell-offs 
with stated purposes, the largest group is to reduce debt (18.6%). Only 2.5% (1.9%) of sell-offs 
are to distribute dividends (to repurchase shares). In our sample, the breakdown by property type 
is qualitatively similar to Campbell et al. (2006), which examine equity REIT property sell-offs 
between 1992 and 2002. However, the breakdown by the use of sale proceeds is different from 
Campbell et al. (2006) as the largest group in our more recent sample is fund acquisition.  
Panel A of Table 3 shows summary statistics CARs based on six different event windows, 
(-1,0), (0,0), (0,1), (-1,1), (-5,5) and (-5,0), which represent the one-day before, one-day, one-day 
ahead, three-day, eleven-day, and six-day windows, respectively. All CARs are positive and 
significant at 1% level except for the six-day window. Compared the CAR magnitude with prior 
studies, the mean in three-day window (-1, 1) is 1.18%, which is very close to the finding in 
Glascock, Davison and Sirmans (1991) and is greater than 0.8% reported in Campbell et al. 
(2006.).15  
In Panel B, we separate our asset sales into two groups based on the distribution of 
distances from disposed properties to their headquarters. If the distance of a disposed property is 
                                                          
15 In unreported results, we find that, consistent with Campbell et al (2006), the average CAR in three-day window is 
significantly positive for sales that are not structured as Section 1031 transactions while there is no evidence of CAR 
for Section 1031 transactions. 
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greater than the sample median, it is assigned to the below-median group. Otherwise, it is assigned 
to the above-median group. If the deal consists of multiple properties, we use the average distance.  
By comparing CARs of sell-offs with relatively short distance (in the below-median group) 
and that with relatively large distance (in the above-median group), we find that CARs of nearby 
sell-offs are positively significant while that of distant sell-offs are statistically insignificant. The 
t-statistics (=2.00) of mean difference and z-statistics (=1.69) of rank-sum tests (for median 
difference) between these two groups are significant. Unreported results suggest a similar pattern 
in all windows.16 It reveals that the abnormal returns of sell-offs are higher if disposed properties 
are located in a relatively short distance from the headquarter location of its holding company, in 
favor of the managerial alignment explanation. By further separating our asset sales into four 
distance quartiles, Panel C confirms the negative relation between distance and CAR as we observe 
a monotonically decreasing pattern across distance quartiles.  
The finding of a negative relation between market reaction to property sales and the 
distance of sell-off properties to their HQs is new and complements previous studies such as 
Hartzell, Sun, and Titman (2014), who find evidence of regional diversification discount of REITs 
utilizing a sample of equity REITs over the 1995-2003 period.  
Hartzell, Sun, and Titman (2014) also suggest that the regional diversification discount is 
mitigated when institutions have a greater equity stake as institutions monitor the REITs more 
effectively than retail investors. We predict that firms located in areas with larger population has 
stronger monitoring effect as population can be used as an approximation of the size of potential 
                                                          
16 In unreported results, for each property-year, we define Distant as an indicator variable that takes value of one if it 
is located above median distance of the other underlying properties. For multiple property sales, we calculate aggregate 
this variable at deal level by taking the average. We investigate the sub-sample of CARs with Distant above median 
and that below median and find similar results.    
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director pool (Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis, 2013); therefore, benefits to the shareholders 
associated with local selloffs is smaller. To test this prediction, we sort CARs over three-day 
window into different subgroups based upon four distance quartiles and median local population, 
which is measured by the population of the county where a REIT is headquartered.17  
In Panel D, our results suggest that the positive relation between selloff CARs and 
geographic proximity only exists among REITs headquartered in counties with population below 
sample median (Small Population). There is no such relation for REITs headquartered in counties 
with population above sample median (Large Population). Moreover, CARs are larger for Small 
Population group than for Large Population group in the first three distance quartiles. 
In an alternative measure of monitoring based on population, we follow Loughran and 
Schultz (2005) and define a REIT as in a “top-ten” MSA if its headquarter is in one of the ten 
largest metropolitan areas of the U.S. according to the 2010 Census.18 We define the rest of the 
REITs in our sample as in “non-top-ten” MSAs. Information asymmetry concern is likely to be 
more severe among firms in smaller MSAs than those in larger ones due to the lack of monitoring 
effect. Consistent with Panel D, results in Panel E suggest that the negative relation between CARs 
and distance only exists among property selloffs by non-top-ten-MSA REITs.   
 As business cycle might exert different effects on small and on big MSAs and potentially 
drive the previously documented results, in Panel F, we use the fall of Lehman Brothers (May 28, 
2009) as the cutting point. Selloffs occur prior to May 28, 2009 are defined as Pre-Recession 
                                                          
17 We also divide the selloff CARs into different subgroups four distance quartiles and small-, medium-, and large-
population groups. We find that the monotonic declining relation between CARs and distance only exists among the 
small-population group. The results are reported in Panel E. 
18 Loughran and Schultz (2005) define firms as urban, small-city or rural based on their location relative to the largest 
MSAs in terms of population. 
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selloffs; the rest of the selloffs are defined as Post-Recession selloffs. We did not find too much 
evidence that our previous findings are affected by business cycle: Small (non-top-ten) MSA 
selloffs experienced a decline in CARs during the post-recession period but such effect does not 
exist in large (top-ten) MSA selloffs. 
4.2. The Impact of Distance on Market Reactions – OLS Regressions of CARs on the 
Determinants of Abnormal returns 
To further investigate the heterogeneity among sell-off firms, our next step is to conduct 
multivariate analysis controlling for firm-level and deal-level characteristics. We follow Wiley 
(2013) and perform three sets of tests based on firm-level determinants of CARs: (1) fundamentals, 
(2) source of fund and (3) use of fund. In addition, we add tests based on deal-level characteristics 
as documented in the literature (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Campbell et al., 2006; Wiley et 
al., 2010; Wiley, 2013). We report summary statistics of these determinants in Table 4 Panel A 
and regression results in Panel B, C, D and E. 
4.2.1 Fundamentals 
 The difference in market reactions are driven by differences in firm fundamentals. The 
model of the impact of distance on market reactions with firm fundamentals is   
 𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 +
                            𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐶 + 𝜀,                       (2) 
 where Distance Proxies include average and median firm-property distance described in 
Equation (1).  Cash is cash and short-term investments (CHE) divided by total assets (AT). Firm 
Size is the quarterly reported book value of total assets (AT) in millions of USD. Return on assets 
(ROA) is expressed as the quarterly net income (NI) over total assets (AT). Debt equals to the sum 
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of total long-term debt (DLTT) and debt in current liabilities (DLC) divided by total assets (AT). 
Coverage is interest coverage ratio, which equals income before extraordinary items (IB) divided 
by the sum of preferred dividends (DVP) and interest and related expenses (XINT). Tobin’s Q 
equals total book assets (AT) plus the market cap (PRCC_C*CSHO) minus common equity (CEQ), 
all divided by total book assets (AT).  DC is an indicator variable which equals one if a firm’s 
coverage ratio is below the sample median in the last fiscal quarter prior to the announcement, and 
zero otherwise. All the fundamental variables are lagged. 
 Table 4 Panel A presents summary statistics and Panel B includes regression results of the 
relation between investor reactions and underlying property distance to the selling REIT’s 
headquarter. In both Model (1) and (2), the coefficient estimates of distance proxies are negative 
and statistically significant, controlling for firm fundamentals. The effect is also economically 
significant: one standard deviation increase in average (median) distance decreases CARs by 117 
(114) basis points from the mean (median).19 
Coefficient estimates of control variables have expected signs and are consistent across 
model specifications. Since we restrict our analysis to the short event window (3 days) and avoid 
property selloffs coincide with other events, i.e., mergers and acquisitions, coefficient estimates 
on most ex ante fundamental return predictors are insignificant. There is a positive and statistically 
significant relation between CAR and pre-announcement debt ratio. Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) 
suggest that asset sale may help avoid recapitalization costs that would have to be paid to raise 
funds on capital markets when the firm’s debt overhang is large. Therefore, lower cost of 
                                                          
19 From Table 4, Panel A, the standard deviation of average (median) distance is 0.961 (1.001); from Table 4, Panel 
B, the coefficient estimate on average (median) distance is -1.216 (-1.142). Therefore, one standard deviation change 
in average (median) distance leads to -1.216 * 0.961= 1.17 (-1.142 * 1.001= 1.14) percent, or 117 (114) basis points 
from the mean (median), decrease in CAR. 
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refinancing might explain the positive relation between CAR and pre-announcement debt ratio. 
On the other hand, the positive relation between CAR and pre-announcement debt ratio could also 
be explained by lower agency cost if debt plays a useful role in disciplining management. 
The results based on continuous distance measures might be driven by outliners. As a result, 
we use an alternative binary measure of distance, Nearby, which equals to 1 if median distance in 
Equation (1) is less than the sample median of the 154 selloff observations and 0 otherwise. In 
Model (3), we find that Nearby dummy is positively associated with the abnormal returns. This 
finding indicates that our previous results based on the other distance measures are robust and 
supports the managerial alignment hypothesis. 
4.2.2 Sources of Fund and Use of Fund 
 In addition to ex ante firm’s fundamentals, sources of funds and use of funds are also likely 
to affect ex post sell-off stock performance. For instance, Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) find 
that firms paying out the proceeds are typically poor performers and highly levered firms. Lang, 
Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) address the importance of both sets of variables. They suggest that 
managers are self-interest individuals who pursue their own objectives and are likely to be empire 
builders. Empirically testing managerial alignment involves both sources of funds and use of funds. 
Therefore, including these two sets of variables as control variables help disentangle the effects of 
our distance measures, firm’s fundamentals, and firm’s financing and investment activities.  
Consistent with the literature (e.g. Wiley, 2013), we conduct analysis with sources of funds 
and use of funds as control variables separately. We control for funding generated from the 
proceeds of an asset sale and/or from the capital markets. The model of the impact of distance on 
market reactions with sources of funds is  
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𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠 +
                            𝛽5𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀,                         (3) 
 where Distance Proxies and Selloff are defined the same as Section 4.2.1. Gain is the 
reported gain or loss generated from the sale of property (SRET). Debt Issues is the total new long-
term debt issued (DLTISY). Equity Issues is the total proceeds from the sale of common and 
preferred stock (SSTKY). All the sources of fund variables are lagged. 
 Next, we address the question how funding raised in the previous step is spent. Funding 
can be used to retire debt, to distribute as preferred and/or common dividends, and/or to invest in 
new projects. Therefore, we follow Wiley (2013) and include potential usage of funds as control 
variables in our analysis. The model of the impact of distance on market reactions with use of 
funds is 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 +
                            𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
                            𝛽6𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀,                                                                                 (4) 
where Distance Proxies and Selloff are defined the same as Section 4.2.1. Delta Debt is the 
difference in debt reduction (DLTRY) from the previous fiscal year (t-2) divided by total long-
term debt (DLTTY), in the last fiscal year prior to the sell-off announcement (t-1). Delta preferred 
equals the difference in preferred dividends paid (DVPY) from the previous fiscal year (t-2) 
divided by total liabilities (LT). Delta common equity equals the difference in cash dividends paid 
(DVY) from previous fiscal year (t-2), divided by the market cap (PRCC_C*CSHO). Delta 
investment equals the difference in increased investments (IVLTY). 
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Results in Panel C and D of Table 4 conform the negative relation between property-HQ 
distance and market reaction to property sell-offs: the coefficient estimates of different distance 
measures are negative in all the model specification. The coefficients of continuous distance 
measures are smaller compared with those in Panel B. The coefficient estimates of control 
variables associated with the sources of funds and use of funds have consistent signs as in Wiley 
(2013) but are statistically insignificant.20 
4.2.3 Deal-level Characteristics   
 For each transaction, we hand collected detailed information on the purpose of the sale and 
the usage of sale proceeds which is unarguably important as it affects investors’ prospect on the 
asset sell-off and thus can affect post sell-off stock performance. The model of the impact of 
distance on market reactions with deal-level dummies and firm’s fundamentals is  
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 +
                            𝛽4𝑈𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐷 + 𝛽5𝑈𝑅𝐿𝑇𝐷 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑎𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 +
                            𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽10𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽12𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
                            𝛽14𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄 + 𝛽15𝐷𝐶,                                                          (5) 
where Distance Proxies, Selloff, and fundamental variables (Cash, lnrsize, ROA, dassets, 
Coverage, Tobin’s Q, and DC) are defined the same as Section 4.2.1. Deal Size equals to the 
transaction price divided by total book assets (AT). Geographic Focus is an indicator variable 
equals to 1 if the stated goal of a particular asset sale is geographic focus and 0 otherwise. URSTD 
(URLTD) is an indicator variable equals to 1 if proceeds from sale are announced to be used to 
                                                          
20 There are two potential explanations for this. First, Wiley (2013) use abnormal returns over intermediate window 
(5 weeks) as dependent variable but we follow Campbell et al. (2006) and use abnormal returns over the short horizon 
(3 days) as dependent variable. Second, Wiley (2013) focus on apartment and office properties through 2010, but our 
sample covers all major types of properties through 2013. 
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reduce short-term (long-term) debt. Pay Dividend is an indicator variable equals to 1 if proceeds 
from sale are announced to be distributed as dividends. Prior studies suggest that distributing 
dividends to shareholders may signal either the seller’s financial solvency, or a less-entrenched 
management team, or both. EXCH is an indicator variable equals to 1 if 1031 tax-free exchange is 
used. Recession is an indicator variable equals to 1 if announcement date is in the recession period 
defined by NBER US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions.21 
In Panel E with more controls of deal level characteristics, we find that the negative relation 
between CAR and the proximity of sell-off properties to their HQs is still robust. The magnitude 
of the coefficients are very similar to those in Panel C and D, even controlling for Geographic 
Focus, whether the purpose of a particular sale is to increase the geographic focus of the selling 
REIT. Regarding deal-level indicators, we find that market reactions are positively associated with 
the application of sale proceeds to the retirement of short-term debt (URSTD), deal size (Deal Size) 
and Pay Dividend dummy.   
4.3. Matched Sample based on Two-stage Sequential Model of Asset Sell-off Decisions    
Although our cross-sectional regression results in Section 4.2 suggest that investors react 
more positively to sell-offs of nearby assets, controlling a large set of aspects that might affect the 
abnormal returns of asset sell-offs, selection bias may occur at firm-level because we only observe 
the market reaction-distance relation among firms that self-select to be sellers. For example, firms 
that are more financially constraint, holding more geographically dispersed properties are more 
likely to become sellers. A possible solution is to construct a matched sample of firms with similar 
characteristics of sell-off firms. 
                                                          
21 http://www.nber.org/cycles.html 
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However, one complication arises because, given that a sell-off is likely at firm-level, 
selection bias may occur at property-level because assets being sold maybe fundamentally 
different than those being hold. For example, it is well-documented in literature that REITs tend 
to specialize in operating a single type of property or in a more focused geographic area (Capozza 
and Seguin (1999), Campbell, Petrova, and Sirmans (2003), Hartzell, Sun, and Titman (2014), Ro 
and Ziobrowski (2012)). If an underlying property is of a different type from the majority of the 
other holding properties or is located in a distant area compared with the majority, it is more likely 
to be sold. As a result, the typical firm-level matching is not sufficient to mitigate this endogeneity 
problem.  
Our matching sample is constructed based on a two-stage sequential decision making 
process, in which the first stage is to estimate the likelihood of asset sell-off occurs at firm-level 
and the second stage is to estimate, conditional on the firm-level sell-off, the likelihood of a 
property being sold within the firm. Next, the joint probability is the product of firm-level sell-off 
probability and the property-level conditional probability as follows 
𝑃(𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 = 1)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3
𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+
                                                  𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 +
                                                  𝛽7𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 +
                                                  𝛽10𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  ε, 
                                                                                                                                           (6) 
𝑃(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 1|𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 = 1)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +
                                                   𝛾3𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 + 𝛾4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑗 + 𝛾5𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑗 + 𝛾5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑗 +
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                                                   𝛾6𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗 + 𝛾7𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗 + 𝛾8𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗 +
                                                   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  ε,            (7) 
where  𝑃(𝑝𝑝𝑡 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 1, 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 = 1)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the joint probability that property j is disposed 
by firm i in year t, 𝑃(𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 = 1)𝑖,𝑡  is the probability of sell-off by firm i in year t,   
𝑃(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 1|𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 = 1)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the conditional probability that property j hold by firm i is 
disposed, given that 𝑃(𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 = 1)𝑖,𝑡 = 1.  
Firm-level determinants of asset sale are selected based on prior studies and include Size, 
ROA, FFO/TA, Debt Ratio, Tobin’s Q, Cash, Sales Growth, Coverage, Momentum and DC. 
FFO/TA is the ratio of funds from operations (FFO) to total assets (AT). Sales Growth is the annual 
percentage change in total revenue (REVT). The remaining variables are the same as in Equation 
(2). For property-level characteristics, Nearby is a dummy variable that takes one if the distance 
of a property been sold (held) to seller’s headquarter is less than the sample median and zero 
otherwise. Diverse is a dummy variable that equals one if the property type of the property been 
sold (held) is different from seller’s property type and zero otherwise. Hold Time describes how 
many years has a property been held by a particular seller. Office, Retail, Multifamily, Industrial, 
Health Care, Hotel and Others are indicator variables of property types. CRSP permanent security 
identification numbers (PERMNOs) are used to identify property sellers.  
Table 5 presents the comparison between firm-level and property-level characteristics of 
sell-off firms with that of non-sell-off firms. The last two columns report t-test statistics of the 
mean differences between sell-off firms and non-sell-off firms and their significance. The “Firm-
level” comparison suggests a stark difference between these two groups: sell-off firms are larger, 
have better operating performance prior to the sell-off, hold more debt and less cash, consistent 
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with Campbell et al. (2006) and Warusawitharana (2008). These comparisons are statistically 
significant. The “Property-level” comparison suggests that the sell-off firms adopt a “pecking 
order” and tend to dispose distant properties (Landier, Nair and Wulf, 2009; Peterson and Rajan, 
2002; and Peterson, 2004). If the underlying property is different from the majority, it is more 
likely to be disposed. In addition, sell-off firms tend to hold properties for a shorter period of time. 
Breaking down the underlying properties by type, there is a large discrepancy in property 
compositions between sell-off firms and control firms. REITs are more likely to dispose of office 
and industrial properties. Together, both firm-level and property-level comparisons between sell-
off REITs and control REITs suggest that it is important to control for heterogeneities at firm level 
and property level.  
Table 6 presents our results of two-stage sequential analysis with binary outcome variables. 
Results of the first stage of firm-level sell-off decision in Equation (6) and that of the second stage 
of property-level sell-off decision in Equation (7) are included in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. 
In Column (1), a selloff firm is firstly matched to a non-selloff firm with the closest holding 
distance. Holding distance is defined as the average geographic distance between firm 
headquarters and properties been held. Then we estimate Probit model with the selloff sample and 
distance-matched non-selloff sample (hereby distance-matched model). Therefore, there is no 
property matching corresponding to Column (1). Results based on logit model and Probit model 
are shown in Column (2) and (3), respectively. To accommodate repeated sales, we repeat our 
analysis with the number of properties sold as weights, shown in Column (4) and (5), respectively. 
Results in Panel A suggest that REITs are more likely to become sellers if they are larger, 
have higher ROA, have high debt ratio and less cash. These results are largely consistent with 
Warusawitharana (2008). Based upon his theoretical framework, firms that are exposed to a 
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negative profitability shock find themselves with more assets to reach optimal size.22 In Panel B, 
consistent with REITs pursuing a focusing strategy, properties located near its headquarters and of 
a different type from the majority of the underlying properties are more likely to be sold. In 
addition, industrial properties are more likely to be disposed relative to the other types.  
The results of the two-stage sequential model in Table 6 suggest that there are selection 
problems at both firm level and property level. Our next step is to construct a matched sample of 
properties based on the predicted joint probability that a property j is disposed by firm i in year t, 
which is the product of the predicted probability calculated based on the first-stage estimates in 
Equation (7) (shown in Panel A) and the predicted conditional probability based on the second-
stage estimates in Equation (8) (shown in Panel B) as follows  
𝑃(𝑝𝑝𝑡 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 1, 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 = 1)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡̂ = 𝑃(𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 = 1)𝑖,𝑡̂ × 𝑃(𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑 = 1|𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 = 1)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡̂                                   
(9) 
For a given firm-year, we calculate our propensity score for a given firm-year by 
aggregating the predicted joint probabilities at property-level as an average predicted probability 
as shown below.  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑃(𝑝𝑝𝑡 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑=1,𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟=1)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐽
,                     (10) 
Next, we calculate absolute differences between the average predicted probabilities 
(propensity scores) of firms in our sell-off sample (treatment group) and that in the non-sell-off 
                                                          
22 However, one of our findings contradicts his prediction. We find ex ante profitability positively predicts the 
probability of a property being disposed. One explanation for this is that our sample period coincides with the capital 
recycling phase of REITs (2003-2007), through which REITs became net sellers. Although REITs enjoyed high 
growth and profitability due to property appreciation during this period, the majority of the managers of REITs realized 
the upcoming threat brought by overvalued properties and actively disposed those particular properties. 
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firms. We then rank the absolute differences and keep firms in the non-sell-off sample using the 
nearest neighborhood 1:1 with replacement (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 23  The match is 
performed in year t-1, prior to the sell-off.  
Results based on propensity score matched sample are presented in Table 7. Tests based 
on firm fundamentals, source of fund and use of fund are presented in Panel A, B and C, 
respectively.  In Panel A, we include the sell-off sample (treatment group, as in Panel B of Table 
4) and the control groups constructed using five different propensity score matching methods. We 
use lagged fundamental variables and sell-off dummy as control variables. We regress three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns on Average Distance, Sell-off dummy, and firm’s fundamentals.  
The coefficient estimates of return predictors (fundamentals, sources of funds, and use of 
funds) are largely consistent with results reported in Table 4. It is worthwhile noting that the 
distance measure, Average Distance, is the average of all the firm-property distances prior to the 
asset sell-off. The coefficient estimates for Average Distance are negative and statistically 
significant. ROA, which is defined the same as previously, has negative and significant coefficient 
only when distance-matched model is applied to construct our control sample. This is potentially 
due to the bad match by simply distance-matched model, which ignores property-level information. 
Dassets has positive and significant coefficient estimates under distance-matched and Probit 
Model weighted by the number of underlying properties. This is consistent with the financing 
hypothesis of asset sales to some extent. We use sources and use of funds variables as control 
                                                          
23 We repeat our tests using (1) nearest neighbor 1:1 with replacement, (2) nearest neighbor 1:1 without replacement, 
(3) nearest neighbor 1:3 without replacement and (4) a sample including all firms within the region of common support 
of their propensity scores. Results are qualitatively similar. 
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variables in Panel B and C, respectively, and find that our results on distance are robust to the 
inclusion of different control variables. 
4.4. What Explains the Negative Relation between Distance and CARs 
 In the previous sections, we conclude a negative relation between post sell-off stock return 
and distance measures, suggesting a dominant role of managerial alignment. In this section, we 
investigate the role of social factors (local union power, population, etc.) and managerial concern 
for employees as documented in Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009). High local union power 
(employee friendliness) might lead to distortions in management’s incentive to maximize 
shareholder wealth, due to the managerial concern for nearby employees. Therefore, REITs located 
in ex ante high union power area are likely to hold properties within local or proximate areas ex 
post. Population size is important for at least two reasons. First, Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) 
find that the managerial alignment effect only exists in small towns, where managers are likely to 
be more visible. Moreover, larger population size indicates larger pools of local director talent, 
therefore better monitoring effect (Knyazeva, Knyazeva and Masulis, 2013). Therefore, we 
evaluate if the effect of proximity on post sell-off stock performance varies by size of community. 
In other words, we explore if the proximity-firm value linkage is stronger when the manager is 
more visible in the community.24 
4.4.1. Labor Union Power and Geographic Concentration 
 As stated in Landier, Nair, and Wulf (2009), geographic dispersion of firms is related to 
corporate actions such as employee friendliness and divestitures. Proximity between a firm’s 
headquarters location and its division locations can cause misalignment of interest between 
                                                          
24 Landier, Nair and Wulf (2009) use the population of the county in which the headquarters is located as a measure 
of size of community. We use the same definition in our study. 
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managers and shareholders because of more frequent interactions between managers and nearby 
employees. This proximity can cause detrimental effect on shareholder wealth. In this section, we 
tests whether geographical concentration and employee friendliness are related. Similar to Landier 
et al (2009), we regress Geographic HHI, a geographic concentration measure, on Union Power, 
a measure of employee friendliness. Union Power is the state-level union coverage (membership) 
density adopted from Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). Geographic HHI is a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index that measures the geographic concentration of a firm’s property holdings. We calculate this 
measure based on Hartzell, Sun and Titman (2014) as, 
Herfindahl Index (HHI) = ∑ 𝑃𝐼
2𝐼
𝑖=1 ,             (11) 
where 𝑃𝑖 is the proportion of a REIT’s properties located in geographic location (city) i. In 
other words, we examine how property management teams can exert influence on managers ex 
post via its proximity to the firm’s headquarter location. The regression coefficient estimates are 
reported in Table 8. 
 We find a positive and significant relation between Geographic HHI and Union Power, 
which confirms our prediction that high Union Power ex ante lead to misalignment of interest 
between managers and shareholders, whereby managers are more likely to dispose distant assets 
relative to nearby ones. The outcome of this misalignment of interest is captured by the higher 
geographic proximity between a particular firm headquarters location and properties held ex post.  
4.4.2. Population and Effect of Distance on CAR 
 To explore the driving force behind the negative relation between CAR and distance 
measures, we focus on population around a particular firm’s headquarter location. There are at 
least two reasons for us to examine population. First, as mentioned in Landier, Nair, and Wulf 
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(2009), managers are more visible in small population communities where social factors are likely 
to play an important role. If the effect of distance on CAR is purely information driven, one should 
not expect to find different results. Second, monitoring effect on managers is stronger in large 
population communities relative to small ones because population are positively correlated with 
director pool. The monitoring effect from directors strengthens corporate governance and mitigates 
misalignment of interest between managers and shareholders (Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis 
(2013)). Both reasons indicate that the effect of distance on CAR should be more prominent in 
small population communities relative to large ones. 
To empirically test these implications, in Table 9 we divide our matched sample into high 
and low population sample (Less population=0 and 1, respectively) by comparing the population 
around a particular firm’s headquarter to the sample median population. Population data is 
obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau in the year 2010 at county level. Consistent with our 
predictions, the effect of distance on CAR becomes more negative and significant for low 
population sample. However, we didn’t find any evidence for high population sample. This finding 
further supports our previous results that both informational and social factors are important in 
affecting post sell-off stock returns via proximity and this effect is more robust among low 
population firms relative to high population ones.  
4.4.3. Market Depth as an Alternative Explanation that Supports Information Asymmetry 
 Our results are supportive of managerial alignment effect in the literature, especially for 
firms that are located in less-populated MSAs. However, one could argue that the negative relation 
between market reaction to asset sales and property-HQ distance might be affected by market 
depth, which is essentially driven by information asymmetry. For example, even when the sell-off 
properties are far from the HQ, the information asymmetry could be low in an active market if 
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there are abundant sales transactions and comparables. If it is the case, finding a negative relation 
between CAR and distance of disposed properties to their HQs becomes a story about information 
dissemination and is irrelevant to managerial alignment.  
To investigate this issue, we take advantage of our property-level dataset and conduct 
analysis to see whether the selloff distance is determined by market depth. In Appendix 1, Panel 
A and B, we use two proxies for market depth (total appraisal value and total number of properties 
sold). We would expect a positive relation between market depth and average selloff distance 
within a certain MSA if more observable settled deals available to the market participants mitigate 
information concern, and market participants are confident with negotiating deals from further 
distance.  
 Based upon Appendix 1, Panel A and B, we do not observe a clear pattern that average 
selloff distance increases with more properties sold, either in terms of total appraisal value or total 
number of properties. For instance, New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA MSA ranked 
highest in terms of total appraisal value ($2,538 million). However, the average selloff distance is 
only around 848 kilometers (or 527 miles), which is much less than the sample mean of 1,322 
kilometers (or 821 miles). Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV MSA ranked 
second (third) in terms of total appraisal value (total number of properties sold), and the average 
distance for Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV MSA is about 557 kilometers 
(or 346 miles). In Panel C and D, we didn’t observe a clear relation between distance and market 
depth at least for top MSA of properties selloffs in each year. 
Together, results in Appendix 1 suggest that there is virtually no relation between selloff 
distance and market depth. Moreover, most MSAs listed among the top MSAs for property selloffs 
are among the top 10 MSAs ranked by population. It is likely that REITs headquartered in non-
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top 10 MSAs (which are considered as distant investors to the top 10 MSAs) are not able to invest 
in top 10 MSAs due to market frictions, such as higher cost of obtaining capital, etc. In Appendix 
2, we listed all selloffs that are conducted by REITs headquartered in non-top 10 MSAs. 
5. Discussions and Conclusion 
 In this research, we investigate how geographic dispersion of asset dispositions and of 
REIT Headquarters affects shareholder wealth through the vendor of property sell-offs by the U.S. 
equity REITs. We find evidence that the geographic distance between a firm’s headquarter location 
and property (properties) been disposed negatively affects sell-off stock performance of the firm’s 
shareholders. Our major findings are threefold. 
 First, using different distance measures and different sets of sell-off controls, we find 
distance measures have negative and significant effect on post sell-off stock performance.  
 Second, we conduct propensity score matching based on a sequential choice process to 
mitigate potential self-selection and endogeneity concerns. Specifically, we estimate the firm-level 
sell-off likelihood in the first stage and the property-level likelihood of being sold, given a sell-off 
decision is made, in the second stage. The matched sample is constructed based on propensity 
scores by multiplying the predicted probability in the first stage and the conditional probability in 
the second stage. Results based on the two-step sequential choice matched sample using different 
model specifications and models suggest that that the effect of distance on CAR is still negative 
and significant and managerial alignment effect plays a dominant effect. 
 Finally, we analyze the potential driving force(s) behind the managerial alignment effect 
by examining the role of distance on CAR using size of local community. When we divide firms 
into large and small population subsamples, we find that the effect of distance on CAR only exists 
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among firms headquartered in less populated areas. Therefore, we identify that informational and 
social factors together determine post sell-off shareholder wealth through geographic proximity 
only in less populated areas. Moreover, we find that high local union power ex ante leads to 
geographic concentration of property holdings by REITs ex post. Overall, our findings are in favor 
of the managerial alignment explanation. 
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Table 1: Property Sell-offs by Equity REITs, 2003-2013 
This table describes a sample of property sell-offs by U.S. equity REITs from 2003 to 2013 with sale price 
exceeding USD 20 million. 
Year 
Total  
Number of 
Transactions 
Total  
Value  
(Million USD) 
Average  
Deal Size  
(Million USD) 
2003 16 1676 105 
2004 18 1839 102 
2005 17 2608 163 
2006 24 7556 315 
2007 19 4391 231 
2008 3 293 98 
2009 8 514 64 
2010 4 2578 645 
2011 15 2892 193 
2012 17 3582 211 
2013 20 4914 246 
Total 161 32843 204 
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Table 2: Property Sell-offs by REIT Type and Stated Use of Proceeds, 2003-2013 
This table presents property sell-offs by REIT property type and by stated use of proceeds based on a sample 
of property sell-offs by U.S. equity REITs from 2003 to 2013 with sale price exceeding USD 20 million. 
Sell-offs are divided into different groups based on property type, including multi-family, office and/or 
industrial, diversified, and shopping center or regional mall. Sell-offs are divided into different groups based 
on stated use of proceeds from property sales. Information on selling REITs’ property type is from SNL 
Financial and information on the stated use of proceeds is obtained from press releases. 
Category N   % 
Sell-offs by REIT Property Type     
Multi-Family 20   12.4 
Office and/or Industrial 66   41 
Diversified 16   9.9 
Shopping Center or Regional Mall 24   14.9 
Other 35   21.7 
Total 161   100 
     
Sell-offs by Stated Use of Proceeds     
Fund acquisitions 11   6.8 
Mixed use 15   9.3 
Reduce debt (General) 30   18.6 
Reduce long-term debt 2   1.2 
Reduce short-term debt 8   5.0 
Repurchase shares 3   1.9 
Distribute dividends 4   2.5 
Other 15   9.3 
Not stated 73   45.3 
Total 161   100 
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Table 3: Market Reactions to Equity REIT Property Sell-offs 
This table presents summary statistics of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Panel A presents CARs 
based on six event windows, (-1,0), (0,0), (0,1), (-1,1), (-5,5), (-5,-1), which represent respectively the one-
day before, one-day, one-day ahead, three-day, eleven-day, and six-day windows. In Panel B, we divide 3-
day CARs, our main variable of interest, into (1) distance below median and (2) distance above median 
subsamples based on the comparison between average firm-property distance of a particular firm and the 
sample median of firm-property distances. In Panel C, we divide 3-day CARs, number of properties sold 
(held), deal size, and property appraisal value into 4 quartiles based on firm-property distances. In Panel D, 
we sort 3-day CARs into different subgroups based upon firm-property distance and population. In Panel 
E, we sort 3-day CARs into different subgroups based upon firm-property distance and REIT headquarter 
locations. We follow Loughran and Schultz (2005) and define an REIT as in “top-ten MSA” if its 
headquarters is in one of the ten largest metropolitan areas of the U.S. according to the 2010 Census. We 
define the rest of the REITs in our sample as in “non-top-ten MSAs”. In Panel F, we sort 3-day CARs into 
different subgroups based upon REIT headquarter locations and pre- & post-recession periods (the fall of 
Lehman Brothers on May 28, 2009 is used as the cutting point). The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of Portfolio Time-Series (CDA) t statistics, respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)  
 N CAR % Negative t-stat z-stat 
CAR (-1, 0) 161 0.74*** 40.99 4.06 1.99 
CAR (0) 161 0.71*** 41.61 5.52 2.21 
CAR (0,1) 161 1.15*** 40.99 6.29 2.20 
CAR (-1, +1) 161 1.18*** 43.48 5.26 2.14 
CAR (-5, +5) 161 1.49*** 42.86 3.49 1.08 
CAR (-5, -1) 161 0.44 44.10 1.52 -0.48 
 
Panel B:  CAR (-1, 1) by Nearby Sell-offs versus Distant Sell-offs 
Distance to HQs Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Below Median 2.047 5.926 -0.72 1.45 3.51 
Above Median 0.465 3.447 -1.29 -0.04 2.36 
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Panel C: CAR (-1,1) by Distance Quartile 
Distance to HQs 
# sell-
offs 
Avg. distance 
(in km) 
CAR  
(-1,1) 
CDA  
t-stat 
# Ppties Sold 
Deal Size 
(USD mil) 
# Ppties Held 
Appraisal Value 
(USD mil) 
Q1 (0-25 percentile) 39 132.15 2.19* 1.804 139 6058 8871 393039.8 
Q2 (25-50 percentile) 38 917.24 1.93** 2.673 210 5318 12396 234084.6 
Q3 (50-75 percentile) 39 1631.90 0.93 0.616 880 10690 17822 335486.1 
Q4 (75-100 percentile) 38 2629.15 0.12 1.076 147 6485 13617 316032.4 
 
Panel D: CAR (-1,1), sort by Distance and HQ County Population (Small and Large) 
 Small Population Large Population 
Distance Quartile Avg. distance(in km) CAR (-1,1) CDA t-stat Avg. distance (in km) CAR (-1,1) CDA t-stat 
Q1 (0-25 percentile) 183.69 2.73*** 5.424 83.18 1.42 0.489 
Q2 (25-50 percentile) 890.10 2.10** 2.378 944.37 1.43 1.324 
Q3 (50-75 percentile) 1599.21 1.59 0.413 1662.95 1.00 0.414 
Q4 (75-100 percentile) 2682.59 -0.50 -0.129 2575.71 0.61 1.434 
 
Panel E: CAR (-1,1), sort by Distance and HQ MSA Population (Non-top-ten MSAs and Top-ten MSAs) 
 Non-top-ten MSAs  Top-ten MSAs  
Distance Quartile Avg. distance (in km) CAR (-1,1) CDA t-stat Avg. distance (in km) CAR (-1,1) CDA t-stat 
Q1 (0-25 percentile) 348.47 4.35** 2.60 88.44 2.04*** 3.381 
Q2 (25-50 percentile) 1197.10 3.26*** 3.24 767.37 0.21 0.819 
Q3 (50-75 percentile) 1642.48 2.10*** 10.12 1656.21 0.93 1.091 
Q4 (75-100 percentile) 2368.71 0.00 -1.56 2747.05 -0.11* -2.109 
  
Panel F: CAR (-1,1), sort by sub-periods and HQ MSA Population (Non-top-ten MSAs and Top-ten MSAs) 
 Non-top-ten MSAs  Top-ten MSAs  
Sub-period Avg. distance (in km) CAR (-1,1) Average distance (in km) CAR (-1,1) 
Pre-Recession 1522.47 2.04 1472.86 -0.17 
Post-Recession 1132.57 1.17 1077.26 0.66 
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Table 4: Determinants of CARs 
This table includes summary statistics and regression results of determinants of CARs. Panel A presents 
summary statistics on distance proxies, firm-level characteristic and deal-level characteristics. Panel B 
presents regression results based on firm fundamentals. Panel C (D) presents regression results based on 
source of fund (use of fund). Panel E presents regression results based on deal-level determinants. The 
dependent variable is three-day window cumulative abnormal returns, CAR (-1,+1). Average distance 
(Median distance) is the average (median) distances of all the properties disposed by a particular firm (in 
1,000 kilometers). We scaled the distance measures in order to better interpreting its economic meaning. 
Since our historical property portfolios are constructed such that they were rebalanced annually, we 
compute the Average (Median) Holding distances at firm-year level instead of deal level for each seller (in 
1,000 kilometers).  Number of Properties Sold (Held) is defined as the total number of properties sold (held) 
in an average firm-year. Firm Size (lnrsize) is the natural logarithm of the quarterly total assets of the firm 
in millions of dollars (ATQ). ROA (Return on assets) is expressed as the quarterly net income (NIQ) over 
total assets (ATQ). Debt Ratio (dassets) equals to the sum of total long-term debt (DLTTQ) and debt in 
current liabilities (DLCQ) divided by total assets (ATQ). Coverage is interest coverage ratio, which equals 
income before extraordinary items (IBQ) divided by the sum of preferred dividends (DVPQ) and interest 
and related expenses (XINTQ). Tobin’s Q equals total book assets (ATQ) plus the market cap 
(PRCCQ*CSHOQ) minus common equity (CEQQ), all divided by total book assets (ATQ). Gain is the 
reported quarterly gain or loss generated from the sale of property (SRETQ). Debt Issues is the total new 
long-term debt issued (DLTISY). Equity Issues is the total proceeds from the sale of common and preferred 
stock (SSTKY). Delta Debt is the difference in debt reduction (DLTRY) from the previous fiscal quarter 
(t-2) divided by total long-term debt (DLTTQ), in the last fiscal quarter prior to the sell-off announcement 
(t-1). Delta preferred equals the difference in preferred dividends paid (DVPQ) from the previous fiscal 
quarter (t-2) divided by total liabilities (LTQ). Delta common equity equals the difference in cash dividends 
paid (DVY) from previous fiscal quarter (t-2), divided by the market cap (PRCCQ*CSHOQ). Delta 
investment equals the difference in increased investments (IVLTQ). Deal Size is the transaction price of the 
selloff divided by the total book assets (ATQ). Geographic Focus is an indicator variable equals to 1 if the 
stated goal of a particular asset sale is geographic focus and 0 otherwise. URSTD is an indicator variable 
equals to 1 if proceeds from sale are announced to be used to reduce short-term debt. URLTD is an indicator 
variable equals to 1 if proceeds from sale are announced to be used to reduce long-term debt. Pay Dividend 
is an indicator variable equals to 1 if proceeds from sale are announced to be distributed as dividends. EXCH 
is an indicator variable equals to 1 if 1031 tax-free exchange is used. DC is an indicator variable equals to 
1 if a particular firm’s interest coverage ratio is below the sample median at the end of the last fiscal quarter 
prior to the announcement. Recession is an indicator variable equals to 1 if announcement date is in the 
recession period defined by NBER US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions 
(http://www.nber.org/cycles.html). All quarterly variables are lagged. Robust standard errors are used and 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
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Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Distance Proxies     
Average Distance (dmean, in 1,000 km) 154 1.322 1.296 0.961 
Median Distance (dmedian, in 1,000 km) 154 1.293 1.199 1.001 
Nearby 154 0.025 0.500 0.160 
     
Distance Proxies and Number of Properties (Firm-Year) 
Average Holding Distance (in 1,000 km) 100 0.945 0.684 0.835 
Median Holding Distance (in 1,000 km) 100 0.772 0.497 0.845 
Number of Properties Sold 100 156 94 159 
Number of Properties Held 100 12 3 34 
     
Firm-level Characteristics     
Fundamentals     
Cash 154 0.032 0.016 0.047 
Firm Size (lnrsize) 154 7.850 8.105 1.713 
ROA 154 0.007 0.004 0.021 
Debt Ratio (dassets) 154 0.472 0.542 0.215 
Coverage 154 0.671 0.284 2.336 
Tobin’s Q 154 1.234 1.236 0.338 
DC 154 0.610 1 0.489 
     
Source of Fund     
Gain 154 5.145 0 26.18 
Debt Issues 154 700.2 303.2 1598.3 
Equity Issues 154 133.5 12.28 292.3 
     
Use of Fund     
Delta Debt 154 0.0362 0.0331 0.2245 
Delta Preferred 154 0.0002 0 0.0016 
Delta Common Equity 154 0.0031 0.0107 0.0328 
Delta Investment 154 0.0047 0.0121 0.0948 
     
Deal-level Characteristics     
Geographic Focus 154 0.214 0 0.412 
URSTD 154 0.013 0 0.114 
URLTD 154 0.045 0 0.209 
EXCH 154 0.065 0 0.247 
Pay Dividend 154 0.026 0 0.160 
Recession 154 0.110 0 0.314 
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Panel B: Firm Fundamentals 
CAR (-1, 1) (1) (2) (3) 
Average distance -1.216**   
 (-2.54)   
Median distance  -1.142***  
  (-2.62)  
Nearby   1.944** 
   (2.09) 
Cash -10.855 -10.816 -10.074 
 (-1.41) (-1.40) (-1.25) 
Firm Size (lnrsize) -0.462 -0.458 -0.444 
 (-1.31) (-1.29) (-1.23) 
ROA 14.436 15.960 21.082 
 (0.70) (0.78) (0.96) 
Debt Ratio (dassets) 5.708* 5.673* 5.193* 
 (1.89) (1.90) (1.75) 
Coverage -0.078 -0.086 -0.138 
 (-0.47) (-0.52) (-0.81) 
Tobin's Q 0.155 0.156 0.155 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
DC 0.075 0.052 -0.025 
 (0.07) (0.05) (-0.02) 
Intercept 3.907** 3.771** 1.464 
 (2.14) (2.11) (0.90) 
    
R Squared 10% 10% 9% 
Number of Obs 154 154 154 
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Panel C: Source of Fund 
CAR (-1, 1) (1) (2) (3) 
Average distance -0.941**   
 (-2.18)   
Median distance  -0.893**  
  (-2.24)  
Nearby   1.644** 
   (1.98) 
Gain 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.38) (0.35) (0.30) 
Debt Issues -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00011 
 (-0.73) (-0.72) (-1.27) 
Equity Issues -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.35) (-1.40) (-1.36) 
Intercept 2.731*** 2.649*** 0.699 
 (3.08) (3.17) (1.49) 
    
R Squared 4% 3% 3% 
Number of Obs 154 154 154 
 
Panel D: Use of Fund 
CAR (-1, 1) (1) (2) (3) 
Average distance -0.984**   
 (-2.48)   
Median distance  -0.919**  
  (-2.53)  
Nearby   1.629** 
   (2.01) 
Delta Debt 0.412 0.442 0.530 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.32) 
Delta Preferred -242.7 -238.9 -236.5* 
 (-1.49) (-1.47) (1.74) 
Delta Common 17.074 16.555 14.578 
 (0.52) (0.50) (0.45) 
Delta Investment -3.393 -3.451 -3.255 
 (-0.93) (-0.95) (-0.92) 
Intercept 2.588*** 2.476*** 0.475 
 (3.15) (3.21) (1.10) 
    
R Squared 5% 4% 4% 
Number of Obs 154 154 154 
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Panel E: Deal-level Determinants 
CAR (-1, 1) (1) (2) (3) 
Average distance -0.985**     
 (-2.44)    
Median distance  -0.924**    
  (-2.46)   
Nearby   1.819**    
   (2.06)  
Deal Size 0.000    0.000    0.000*    
 (1.53)   (1.52)   (1.71)   
Geographic Focus -0.883   -0.900   -1.104   
 (-1.13)   (-1.15)   (-1.32)   
URSTD 2.366*    2.488*   2.973**    
 (1.97)   (1.96)   (2.35)  
URLTD 0.147    0.194    -0.132   
 (0.05)   (0.07)   (-0.05)   
EXCH 0.466    0.526    0.549    
 (0.40)   (0.45)   (0.49)   
Recession 4.154**    4.077**    4.134**    
 (2.13)  (2.09)  (2.11)  
Pay Dividend 8.554*     8.758*    8.546*    
 (1.76)  (1.80)   (1.73)   
Cash -17.104**   -17.248**   -17.492**   
 (-2.42)  (-2.47)  (-2.42)  
Firm Size (lnrsize) -0.615   -0.596   -0.500   
 (-1.53)   (-1.48)   (-1.25)   
ROA 36.590   37.800   40.502   
 (1.44)   (1.50)   (1.52)   
Debt Ratio (dassets) 3.134    3.131    3.045    
 (1.53)   (1.54)   (1.44)   
Coverage -0.140   -0.144   -0.159   
 (-0.68)   (-0.70)   (-0.74)   
Tobin's Q -0.835   -0.833   -0.897   
 (-0.55)   (-0.55)   (-0.60)   
DC 1.272*    1.251*   1.109    
 (1.71)   (1.69)   (1.49)   
Intercept 5.989 5.740    3.032    
 (1.40) (1.34)   (0.67)   
    
R Squared 30% 29% 29% 
Number of Obs 154 154 154 
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Table 5: Firm-level and Property-level Comparisons between Sell-off Firms and Non-sell-off Firms 
This table compares firm-level and property-level descriptive statistics of a sample of REITs with asset sales from 2003 to 2013 and a sample of 
REITs without asset sale (control sample) during the same period. Firm Size is the annual reported book value of total assets (AT) in millions of 
USD. ROA (Return on assets) is expressed as the annual net income (NI) over total assets (AT). FFO/Total Assets equals to funds from operations 
(FFO) divided by total assets (AT). Debt Ratio (dassets) equals to the sum of total long-term debt (DLTT) and debt in current liabilities (DLC) 
divided by total assets (AT). Cash is expressed as cash and short-term investments (CHE) divided by total assets (AT). Sales Growth is the most 
recent annual percentage change in total revenue (REVT). Coverage is interest coverage ratio, which equals income before extraordinary items (IB) 
divided by the sum of preferred dividends (DVP) and interest and related expenses (XINT). Momentum is the aggregated stock return from month 
t-12 to t-2. DC is an indicator variable which equals 1 when a firm’s coverage ratio is below the sample median in the last fiscal year prior to the 
announcement, 0 otherwise. Nearby is a dummy variable that takes one if the distance of a deal is less than the sample median and 0 otherwise. 
Diverse is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the property type of the property been disposed is different from the property type of a particular firm 
identified by CRSP permanent security identification number (PERMNO) and 0 otherwise. Hold Time describes how long has (had) a property been 
held by a particular company. Health care, hotel, industrial, office, retail, multifamily, and other are indicator variables of major property types. 
“N.A.” means that the median of a variable is not shown if it’s a dummy. The last column reports t-test statistics and significance. *, ** and *** 
stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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  (1) Non-sell-off   (2) Sell-offs (1)-(2) 
 N Mean Median Std Dev N Mean Median Std Dev t-stat 
Firm-level (firm-year)    (firm-year)      
Firm Size 3,697 1803.358 666.803 3274.583 100 4919.646 2803.544 5862.672 -9.13 *** 
ROA 3,697 0.026 0.027 0.128 100 0.028 0.023 0.051 -0.14  
FFO/Total assets 3,697 0.025 0 0.090 100 0.039 0.044 0.031 -1.52 * 
Debt Ratio 3,697 0.455 0.478 0.223 100 0.522 0.542 0.142 -3.04 *** 
Tobin's Q 3,697 1.252 1.184 0.475 100 1.272 1.227 0.281 -0.42  
Cash 3,697 0.045 0.017 0.092 100 0.028 0.017 0.039 1.80 ** 
Sales Growth 3,697 46.615 7.676 1057.434 100 6.025 2.735 24.893 0.38  
Coverage 3,697 6.614 0.606 93.387 100 0.580 0.429 1.112 0.65  
Momentum 3,697 0.14 0.136 0.880 100 0.124 0.157 0.309 0.19  
DC 3,697 0.492 0 0.500 100 0.5 1 0.503 -0.16  
           
Property-level (property-year)    (property-year)      
Hold Time 332,853 11.880 10 7.298 1,157 6.790 6 4.572 23.71 *** 
Nearby 332,853 0.556 1 0.497 1,157 0.476 0 0.499 5.44 *** 
Diverse 332,853 0.285 0 0.451 1,157 0.656 1 0.475 -27.93 *** 
Health Care 332,853 0.085 0 0.279 1,157 0.008 0 0.088 9.42 *** 
Hotel 332,853 0.037 0 0.189 1,157 0.041 0 0.199 -0.75  
Industrial 332,853 0.107 0 0.309 1,157 0.273 0 0.446 -18.18 *** 
Office 332,853 0.130 0 0.336 1,157 0.186 0 0.389 -5.63 *** 
Retail 332,853 0.281 0 0.449 1,157 0.123 0 0.328 11.95 *** 
Multifamily 332,853 0.137 0 0.343 1,157 0.091 0 0.287 4.54 *** 
Other 332,853 0.156 0 0.363 1,157 0.249 0 0.433 -8.67 *** 
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Table 6: Two-stage sequential model of property sell-offs 
This table reports results of coefficient estimates used to calculate predicted probabilities of asset sell-offs at firm-level in Panel A and (conditional) 
predicted probabilities of asset sell-offs at property-level in Panel B. In Panel A of firm-level, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equals 
to one if a firm sells any properties in a specific year, and zero otherwise. Model (1) reports probit results based on a sample of firm-year with sell-
offs and a sample of firm-year without sell-off matched with average firm-holding property distance. Model (2) ((3)) report coefficient estimates 
based on logit (probit) model without weights. Model (4) ((5)) report coefficient estimates based on logit (probit) model with weights of the inverse 
of the number of properties held by firm i in year t. In Panel B of property-level, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equals to 1 if a 
property is disposed in a specific year, given the holding company is a seller in that year; and zero otherwise. The estimation of firm-level propensity 
is indicated by P(seller = 1), and the estimation of property-level propensity is indicated by P(property sold = 1 | seller = 1). Model (1) ((2)) report 
results based on logit (probit) model. Coefficient estimates and t statistics (in parentheses) are reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the 
coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Panel A: The probability of property sell-offs at firm-level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: 
P(seller=1) 
Probit, distance  Logit Logit, weighted  Probit Probit, weighted  
      
Firm Size 0.00006*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.00006*** 0.00006*** 
 (7.58) (6.17) (8.07) (6.00) (9.13) 
ROA 0.343 5.436* 8.766*** 2.550* 4.689*** 
 (1.57) (1.76) (3.91) (1.68) (4.39) 
FFO/Total Assets 0.757*** 2.076 5.251*** 1.048 3.071*** 
 (2.61) (0.59) (3.33) (0.64) (3.31) 
Debt Ratio 0.545** 0.706 0.777*** 0.329 0.644*** 
 (2.38) (1.00) (2.64) (1.02) (3.81) 
Tobin’s Q 0.023 -0.190 0.197 -0.071 0.075 
 (0.26) (-0.51) (1.17) (-0.40) (0.74) 
Cash -1.756 -0.467 -10.659*** -0.161 -5.525*** 
 (-1.48) (-0.21) (-6.55) (-0.16) (-6.31) 
Sales Growth -0.00007 -0.00008 -0.00017 -0.00004 -0.0001 
 (-1.63) (-0.48) (-1.35) (-0.43) (1.49) 
Coverage -0.00027 -0.097* -0.207*** -0.051* -0.054*** 
 (-0.93) (-1.75) (-3.21) (-1.67) (-2.66) 
Momentum -0.003 -0.239 0.030 -0.100 0.016 
 (-0.11) (-0.67) (0.75) (-0.60) (0.66) 
DC -0.015 0.106 0.096 0.064 0.124** 
 (-0.15) (0.42) (0.89) (0.54) (1.98) 
Intercept -2.357*** -3.596*** -1.174*** -1.999*** -0.853*** 
 (-16.13) (-6.97) (-4.79) (-8.16) (6.02) 
      
Log likelihood -432.61 -376.05 -1883.93 -374.44 -1892.25 
Pseudo R-squared 6.43% 5.24% 8.59% 5.64% 8.19% 
Number of Obs 3,797 2,055 3,120 2,055 3,120 
54 
 
Panel B: The conditional probability of property sell-offs at property-level 
Dependent variable: P(property sold = 1 | seller =1)  (1) (2) 
 Logit Probit 
   
Nearby -0.408*** -0.212*** 
 (-6.26) (-6.55) 
Diverse 1.010*** 0.422*** 
 (13.47) (11.38) 
Health Care -1.027*** -0.443*** 
 (-2.67) (-2.84) 
Leisure 0.653*** 0.302*** 
 (2.77) (2.63) 
Industrial 1.062*** 0.524*** 
 (5.64) (5.69) 
Office 0.139 0.054 
 (0.70) (0.57) 
Retail 0.068 0.045 
 (0.34) (0.47) 
Multifamilty 0.356* 0.166* 
 (1.72) (1.66) 
Other 2.621*** 1.378*** 
 (13.32) (13.85) 
Intercept -3.453*** -1.820*** 
 (-17.68) (-19.24) 
   
Log likelihood -3555.84 -3584.75 
Pseudo R-squared 14.54% 13.85% 
Number of Obs 16,102 16,102 
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Table 7: OLS Regression of CAR on distance and fundamentals using matched samples 
This table presents the regression results of determinants of CARs, using sell-off and matched samples from Model (1) – (5) in Table 6. Panel A 
presents regression results based on firm fundamentals. Panel B (C) presents regression results based on source of fund (use of fund). In Model (1) 
and Model (2) of Panel A, a sell-off firm is first matched with 10 non-sell-off firms using the nearest propensity scores, which are calculated as the 
predicted probabilities at firm-level based on Model (1) Panel A in Table 6. Next, the percentile of the (average) distance between the disposed 
property (properties) and headquarter of the sell-off firm is matched with the percentiles of the average distance between the holding properties and 
headquarter of the non-sell-off firms. The non-sell-off firm with the smallest absolute difference of percentile is selected. In Model (3) and Model 
(4) of Panel A, a sample of sell-off firms is matched with a sample of non-sell-off firms using the nearest propensity score, which is calculated as a 
multiplication of the predicted probability at firm-level based on Model (2) Panel A in Table 6 and the conditional predicted probability at property-
level based on Model (1) Panel B in Table 6. In Model (5) and (6) of Panel A, a sample of sell-off firms is matched with a sample of non-sell-off 
firms using the nearest propensity score, which is calculated as a multiplication of the predicted probability at firm-level based on Model (4) Panel 
A in Table 6 and the conditional predicted probability at property-level based on Model (2) Panel B in Table 6. In Model (7) and (8) of Panel A, a 
sample of sell-off firms is matched with a sample of non-sell-off firms using the nearest propensity score, which is calculated as a multiplication of 
the predicted probability at firm-level based on Model (3) Panel A in Table 6 and the conditional predicted probability at property-level based on 
Model (1) Panel B in Table 6. In Model (9) and (10) of Panel A, a sample of sell-off firms is matched with a sample of non-sell-off firms using the 
nearest propensity score, which is calculated as a multiplication of the predicted probability at firm-level based on Model (5) Panel A in Table 7 and 
the conditional predicted probability at property-level based on Model (2) Panel B in Table 6. In Model (1) of Panel B and Panel C, a sample of sell-
off firms is matched with the same control sample in Model (1) and (2) Panel A. In Model (2) of Panel B and Panel C, a sample of sell-off firms is 
matched with the same control sample in Model (3) and (4) Panel A. In Model (3) of Panel B and Panel C, a sample of sell-off firms is matched with 
is matched with the same control sample in Model (5) and (6) Panel A. In Model (4) of Panel B and Panel C, a sample of sell-off firms is matched 
with the same control sample in Model (7) and (8) Panel A. In Model (5) of Panel B and Panel C, a sample of sell-off firms is matched with the 
same control sample in Model (9) and (10) Panel A. The matching is conducted by using the nearest neighborhood 1:1 except for Model (1) and (2) 
of Panel A and Model (1) of Panel B and C. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over three days around sell-off 
announcements, CAR (-1,1). Sell-off is a dummy equals to 1 if a particular firm disposes properties on an even date, zero otherwise. Average distance 
is the test variable, which is defined as the arithmetic average firm-property distances of all the properties disposed by a selling firm. Other variables 
are defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors are used and t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the coefficient 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Matched Sample – Fundamentals  
CAR (-1, 1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Matched with 
Probit, 
distance 
Probit, 
distance 
predicted 
prob. 
based on 
logit 
predicted 
prob. 
based on 
logit 
predicted 
prob. 
based on 
probit 
predicted 
prob. 
based on 
probit 
predicted 
prob. 
based on 
logit, 
weighted 
predicted 
prob. 
based on 
logit, 
weighted 
predicted 
prob. 
based on 
probit, 
weighted 
predicted 
prob. 
based on 
logit, 
weighted 
Sell-off 1.201** 1.452** 1.044* 1.046 1.059* 1.118 0.974* 1.260* 1.002* 0.869 
 (2.28) (2.25) (1.89) (1.51) (1.93) (1.65) (1.77) (1.89) (1.88) (1.38) 
Average 
distance 
-0.493* -0.627** -0.448* -0.423* -0.400* -0.416* -0.486** -0.457** -0.551** -0.473** 
 (-1.87) (-2.45) (-1.88) (-1.87) (-1.70) (-1.76) (-2.06) (-2.05) (-2.35) (-2.17) 
Cash  -9.304  5.840  -1.526  1.664  -2.373 
 
 (-1.18)  (0.94)  (-0.70)  -0.31  (-0.43) 
Firm Size  -0.276  -0.129  -0.392  -0.398  -0.380 
 
 (-0.98)  (-0.44)  (-1.20)  (-1.40)  (-1.37) 
ROA  -59.40*  -18.22  -0.479  -20.22  2.768 
 
 (-1.71)  (-0.78)  (-0.02)  (-1.15)  (0.19) 
Debt Ratio  4.951*  2.914  2.560  3.272  4.367** 
 
 -1.93  (1.42)  (1.09)  (1.44)  (2.14) 
Coverage  0.583  0.091  -0.131  -0.021  -0.102 
 
 (1.45)  (0.36)  (-0.42)  (-0.25)  (-1.39) 
Tobin's Q  0.042  -0.819  -1.008  -0.831  -0.532 
 
 (0.05)  (-0.95)  (-0.89)  (-0.71)  (-0.57) 
DC  -0.031  -0.192  -0.259  -0.953  -0.009 
 
 (-0.03)  (-0.22)  (-0.25)  (-1.05)  (-0.01) 
Intercept 0.568 0.576 0.678 1.343 0.615 4.077 0.787* 3.845 0.825* 2.588 
 (1.53) (0.28) (1.58) (0.54) (1.37) (1.38) (1.74) (1.60) (1.89) (1.15) 
 
          
R squared 4% 12% 3% 6% 2% 6% 3% 7% 3% 10% 
Number of Obs 247 247 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 
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Panel B: Matched Sample – Source of Fund  
CAR (-1, 1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Probit, distance Logit Probit Logit weighted Probit weighted 
Sell-off 1.393** 1.153* 0.707 1.148* 1.050* 
 (2.50) (1.93) (1.19) (1.92) (1.85) 
Average distance -0.495* -0.425* -0.407* -0.446* -0.532** 
 (-1.86) (-1.78) (-1.73) (-1.89) (-2.28) 
Gain -0.015 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014 -0.006 
 (-1.50) (-1.43) (-1.49) (-1.48) (-0.79) 
Debt Issues -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.57) (-0.22) (-0.09) (-0.73) (0.09) 
Equity Issues -0.002** -0.001 -0.002 -0.002** -0.002 
 (-2.16) (-0.82) (-1.54) (-2.29) (-1.51) 
Intercept 0.742* 0.728* 1.231*** 0.952** 0.956** 
 (1.86) (1.65) (2.90) (2.02) (2.09) 
      
R squared 5% 3% 2% 4% 4% 
Number of Obs 247 252 252 252 252 
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Panel C: Matched Sample – Use of Fund 
CAR (-1, 1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Probit, distance Logit  Probit Logit weighted Probit weighted 
Sell-off 1.221** 1.118* 0.936* 0.969* 0.962* 
 (2.28) (1.96) (1.81) (1.74) (1.80) 
Average distance -0.538** -0.492** -0.533** -0.473* -0.582** 
 (-1.97) (-2.02) (-2.32) (-1.93) (-2.44) 
Delta Debt -0.693 -0.438 -2.015* -1.571 -0.578 
 (-0.65) (-0.28) (1.93) (-1.40) (-0.66) 
Delta Preferred -102.86* -128.3 -95.63 -87.45 19.95 
 (-1.92) (-1.39) (-1.05) (-0.92) (0.23) 
Delta Common Equity 23.853 27.948 32.81*** 20.02 5.521 
 (0.77) (0.92) (2.70) (1.29) (0.75) 
delta investment -3.558 -3.345 -0.462* -0.823 -3.252** 
 (-0.93) (-1.21) (-1.90) (-0.73) (-2.40) 
Intercept 0.566 0.602 0.839** 0.785* 0.921** 
 (1.41) (1.36) (2.15) (1.68) (2.10) 
 
     
R squared 6% 6% 13% 6% 5% 
Number of Obs 247 252 252 252 252 
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Table 8: Regression of local (state) union power on property holding’s geographic concentration index 
This table presents the regressions for the local (state) union power factors, using sell-off and matched samples from Model (2) – (5) in Table 7. The 
dependent variable is Geographic HHI, which is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index that measures the geographic concentration of a particular firm at 
city level (Hartzell, Sun, and Titman 2014). Local union power is measured by state union coverage density or union membership density. Data on 
union power measures are obtained from Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). Sell-off is defined in Table 8. Column 1 to 4 report OLS regression results 
based on matched samples from different PSM analysis. Robust standard errors are used and t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A         
Geographic HHI (City)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Union Coverage Density 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 
 (3.32)  (2.63)  (3.29)  (3.40)  
sell-off 0.025  0.025  0.053 *** 0.069 *** 
 (1.19)  (1.08)  (2.60)  (3.04)  
Intercept -0.023  -0.003  -0.050  -0.073 * 
 (-0.71)  (-0.09)  (-1.47)  (-1.96)  
         
Model Logit Probit Logit - Weighted Probit - Weighted 
R squared 8% 5% 13% 14% 
Number of obs 281 264 226 231 
         
Panel B         
Geographic HHI (City) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Union Membership Density  0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 
 (3.31)  (2.62)  (3.26)  (3.40)  
sell-off 0.024  0.025  0.053 *** 0.069 *** 
 (1.17)  (1.08)  (2.60)  (3.04)  
Intercept -0.014  0.004  -0.041  -0.063 * 
 (-0.46)  (0.10)  (-1.28)  (-1.83)  
         
Model Logit Probit Logit - Weighted Probit - Weighted 
R squared 8% 5% 13% 14% 
Number of obs 281 264 226 231 
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Table 9: OLS Regression of low and high populated counties 
This table presents the OLS regressions for CAR in different subsamples. Firms are separated into different subsamples based upon the population 
around their headquarters. The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over three days around sell-off announcements, CAR (-
1,1). Sell-off and Average distance are defined as Table 7. Panel A to D presents results with respect to average distance, our main test variable, 
using sell-off and matched samples from sequential logit, sequential Probit, sequential logit with weights, and sequential Probit with weights, 
respectively. In each panel, we report regression results for the full sample, for firms headquartered in less-populated counties, and for firms 
headquartered in highly-populated counties separately in Column 1 to 3. Less-populated counties are defined as counties with population below 
the sample median. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A: matched sample from logit   Panel C: matched sample from logit with weights 
Variables All Less Populated=0 Less Populated=1  Variables All Less Populated=0 Less Populated=1 
Sell off 1.044* 0.637 1.494*  Sell off 0.974* 1.361 0.995* 
 (1.89) (0.76) (1.85)   (1.77) (1.50) (1.25) 
Average distance -0.448* -0.296 -0.847**  Average distance -0.486** -0.034 -0.951** 
 (-1.88) (-0.91) (-2.19)   (-2.06) (-0.09) (-2.53) 
Intercept 0.678 0.324 1.394**  Intercept 0.787* -0.633 2.008*** 
 (1.58) (0.60) (2.06)   (1.74) (-0.85) (3.07) 
         
R squared 3% 1% 7%  R squared 3% 2% 6% 
Number of Obs 252 111 123  Number of Obs 252 113 125 
         
Panel B: matched sample from Probit  Panel D: matched sample from Probit with weights 
Variables All Less Populated=0 Less Populated=1  Variables All Less Populated=0 Less Populated=1 
Sell off 1.059* 0.386 1.737**  Sell off 1.002* 0.183 1.906** 
 (1.93) (0.41) (2.25)   (1.88) (0.20) (2.54) 
Average distance -0.400* -0.148 -0.798**  Average distance -0.551** -0.251 -0.942*** 
 (-1.70) (-0.37) (-2.30)   (-2.35) (-0.68) (-2.65) 
Intercept 0.615 -0.443 1.096*  Intercept 0.825* 0.738 1.087* 
 (1.37) (-0.53) (1.84)   (1.89) (0.92) (1.95) 
         
R squared 2% 1% 8%  R squared 3% 1% 11% 
Number of Obs 252 114 121  Number of Obs 252 116 124 
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Appendix 1: Top MSA of Property Dispositions 
This table presents top MSAs of property holdings and dispositions ranked by total appraisal value (of all 
properties disposed within a particular MSA) and total number of properties sold within a particular MSA 
from 2003 to 2013. Average REIT-properties sold distances (in kilometers) are included for top MSAs. In 
Panel A and B, top 10 MSAs with the highest number of total appraisal value or highest total number of 
properties sold are listed, respectively. In Panel C and D, for each year during 2003 – 2013, top 1 MSA 
with the highest number of total appraisal value or highest total number of properties sold are listed, 
respectively. Panel E includes all selloffs that occurred in small towns (non-top 10 MSAs). MSAs are 
ranked by population according to 2010 Census.  
Panel A: Top 10 MSAs by Total Appraisal Value of Property Dispositions  
MSA Name 
Avg. Distance (in 
kilometers) 
Property Value 
(millions of USD) 
# Properties 
Sold 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-
NJ-PA   
847.70 2538.20 37 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, 
DC-VA-MD-WV   
557.59 1631.85 66 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA   1296.57 1437.78 134 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX   1157.62 729.77 94 
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA   1259.65 626.69 8 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, 
TX   
1345.41 521.09 46 
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD   555.48 508.95 55 
Jacksonville, FL   2968.49 403.54 46 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, 
CA   
1317.92 390.55 13 
Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-
Franklin, TN   
2581.17 388.48 41 
 
Panel B: Top 10 MSAs by Total Number of Properties Disposed 
MSA Name 
Avg. Distance (in 
kilometers) 
# Properties 
Sold 
Property Value 
(millions of USD) 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA   1296.57 132 1437.78 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX   1157.62 91 729.77 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, 
DC-VA-MD-WV   
557.59 66 1631.85 
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD   555.48 55 508.95 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, 
TX   
2968.49 46 403.54 
Jacksonville, FL   1345.41 46 521.09 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, 
MN-WI   
1370.99 45 252.23 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, 
PA-NJ-DE-MD   
491.41 44 360.82 
Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro-
Franklin, TN   
2581.17 41 388.48 
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Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI   471.58 38 278.10 
 
Panel C: Top MSA by Total Appraisal Value of Property Dispositions  
Year 
CBSA 
Code 
MSA Name 
Avg. Distance 
(in kilometers) 
# Properties 
Sold 
Property Value 
(USD million) 
2003 31080 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-
Anaheim, CA 
1386.26 4 303.02 
2004 41860 
San Francisco-Oakland-
Hayward, CA 
2460.92 2 202.86 
2005 12060 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-
Roswell, GA   
1411.55 81 292.46 
2006 35620 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, 
NY-NJ-PA   
1084.99 7 850.09 
2007 35620 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, 
NY-NJ-PA   
1078.84 10 292.59 
2008 47900 
Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV   
1269.15 1 104.96 
2009 28140 Kansas City, MO-KS   2574.83 6 168.97 
2010 41940 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa 
Clara, CA   
2980.54 1 84.77 
2011 47900 
Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV   
272.20 20 365.09 
2012 35620 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, 
NY-NJ-PA   
238.08 3 970.95 
2013 47900 
Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV   
433.64 31 610.36 
 
Panel D: Top MSA by Total Number of Properties Disposed 
Year 
CBSA 
Code 
MSA Name 
Avg. Distance 
(in kilometers) 
# Properties 
Sold 
Property Value 
(USD million) 
2003 33100 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West 
Palm Beach, FL   
1321.60 6 67.57 
2004 16980 
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-
WI   
278.58 29 108.78 
2005 12060 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, 
GA   
1411.55 81 292.46 
2006 19820 Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI   855.89 19 256.55 
2007 19100 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX   199.31 38 208.64 
2008 19100 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX   514.64 4 40.03 
2009 28140 Kansas City, MO-KS   2574.83 6 168.97 
2010 35380 New Orleans-Metairie, LA   1789.26 1 84.77 
2011 47900 
Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV   
272.20 20 365.09 
2012 26420 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar 
Land, TX   
227.19 25 123.25 
2013 27260 Jacksonville, FL   3050.26 32 183.43 
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Appendix 2: Selloffs in the non-Top 10 HQ MSAs 
Event date Company name CAR(-1,1) Avg. disntance Headquarter MSA 
Rank (by 
population) 
10/18/2010 ProLogis 3.87 1789.25 San Francisco–Oakland–Hayward, CA  11 
12/18/2013 Terreno Realty Corporation 2.16 1160.25 San Francisco–Oakland–Hayward, CA  11 
7/10/2006 Glenborough Realty Trust -1.06 1725.31 San Francisco–Oakland–Hayward, CA  11 
4/7/2005 Glenborough Realty Trust Inc. 2.7 1462.52 San Francisco–Oakland–Hayward, CA  11 
9/3/2009 Ramco-Gershenson Properties Trust 1.71 663.38 Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI 12 
9/19/2005 Ramco-Gershenson Properties Trust 2.67 1296.50 Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI 12 
3/31/2003 Pan Pacific Retail Properties 1.82 634.63 San Diego-Carlsbad, CA  17 
1/27/2003 Pan Pacific Retail Properties Inc. -0.44 1242.18 San Diego-Carlsbad, CA  17 
4/4/2012 Corporate Office Properties Trust -2.26 236.52 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 20 
2/2/2012 Corporate Office Properties Trust -0.85 989.56 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD  20 
12/19/2011 Corporate Office Properties Trust 3.66 163.69 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD  20 
7/2/2012 Corporate Office Properties Trust 5.45 150.76 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD  20 
9/29/2006 Corporate Office Properties Trust -1.69 108.58 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD  20 
7/28/2006 Corporate Office Properties Trust 2.36 1726.56 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 20 
5/7/2012 Corporate Office Properties Trust 1.76 96.76 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 20 
7/17/2012 UDR Inc. 1.41 1399.49 Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 21 
3/7/2003 Parkway Properties Inc. 2.35 1630.09 Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 27 
6/9/2006 Developers Diversified Realty Corp. -1.57 2678.91 Cleveland-Elyria, OH 29 
8/6/2004 Glimcher Realty Trust -0.17 1837.45 Columbus, OH  32 
1/6/2009 Glimcher Realty Trust 21.3 1149.32 Columbus, OH 32 
7/25/2006 Duke Realty Corporation 2.99 2278.02 Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN  33 
1/6/2009 Kite Realty Group Trust 7.26 1134.97 Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN  33 
2/21/2012 Kite Realty Group Trust -3.17 2704.51 Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN  33 
9/30/2005 Duke Realty Corporation 1.33 1713.38 Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN  33 
12/6/2007 Essex Property Trust Inc. -0.83 2074.83 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA  34 
9/11/2013 American Campus Communities, Inc. 1.09 1142.86 Austin-Round Rock, TX 35 
8/14/2013 Regency Centers Corporation 1.03 2641.27 Jacksonville, FL 40 
8/23/2012 Sovran Self Storage, Inc. 1.24 1090.67 Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY 47 
5/29/2009 Highwoods Properties, Inc. -2.02 2859.93 Raleigh, NC 48 
1/15/2009 Highwoods Properties, Inc. 28.42 389.97 Raleigh, NC 48 
1/21/2003 Highwoods Properties, Inc. 5.14 1679.91 Raleigh, NC 48 
6/7/2005 Highwoods Properties Inc. 0.45 1608.97 Raleigh, NC 48 
12/17/2007 Highwoods Properties, Inc. -2.45 2536.39 Raleigh, NC 48 
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4/10/2006 Colonial Properties Trust -0.04 1722.31 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 49 
10/25/2005 BNP Residential Properties, Inc. 2.67 2604.77 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 49 
4/27/2006 CBL & Associates Properties Inc. 2.32 1437.70 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 49 
7/8/2005 Colonial Properties Trust 4.64 1638.84 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 49 
12/26/2007 Colonial Properties Trust 6.1 238.03 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 49 
10/11/2005 Colonial Properties Trust 0.65 988.40 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 49 
9/3/2013 CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. -1.53 1646.31 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 49 
7/3/2008 Colonial Properties Trust 0.33 1333.22 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 49 
10/2/2006 Colonial Properties Trust 1.11 144.98 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 49 
2/1/2006 Home Properties, Inc. 2.61 855.89 Rochester, NY 51 
10/2/2006 Home Properties, Inc. 3.51 498.44 Rochester, NY 51 
4/9/2013 Home Properties -0.39 2050.46 Rochester, NY 51 
4/1/2013 
Starwood Hotels & Resorts 
Worldwide, Inc. 
5.37 1442.77 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 58 
7/29/2003 
Starwood Hotels & Resorts 
Worldwide,Inc. 
3.43 1712.82 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 58 
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Essay 2 
Geographic Proximity and Competition for Scarce Capital:  
Evidence from U.S. Stocks and REITs 
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1. Introduction and Literature Review 
 An in-depth understanding of the disaggregated, micro aspects of financial capital deter-
minants is crucial for understanding publicly traded assets.1 While a large body of recent research 
has examined financial capital in several different contexts, much of that work has focused on the 
national-level opposed to the local level, without simultaneously considering a comprehensive set 
of asset classes (that is, having considered only REITs or common stocks, but not both in the same 
analysis).  
In particular, a small strand of recent research has suggested that capital markets are locally 
segmented rather than integrated. Korniotis (2008) and Korniotis and Kumar (2013) argue that, 
due to heterogeneity and variation across the U.S. states, the U.S. economy is better described as 
a collection of 50 state-level investors than a representative U.S. investor. Their research indicates 
that investors’ local preference in equity markets generates strong investor clienteles and thus 
state-level segmentation.  
 Another important reason for studying financial capital is that it has important implications 
for market liquidity due to liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) and segmentation 
by its nature (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010). Glascock and Lu-Andrews (2014) are among the 
first to empirically test the relation between aggregated market and funding liquidity. They find a 
reinforcing relationship between the two liquidity measures at the national level. Other recent stud-
ies show that, at the state level, market liquidity is also positively affected by funding liquidity and 
local macroeconomic conditions due to market segmentation (Bernile, Korniotis, Kumar, and 
                                                          
1 Financial capital and funding liquidity are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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Wang, 2015). An enhanced understanding of financial capital conditions at the local level is clearly 
important for a more complete comprehension of market liquidity. 
 Perhaps the most important determinant of corporate capital structure is financial flexibility 
(Graham and Harvey, 2001). Financial flexibility is crucial because financing frictions could lead 
to increased costs of capital and suboptimal levels of investment (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Stein, 
2001). These frictions diminish with the availability of internal funds (Almeida et al., 2011), but 
there is a tradeoff between lower cost of capital by building financial slack in the face of high 
external cost of capital, and higher agency cost. That is, there may be “empire building” during 
periods with poor growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986). In order to maintain financial flexibility, 
firms would also preserve the access to low cost of capital through capital structure choices, i.e., 
maintain debt capacity (Demos and McKeon, 2011), and through equity repurchases and payouts 
(Brav et al., 2005; Bonaime et al., 2013).2    
 What are the consequences of a lack of financial flexibility? One potential answer to this 
question is that negative spillovers across firms might be occurring when firms prey upon finan-
cially inflexible rivals. Such spillovers might lead to inaccurate estimates of financial capital de-
terminants (because of ignoring the indirect effects) due to violation of the Stable Unit Treatment 
Value Assumption (SUTVA), which assumes that spillovers do not exist. Nordlund (2016) is the 
first to address this issue among studies of financial flexibility. He develops a profit maximization 
model to explain why indirect effects might occur among firms with different costs of capital. He 
assumes that firms may enter into covenants with one another to coordinate their actions. Using 
covenant violations, he finds that non-violating firms benefit from the violating ones by preying 
                                                          
2 For a good review on financial flexibility, one can refer to Denis (2011). 
68 
 
strategically upon them. That is, non-violating firms are “treated” indirectly, which thus violates 
SUTVA. Due to competition between violating and non-violating firms, the indirect treatment 
effect, or the spillover effect, is negative. 
 However, based upon Garmaise and Batividad (2016)’s argument, the firm-level analysis 
of Nordlund (2016) is subject to an important endogeneity issue. Specifically, Nordlund (2016)’s 
thesis does not fully explain where the indirect effect comes from. The indirect effect can either 
be an outcome of competition between geographic neighbors, or across firms within a particular 
industry. Implications on the former scenario are not addressed in Nordlund (2016). However, 
these implications can be important when financial capital conditions are affected by local eco-
nomic conditions. In our theoretical model, we build in the possibility that the optimal amount of 
capital for one firm depends on the amount of capital for other firms, and our empirical tests of 
this model indicate that as other firms use more capital, the amount of capital for a particular firm 
decreases. In other words, we uncover evidence in support for the hypothesis that there is compe-
tition for scarce capital. 
More generally, spatial spillover effects are widely studied in the economics literature, as 
an important source of pure externalities, in which some entities generate non-compensated bene-
fits (or costs) upon others. Moreover, they highlight the role played by geographic proximity in 
the complex processes of local endogenous interactions. Different types of spatial spillovers have 
69 
 
been pinpointed in the literature, including, but not limited to, Knowledge Spillovers,3 Industry 
Spillovers,4 and Growth Spillovers5 (Capello, 2009). 
 The theoretical model in our paper is most closely related to the Growth Spillovers concept. 
We consider a situation where capital utilized by stocks and/or REITs in some locations may 
crowd-out the ability of firms in another region to obtain and/or use capital.  We accomplish this 
by considering the effects of state (MSA)-level macroeconomic conditions on US stocks’ and eq-
uity REITs’ financial capital conditions and its spillovers across state borders. This is a more spe-
cific model than the financial flexibility spillovers considered by Nordlund (2016), and the state-
level analysis of Bernile et al. (2015). In motivating the existence of potential spatial heterogeneity, 
we first rationalize our use of spatial econometrics tools with a theoretical framework based on a 
representative firm-level cost minimization model to develop comparative statics implications for 
our empirical analysis. Our theory implies that either positive or negative spillovers are possibili-
ties, however the actual sign of the spillovers is a question that we test for empirically. We then 
                                                          
3 Knowledge Spillovers refer to the cases where knowledge created by one firm spreads to the other firms, thus creating 
value for those firms (Fischer, 2006). Knowledge or technology producers do not capture the complete knowledge 
value because knowledge spills over the firm and becomes available to other firms. Due to its value enhancing nature, 
the expected effects of Knowledge Spillovers are always positive (Almenida and Kogut, 1999; Maier and Sedlacek, 
2005; Fischer, 2006). 
 
4 Industry Spillovers are defined as the situation in which firms located in the same and/or nearby geographic area(s) 
experience productivity shocks at the presence of one productive and dynamic firm. The expected effects of Industry 
Spillovers could be positive as well as negative. One the one hand, exchange of knowledge and ideas, technological 
innovations and good managerial practice (Griliches, 1992), and labor market pooling effects could lead to positive 
externalities. On the other hand, due to the comparative advantage of new entrée and higher costs of local inputs, 
market competitiveness would increase for local firms and thus lead to negative externalities (Capello, 2009; Alvarez, 
Arias, and Orea, 2006). Industry Spillovers are broader than Knowledge Spillovers and capture more interaction mech-
anisms among firms than information exchange.  
 
5 Growth Spillovers, a situation in which one region’s growth is affected by characteristics of neighboring regions, is 
the most general version of spatial spillovers. Similar to the Industry Spillovers, Growth Spillovers might have positive 
or negative effects. On the one hand, greater regional income generates greater internal savings and more job oppor-
tunities and neighboring regions can benefit from capital and labor accessibility (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1957). On the 
other hand, the effects of Growth Spillovers can be negative since outflows of capital and/or talented labor to other 
regions may be detrimental to a particular region.  
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employ panel regression methods, with fixed effects along with spatial econometrics tools, to esti-
mate the sign and statistical significance of the cross-state/MSA financial capital spillover effects.6 
We also examine whether or not REITs exhibit different spillover patterns than stocks in the con-
text of financial capital. Our key findings are that there is competition for scarce capital among 
stocks (and REITs) in different U.S. states (MSAs); several macroeconomic variables are signifi-
cant predictors of state-level financial capital conditions; and generally speaking, stocks and REITs 
behave similar to each other. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we develop our 
theoretical model to describe the optimal capital to be used by each representative firm as a func-
tion of the capital used by other firms. Then we describe our empirical model, along with some 
general exposition on the spatial lag model. The subsequent section consists of an overview of the 
data (with a more detailed discussion of the data variables in the appendix). Finally, we describe 
our empirical results, followed by a conclusions section where we summarize our key findings and 
possible directions for future research.  
 2. Theoretical Model 
We consider a world where in each U.S. state/MSA there is a representative firm (for ex-
ample, a common stock and/or a REIT; we could generalize this to a representative firm of other 
types). In this cost minimization problem, we assume K is financial capital with “real” price r; L 
is a composite of all other inputs with price w.  Firm 1 will choose 𝐾1, 𝐿1 to minimize its operating 
costs. In other words, firm 1’s problem is to: 
                                                          
6 Thus, we follow a recent trend in the literature of applying spatial econometrics techniques to better analyze local 
data (see for example Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Cohen and Paul, 2004; Case, Clapp, Dubin, and Rodriguez, 2004; 
Lesage and Pace, 2009; and Cohen, 2010). 
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min
𝐾1,𝐿1
𝑤𝐿1 + 𝑟1𝐾1  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑌1 = (𝑆1)𝑓(𝐾1, 𝐿1, 𝐾2),            (i)     
where 𝑆1 is a set of shift factors that consist of other exogenous variables that affect output 
for firm 1, and 𝐾2 is the level of capital used by firm 2 in the other state/MSA. 
This production function specification assumes that more financial capital used by other 
firms may affect the productivity of a particular firm. But we do not know, a priori, how other 
firms’ capital usage affects productivity of a particular firm, or whether there is any effect at all of 
other firms’ capital on a particular firm’s capital. In other words, financial capital available to all 
states/MSAs may or may not be scarce. Firm 1 takes 𝐾2 as given (that is, it has no “control” over 
the amount of capital used by other states/MSAs). 
The optimization problem for firm 1 is: 
min{𝑤𝐿1 + 𝑟1𝐾1 + 𝜆1[𝑌1 − (𝑆1)𝑓(𝐾1, 𝐿1, 𝐾2)]},            (ii) 
First order conditions include: 
𝑟1 − 𝜆1𝑆1 (
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐾1
) = 0,                  (iii) 
and in words, this says that in equilibrium, the “real” price of capital equals the value of its 
marginal product. The “real” price of capital, 𝑟1, also equals to the product of nominal price of 
capital, 𝛾, and the risk premium scaler, 𝜑1, or 𝑟1 = 𝛾𝜑1.
7 
Next suppose, for the moment, that there are only two state/MSA representative firms. This 
assumption simplifies the exposition that follows but does not affect the results of generalizing to 
n firms. Also, below we interchangeably use 𝐾2 and 𝐾𝐴𝑉𝐺  to refer to both firm 2 and all other 
firms. The results of firm 2’s optimization problem is: 
𝑟2 − 𝜆2𝑆2 (
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐾2
) = 0,                  (iv) 
                                                          
7 We assume that the nominal price of capital, 𝛾, is equal across the U.S. and allow variation in the “real” price of 
capital, r. 
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where 𝜆1(𝜆2) is the shadow price of output for firm 1(firm 2). 
Consider a particular functional form for f, such as: 
𝑌1 = 𝑆1(𝐾1)
𝑎1(𝐿1)
𝑏1(𝐾2)
𝑐1,                      (v) 
where 0 < 𝑎1 < 1 , 0 < 𝑏1 < 1 , and 𝑐1 > 0  or 𝑐1 < 0  or  𝑐1 = 0 . This implies that a 
state’s (MSA’s) own capital is productive but it may or may not be scarce; more capital for firm 1 
raises its output. But more capital demanded by firm 2 may raise or lower firm 1’s output, or it 
may have no effect at all on firm 1’s output. One objective of this paper is for us to determine 
whether or not capital is scarce. In other words, we can address the question: does the representa-
tive firm in a state (MSA) compete for capital with the representative firms in other states (MSAs)? 
Then the first order condition of capital for firm 1 implies: 
𝑟1 = 𝛾𝜑1 = 𝜆1𝑆1[(𝐾1)
𝑎1−1(𝐿1)
𝑏1(𝐾2)
𝑐1],            (vi) 
and for firm 2: 
𝑟2 = 𝛾𝜑2 = 𝜆2𝑆2[(𝐾2)
𝑎2−1(𝐿2)
𝑏2(𝐾1)
𝑐2],           (vii) 
where 𝛾 is the nominal price of capital and r is the “real” cost of capital, and since 𝛾 is the 
same for both firms, this implies: 
𝐾1
𝑎1−𝑐2−1 = [(
𝜑1
𝜑2
) (
𝜆2
𝜆1
) (
𝑆2
𝑆1
) (𝐾2)
𝑎2−𝑐1−1][
(𝐿2)
𝑏2
(𝐿1)𝑏1
],         (viii) 
We can solve for 𝐾1 as a function of 𝐾2, which basically is: 
𝐾1 = [(𝐾2)
(𝑎2−𝑐1−1) (𝑎1−𝑐2−1)⁄ ]{(
𝜑1
𝜑2
) (
𝜆2
𝜆1
) (
𝑆2
𝑆1
) [
(𝐿2)
𝑏2
(𝐿1)𝑏1
]}1 (𝑎1−𝑐2−1)⁄ ,         (ix) 
Equation (ix) tells us the optimal amount of 𝐾1, given 𝐾2 and the other variables. In other 
words, this is firm 1’s reaction function for their financial capital.  
If we take natural logs of this equation, we are left with: 
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log(𝐾1) =
𝑎2−𝑐1−1
𝑎1−𝑐2−1
log(𝐾2) +
1
𝑎1−𝑐2−1
[log(𝜆2) − log(𝜆1) + log(𝑆2) − log(𝑆1) +
                                  log(𝜑1) − log(𝜑2)] +
𝑏2
𝑎1−𝑐2−1
log(𝐿2) −
𝑏1
𝑎1−𝑐2−1
log (𝐿1),                    (x) 
Also, 
 
𝜕log (𝐾1)
𝜕log (𝐾2)
=
𝑎2−𝑐1−1
𝑎1−𝑐2−1
,                  (xi) 
therefore, the reaction function for firm 1 is downward sloping if 
𝑎2−𝑐1−1
𝑎1−𝑐2−1
< 0. A set of 
sufficient conditions for this are that 𝑎2 − 𝑐1 > 1 and 𝑎1 − 𝑐2 < 1. Another set of sufficient con-
ditions is 𝑎2 − 𝑐1 < 1 and 𝑎1 − 𝑐2 > 1. Also, if 𝑎2 = 𝑐1 + 1, this implies no interdependences in 
optimal capital usage across states (MSAs).  
This problem can be generalized to a setting with more than 2 firms. The optimization 
problem for firm 1 then becomes: 
𝑤𝐿1 + 𝑟1𝐾1 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑌1 = (𝑆1)𝑓(𝐾1, 𝐿1, 𝐾𝐴𝑉𝐺),          (xii) 
where 𝐾𝐴𝑉𝐺  is the weighted average of all other firms’ capital demand. We can derive re-
action functions for each firm again. 
One way to test empirically for the sign of the reaction functions – and in turn, to under-
stand how different firms utilize capital differently, is to estimate the reaction functions economet-
rically, using spatial econometrics. In other words, we can estimate 
𝜕log (𝐾1)
𝜕log (𝐾𝐴𝑉𝐺)
. 
If we find empirically that the reaction functions have a negative slope, then we can infer 
that the production “technologies” for the two firms are quite different. It is either the case that 
firm 1 may face a large negative spillover effect from firm 2’s demand for capital (if 𝑐1 is highly 
negative), or firm 2 may face a large negative spillover effect from firm 1’s demand for capital (if 
𝑐2 is highly positive). It also may imply that capital is very productive for firm 1, along with a 
large negative spillover effect from firm 2’s capital, while at the same time capital is not very 
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productive for firm 2. In a more general setting with more than 2 firms, a negative reaction function 
implies that when everyone else’s capital usage increases, this leads to a fall in the optimal amount 
of capital for one particular firm.  
Below we test for which effect is present for REITs and stocks in U.S. states (MSAs). If 
we find a negative relation between the spatially lagged dependent variable (i.e., capital usage for 
other states/MSAs) and the capital usage in a particular state/MSA, then this would be evidence in 
favor of negative spillover effects that imply capital is scarce nationally. However, if we find the 
opposite, that is, if there is a positive relation between the spatially lagged dependent variable for 
all states and a particular state’s (MSA’s) capital usage, this would support the notion that there is 
no evidence of scarcity of capital. 
3. Empirical Model 
3.1. Panel Predictive Regression on Liquidity Variables 
One major goal with the empirical model is to test the sign and significance of equation 
(xi). Therefore, we need to estimate an equation where firm-level capital is the dependent variable. 
Ultimately, we also want to include as a regressor the average of all firms’ capital, and the sign 
and significance on this term will enable us to test equation (xi). Initially, we build up our empirical 
model by following Glascock and Lu-Andrews (2014) and Bernile et al. (2015), so we start by 
using the following panel regression models. We extend the national-level analysis of Glascock 
and Lu-Andrews (2014), by using the State/MSA Coverage Ratio as our measure of the representa-
tive firm’s level of capital.8 First, we regress State Coverage Ratio on the lagged change in state 
and national coincident indexes (Change in SCI and Change in NCI), 
                                                          
8 We didn’t include control variable for risk since State Coverage Ratio has been risk-adjusted. Here we take state-
level analysis as an example because most macroeconomic variables are available at state level.  
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 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑆𝐶𝐼 ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝐶𝐼 ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑡 
               +𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡,                                              (1)                    
where t = 1985Q1, 1994Q2, …, 2014Q4 for stocks and 1994Q1, 1994Q2, …, 2014Q3 for 
REITs, and s = 1, 2, …, N (where N is the total number of states with firm/REIT headquarters). In 
the first predictive regression, the dependent variable is State Coverage Ratio for predictive re-
gressions.9 It is calculated as the natural logarithm of the mean of the interest coverage ratios of 
all the firms (REITs) headquartered within a particular state. The other variables are as defined in 
the Appendix. We include quarter fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 , to control for unobservable general price 
changes over time.10 
In our next set of regressions, we regress State Coverage Ratio on the lagged change in 
state coincident indexes (Change in SCI) with state and quarter fixed effects, 
 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑆𝐶𝐼 ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡,        (2) 
 State fixed effects, 𝜇𝑠 , effectively control for unobservable heterogeneity across U.S. 
states. Change in NCI is excluded because it does not vary cross-sectionally.  
 Lastly, since the interpretation of composite indexes are limited, we adopt individual state 
(regional) macroeconomic factors instead of changes in composite indexes to unveil the full pic-
ture. Specifically, we regress State Coverage Ratio on state (regional) macroeconomic variables 
with fixed effects in equation (3) and (4), 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 ∙ 𝐿𝑛(𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑠,𝑡 
                                                          
9 We also consider State Mortgages as an alternative measure of funding liquidity. For the benefit of space, we didn’t 
provide results on State Mortgages in the paper. The results are provided upon request. 
10 We also adopt leading variables such as PSEA and PNEA instead of coincident indexes.  
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                                                         +𝛽𝐺𝑆𝑃 ∙ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑠,𝑡 + 
                                                          𝛽𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑠,𝑡 
                                                          +𝛽𝐻𝑃𝐼 ∙ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠 
                                                               +𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡,                                                                             (3) 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 ∙ 𝐿𝑛(𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑠,𝑡 
                                                         +𝛽𝐺𝑆𝑃 ∙ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑠,𝑡 + 
                                                          𝛽𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∙ 𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑠,𝑡 
                                                          +𝛽𝐻𝑃𝐼 ∙ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑠,𝑡 + 
                                                               +𝐿𝑛(𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑅,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡                              (4) 
 R is the number of geographic regions for which CPI data are available; there are 4 such 
regions in the U.S., including Northeast, Midwest, South, and West regions.11 
3.2. Spatial Lag and Spatial Multiplier 
In order to examine the issue of cross-state/cross-MSA spillovers and test for the sign and 
significance of equation (xi), we need to adapt our state (MSA)-level models described above. A 
useful tool for this analysis is spatial econometrics, which typically includes a spatial autoregres-
sive model (hereby SAR model) and sometimes a spatial Durbin model (hereby SDM model). The 
SAR model is a formulation of the idea of spatial spillovers – levels of the outcome variable y (i.e., 
                                                          
11 We also estimate equation (3) using MSA-level data. 
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State/MSA Coverage Ratio) depend on the levels of y in neighboring geographic units. On the 
other hand, the SDM model says that, in addition to the levels of y in neighboring geographic units, 
the levels of x (i.e., local macroeconomic variables) in neighboring geographic units are also cor-
related with y. Within the context of liquidity spillovers, common forms of a spatial autoregressive 
model (5a) and spatial Durbin's model combined with a spatial autoregressive model (5b) can be 
expressed as follows, respectively.12 
𝑌 = 𝜌𝑊𝑌 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢              (5a) 
𝑌 = 𝜌𝑊𝑌 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑊𝑋𝜃 + 𝑢            (5b) 
Here Y represents a vector of State/MSA Coverage Ratio and X represents a matrix of 
lagged state macroeconomic variables, and N is the number of states/MSAs and T the number of 
time periods covered by the data.13 There are 20 (21) states and the time periods range from the 
first quarter of 1985 (1994) to the fourth (third) quarter of 2014 for stocks (REITs).14 𝜌, 𝜃, and 𝛽 
are parameters to be estimated. W is the spatial weighting matrix, with individual elements con-
sisting of the inverse-distances (where the weight state/MSA j has on state/MSA i equals the in-
verse of the distance between states/MSAs i and j, normalized by the sum of the weights between 
state/MSA i and all other states/MSAs j). While the weights for the SAR model can be different 
from the weights for the SDM model, often in practice the same weights matrices are used for 
both. 𝑊𝑌 is a matrix of spatial lags, and it represents the weighted average of other jurisdictions' 
                                                          
12  (Cohen, 2010) 
13 We create a balanced panel of state (MSA)-level liquidity measures and state (MSA)-level macroeconomic factors 
by keeping states/MSAs with more than 1 REIT headquarters throughout our sample period 1994-2014. A REIT does 
not necessarily have to exist through the whole sample period to be included in our computation of the state (MSA)-
level centroid. The reasons are twofolds. First, all the measures are aggregated at the state (MSA)-level. Thus a single 
firm enter or exit the sample have very limited effect. Second, using the row-normalized contiguity matrix, which is 
not dependent on firms' geographic coordinates, yields similar evidence. 
14 At MSA-level, there are 38 (17) MSAs and the time periods range from the third quarter of 1991 (the first quarter 
of 1994) to the fourth quarter of 2014 for stocks (REITs). 
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endogenous variable, which is the financial capital measure, State/MSA Coverage Ratio. It has 
been shown (e.g., Kelejian and Prucha, 1998) that Equations (5a) and (5b) can be estimated by 
instrumental variables techniques. For Equation (5a), X is the appropriate instrument for itself, and 
𝑊𝑋 is the instrument for 𝑊𝑌. Similarly, for Equation (5b), 𝑋 is the appropriate instrument for 
itself, 𝑊𝑋 is the instrument for itself, and 𝑊2𝑋 is the instrument for 𝑊𝑌.15 The coefficient esti-
mate, 𝜌, represents the effect on a state’s State/MSA Coverage Ratio of a change in the weighted 
average of all other jurisdictions’ State/MSA Coverage Ratio. Also, each element of the vector of 
coefficient estimates, 𝜃, represents the effect on a state’s (MSA’s) financial capital conditions of 
a change in the weighted average of each of all other states’ (MSAs’) macroeconomic variables 
(and there may be several macroeconomic variables in X).  
To illustrate the spatial multiplier effect, consider a simplified example with only two 
neighboring states (j=1), New York and Connecticut, in one quarter, t. Suppose X is the percentage 
change in the State Unemployment Rate (Unemp) and Y is the financial capital (State Coverage 
Ratio). Then the two rows of observations in Equation (5a) would be written as: 
𝑌𝐶𝑇 = 𝜌𝑌𝑁𝑌 + 𝑋𝐶𝑇𝛽 + 𝑢𝐶𝑇             (6a) 
𝑌𝑁𝑌 = 𝜌𝑌𝐶𝑇 + 𝑋𝑁𝑌𝛽 + 𝑢𝑁𝑌                                   (6b) 
If 𝑋𝐶𝑇 increases by 1%, this leads to a 𝛽% rise or fall in 𝑌𝐶𝑇. But this increase in 𝑌𝐶𝑇 leads 
to a 𝜌𝛽% change in 𝑌𝑁𝑌, which this leads to another 𝜌
2𝛽% change in 𝑌𝐶𝑇, and so on and so forth. 
This spatial multiplier effect is just β[1 + 𝜌 + 𝜌2 + 𝜌3 + ⋯ ] and can be expressed as 𝛽
1
1−𝜌
. It is 
                                                          
15 This is formally expressed as Gershgorin’s Theorem (Cohen, 2002).  
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straightforward to generalize this to the case involving multiple geographic units. Using the exam-
ple from Panel A, Table 6, if the direct effect on Unemployment Rate, 𝛽𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 = −13.180, 𝜌 =
−0.535, then the total effect (including the spatial multiplier effect) is −13.180 ×
1
1−(−0.535)
≈
−8.59. Had we ignored the spatial effects, this would have led to an overestimation of the impact 
by approximately 54%.16 The spatial spillover effects arise through the endogenous interactions 
between neighboring states, and with our spatial econometrics approach, we are able to identify 
the causal effects of states’ changes in financial capital conditions on a particular state’s financial 
capital. 
4. Data 
 In this paper, we use both national and local (MSA-level, state-level, and regional) data to 
examine how macroeconomic conditions can affect the financial capital (measured by State or 
MSA coverage ratio) of common equities (hereby stocks) and equity real estate investment trusts 
(hereby REITs). A detailed explanation on variables can be found in the Appendix. 
Due to the application of spatial models, we only include states that have more than 15 
headquartered stocks over the entire sample period.17 Since REITs represent a relatively homoge-
neous asset class with real estate as their underlying assets, we require a state to have at least one 
REIT in each quarter to be included in our sample (even though most states in our sample host 
more than one REIT per quarter). Our sample ended up having 20 (21) states with 9598 (367) 
                                                          
16 The overestimation of the effect of Ln(Unemployment Rate) on State Coverage Ratio is approximately 60.8% for 
REITs. 
17 We only include MSAs that have more than 5 headquartered stocks (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006) or at least one REIT 
in each quarter. 
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stocks (REITs) from 1985-2014 (1994-2014).18 Over the entire sample period, California (Cali-
fornia) and Texas (New York) are the states with the most and second most stock (REIT) head-
quarters. With 1932 (81) and 1168 (43) stocks (REITs) currently or used to locate in California 
(California) and Texas (New York), respectively. Missouri has the only 164 (4) stock (REIT) 
headquarters. An average state in our sample has approximately 103 (17) stock (REIT) headquar-
ters for each quarter.  
We use the state (MSA) centroid as the location of a state (MSA)’s representative stock 
(REIT) in order to mitigate the concern that headquarter location choice is endogenous to the stock 
(REITs). Since state borders were settled far back to the 19th century (prior to when most listed 
securities were issued), it is less of a concern that our spatial weighting matrix might be endoge-
nous by itself. The latitude and longitude coordinates of each state centroid in our sample are 
reported in Table 1.19 
Summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis are reported in Table 2 for stocks 
and REITs, respectively. We use State/MSA Coverage Ratio to proxy for state (MSA) financial 
capital conditions. State Coverage Ratio is computed as the arithmetic mean of quarterly interest 
coverage ratio for stocks or REIT(s) located in a particular state. Interest coverage ratio is widely 
adopted as a measure of financial solvency. Therefore, a higher State Coverage Ratio indicates 
higher financial capital available to a state representative stock (REIT). 
 For an individual stock (REIT) i headquartered in state s in quarter q,  
                                                          
18 Our MSA-level sample has 38 (17) MSAs with stocks (REITs) from 1991-2014 (1994-2014). We start from 1991 
because data on MSA HPI growth is only available since then. 
19 The latitude and longitude of each MSA centroid is reported in Table A-1 in a similar manner. MSAs are geo-
graphic entities defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
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 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑠,𝑞 =
𝐼𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞
𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞+𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞
, 
 where 𝐼𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞 is the income before extraordinary items of stock (REIT) i headquartered in 
state s in quarter q. 𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞 is the preferred dividends, and 𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞 is the interest and related 
expenses. Then we aggregate stock (REIT)-level interest coverage ratio at the state level to obtain 
State Coverage Ratio. Suppose that there are a total of N stocks (or REITs) headquartered in state 
s, then for state s in quarter q, we compute State Coverage Ratio as, 
 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠,𝑞 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑠,𝑞
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 
 Quarterly financial statement data, most currently obtained from the Compustat quarterly 
database, is used to compute State Coverage Ratio.20 We manually adjust for headquarter reloca-
tions using a combined dataset of headquarter relocation announcements.21 We use State/MSA 
Coverage Ratio as the proxy for state/MSA financial capital because it captures (to some extent) 
the ease with which a stock (or REIT) can gain access to capital. 
 Data on the state unemployment rate and regional consumer price index (1987Q1 and on-
ward) are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); data on gross state product and 
quarterly state income growth are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
Marginal tax rates and state mortgage deduction are acquired from the Feenberg Taxism database 
on NBER's website. State HPI growth is obtained from Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
website. National macroeconomic data are acquired from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Database (FRED). We also download State and National Coincident (Leading) Indexes from the 
                                                          
20 We calculate MSA Coverage Ratio in a similar manner. 
21 For the years 1988 – 2005, these were collected by Dr. Joseph Engelberg. For 2006 onward, this information was 
obtained from news articles from Factiva search. 
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Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (FRED).  Quarterly change in the coincident indexes are 
calculated as the mean of monthly changes within a specific quarter. Quarterly predicted economic 
activities proxies are calculated as the means of the ratio of State and National Leading Index, or 
the predicted six-month growth of the corresponding coincident indexes, to the corresponding co-
incident indexes. We also report pairwise correlation tables of all variables used in our analysis for 
stocks and REITs in Table 3.22 
5. Empirical Results 
 Our findings naturally fall into three categories. Before we present these results, section 
5.1 below briefly discusses the predicted effects of macroeconomic variables on State/MSA cov-
erage ratio for stocks and REITs. Section 5.2 explains the interpretation of spatial lag and spatial 
multiplier, and the distinction between the Spatial Autoregressive Model and Spatial Durbin's 
Model. Section 5.3 describes the predictive panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) 
Model and reports regression results.  
5.1. Macroeconomic effects on local financial capital 
The predicted effects of each macroeconomic variable on State Coverage Ratio are re-
ported in the Appendix. We follow Bernile, Korniotis, Kumar, and Wang (2015) and include in-
formation of local business cycle, i.e., unemployment rate (Ln(state unemployment rate) or 
Ln(MSA unemployment rate)), and housing price index growth (State HPI growth or MSA HPI 
growth) into our analysis of local macroeconomic effects on local financial capital (State coverage 
ratio or MSA coverage ratio). The unemployment rate (Ln(state unemployment rate) or Ln(MSA 
                                                          
22 Data on the MSA unemployment rate, gross MSA product, MSA income growth, and MSA HPI growth is obtained 
from the same data sources. 
83 
 
unemployment rate)) and personal income growth (State income growth or MSA income growth) 
capture local (state-level or MSA-level) labor market conditions and return to human capital, re-
spectively. Ceteris paribus, a lower local unemployment rate leads to higher financial capital in 
the next quarter. Our measure of housing price index growth (State HPI growth or MSA HPI 
growth) reflects financial capital conditions to some extent because it measures local household’s 
borrowing capacity conditional on their housing equity. Therefore, higher local housing price in-
dex growth positively predicts future financial capital conditions. Similarly, one would argue that 
higher level of return to human capital (State income growth or MSA income growth) leads to 
higher financial capital in the next quarter. 
As in Bernile, Korniotis, Kumar, and Wang (2015), we also include variables that capture 
local economic development (GSP growth or GMP growth), local borrowing flexibility (Ln(state 
mortgage deduction)), and local inflation (Regional CPI). Moreover, in order to examine the com-
bined effect of economic activity on financial capital conditions, we obtain state and national co-
incident indexes (Change in SCI, Change in NCI) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
(FRED). We also adopt forward-looking proxies for economic development (PSEA, PNEA) in 
addition to the coincident indexes. These forward-looking measures predict the 6-month growth 
of the corresponding coincident indexes with variables that lead the economy.23 The theoretical 
model developed in Section 3 predicts that larger increases in economic development (GSP growth 
or GMP growth) and economic activities (Change in SCI, Change in NCI, PSEA, and PNEA), 
higher levels of borrowing flexibilities (Ln(state mortgage deduction)), and lower (higher) price 
levels (Regional CPI) should lead to higher level of financial capital (State coverage ratio) for 
                                                          
23 Such variables include state-level housing permits (1 to 4 units), state initial unemployment insurance claims, de-
livery times from the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread be-
tween the 10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill.  
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stocks (REITs) in the next quarter. REITs hold real estate and are resistant to inflation. They are 
attractive to investors particularly when local inflation rates are high (Glascock, Lu and So, 2002). 
Therefore, we expect a positive relation between regional inflation and financial capital conditions 
of REITs. Also, since the market for available funding is more likely to be segmented than inte-
grated, local economic activities (Change in SCI, PSEA) should be more influential than national 
ones (Change in NCI, PNEA). 
5.2. Spatial lag, and spatial multiplier, and spatial econometrics models 
In this section, we extend panel regression analysis in estimating the spatial autoregressive 
model (Hereafter SAR) and the spatial Durbin's model (Hereafter SDM). SAR and SDM are two 
of the most commonly used models in studies applying Spatial Econometrics. The main difference 
between SAR and SDM is that SAR (equation 4a) assumes only the dependent variable has spatial 
dependence while SDM (equation 4b) assumes both the dependent variable and certain independ-
ent variables (i.e., in our example, state or MSA macroeconomic variables) have spatial depend-
ence.24  
In all spatial models, an important consideration is how jurisdictions interact with each 
other. This is modelled empirically through a spatial weights matrix of dimension N by N. We use 
a row-normalized inverse distance matrix. Specifically, in the inverse distance matrix, we first 
obtain data on the centroid location of each state (shown in Table 1) or MSA (shown in Table A-
1). Then we calculate the average distance between centroids in states (MSAs) i and j as the hav-
ersine distance, dij (assuming the earth’s surface is approximately spherical). The haversine for-
mula is expressed as: 
                                                          
24 In our study, the SDM is potentially more robust to cross-sectional heterogeneity than the SAR model but is subject 
to multicollinearity. Therefore, we present only SAR results in the next subsection. 
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𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 2 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠 ∙ arcsin (√𝑠𝑖𝑛2 (
𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗−𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖
2
) + cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) cos (𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗)𝑠𝑖𝑛2(
𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑗−𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖
2
)),  
where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the geographic distance between state (MSA) i’s centroid (with coordinates 
𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖 and 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖) and state (MSA) j’s centroid (with coordinates are 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗 and 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑗), and radius is the 
earth’s radius (radius = 6,378 kilometers, or 3,959 miles). The centroid of each state (MSA) is 
exogenously determined and not subject to selection bias. Each element of the inverse distance 
matrix is expressed as 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 =
1 𝑑𝑖,𝑗⁄
∑ 1 𝑑𝑖,𝑚⁄
𝑁−1
𝑚=1
, where 𝑑𝑖,𝑗 (𝑑𝑖,𝑚) is the distance between the centroids of 
states (MSAs) i and j/m (where we assume 𝑑𝑖,𝑖 = 0), and N is the total number of states (MSAs).  
We report results for both stocks (excluding highly regulated industries, i.e., financial and 
utility firms) and REITs, each in different tables. For instance, while Panel A, Table 4 reports 
regression results for stocks, Panel B, Table 4 reports regression results for REITs. The rest of the 
tables are arranged in a similar manner. In order to show how the coefficient estimates can vary 
across panel regressions and the spatial autoregressive (SAR) model, we report panel regression 
results, direct effects, which are similar to the panel regression results, and total effects, which 
equals the sum of direct effects and indirect effects caused by the spatial multiplier, which captures 
the feedback effects of dependent variables between neighboring states (MSAs). We also report 
the spatial multiplier next to the SAR parameter, . As we describe in the model section, the spatial 
multiplier is 
1
1−𝜌
. We estimate the spatial multiplier utilizing this formula. 
5.3. Regression results and interpretation 
 In Table 4, we test equation (1) by regressing the measure of state financial capital – ag-
gregated measure of State coverage ratio – on the change in state and national coincident indexes 
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(Change in SCI, Change in NCI), with quarterly fixed effects.25 We find that in general, State 
coverage ratio is more influenced by state-level economic activities (Change in SCI) than national 
ones (Change in NCI). The coefficient estimate on the Change in SCI is statistically significant 
and economically meaningful, for both stocks and REITs, while the coefficient estimate on the 
Change in NCI is insignificant. This finding is consistent with our prediction given the evidence 
that the market for available funding is more likely to be segmented than integrated. 
 Based on our theoretical framework, one hypothesis is that the capital available to each 
state’s representative stock (REIT) is heterogeneous, and the impact of financial capital is likely 
to be asymmetric among neighboring states. That is to say, some states might compete with their 
neighbors by drawing scarce capital away from their neighbors, thus causing negative spillovers 
(externalities) on the financial capital conditions of their neighbors. 
 Empirically, we apply the spatial autoregressive (SAR) model to confirm this conjecture. 
We find that the impact of financial capital is asymmetric, where some states are more competitive 
in the local capital markets than their neighbors. We find a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient, , on the spatially lagged financial capital measure, 𝑊 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 for 
both common equities (stocks) and REITs.26 
The magnitude of spatial spillover effects is comparable but more negative for REITs (-
0.596) than stocks (-0.497). Since REITs largely resemble small-cap stocks and have payout re-
                                                          
25 We also use forward-looking measures of economic activities, i.e., predicted economic activity indexes, instead of 
the coincident indexes. The results, which largely resemble Table 4 and 5, are reported in Table A-2 and Table A-3.  
26 It is noteworthy that financial capital conditions of state i itself always receives a spatial weight of 0; therefore, ρ 
only captures the effect of neighboring states’ financial capital conditions on state i’s financial capital. And neighbor-
ing states receive larger weights because of the segmentation of market for funding liquidity. 
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strictions (payout ratio > 90%), they may have restricted sources of funding and more urgent de-
mand for scarce capital (explained by the lower coverage ratio). Therefore, it is likely that there is 
more fierce competition for capital among REITs than among stocks. 
 Moreover, a negative spillover effect indicates overestimation of the effect of local eco-
nomic activities on financial capital conditions for both stocks and REITs. When estimating the 
spatial autoregressive (SAR) model, the coefficient estimates of the direct effect largely resemble 
those of the panel regressions. For instance, the direct effect of Change in SCI is 3.104 (0.556) for 
stocks (REITs). The corresponding panel regression coefficient estimates are 3.477 and 0.545 for 
stocks and REITs, respectively.  
Spatial spillover effects unveil a more comprehensive picture of the impact of Change in 
SCI on State coverage ratio, through the spatial multiplier effect. The spatial multiplier equals the 
inverse of one minus the coefficient estimate on the spatial lagged financial capital measure, 
or1 1 − 𝜌⁄ . Typically, for stability, 𝜌 is in the range of −1 < 𝜌 < 1. Since 𝜌 is negative in our 
application, the spatial multiplier is less than 1. This implies that the spatial multiplier effect may 
actually be a “spatial diminisher” due to the competition for capital among stocks (REITs) in dif-
ferent geographic states. Therefore, the direct effect (and the panel regression estimates) may be 
biased upward. When allowing for competition for capital across space, the total effect of Change 
in SCI is 2.075 (0.353) for common equities (REITs), which is considerably smaller than the cor-
responding direct effect of 3.171 (0.577) and the panel regression coefficient estimates (3.544 and 
0.569 for stocks and REITs, respectively). 
 Since national economic activities do not seem to predict State coverage ratio in the next 
quarter, we exclude Change in NCI and include state and quarter fixed effects. By including state 
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fixed effects, we control for the possibility that the spatial spillovers may be driven by unknown 
state-level characteristics. Any regional or national macroeconomic variables must be excluded 
before state fixed effects are adopted. Results with state fixed effects for stocks and REITs are 
reported in Table 5, Panels A and B, respectively. 
 The results in Table 5 largely resemble those reported in Table 4. The coefficient estimates 
of the spatial lagged State coverage ratio and the Change in SCI are statistically significant and 
economically meaningful, for both stocks and REITs. Therefore, our results are not likely to be 
driven by state-level omitted variables. 
 Thus far we have discussed how changes in economic activities (Change in SCI, Change 
in NCI) predict financial capital (State coverage ratio) in the next quarter. In general, changes in 
state economic activities are positively correlated with future financial capital of stocks and REITs 
headquartered in a particular state. We also find a negative spatial spillover effect that is associated 
with financial capital, for both stocks and REITs. Such a negative spatial spillover effect has two 
implications: (i) stocks and REITs located in neighboring states are competing for scarce capital; 
such competition is fiercer for REITs and, (ii) panel regression coefficient estimates and direct 
spatial effects overestimate the real impact of Change in SCI on State coverage ratio. The true 
impact is the total effect, which is the product of the direct effect and spatial multiplier. 
 However, one may question the usage of changes in state (national) coincident indexes 
(Change in SCI, Change in NCI) since these measures do not demonstrate the specifics of how 
state-level macroeconomic variables affect state financial capital. For instance, whether Change 
in SCI has an effect on future State coverage ratio through local labor market conditions, local 
economic development, or collateral channel is not clear at this moment. Relatedly, one may argue 
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that interpretation of composite indexes is not as intuitive as individual macroeconomic variables. 
Admittedly, with limitations imposed on a single index of local economic activities, we cannot 
restrict our analysis to existing composite indexes. Therefore, we test equation (3) by substituting 
the Change in SCI with the state-level macroeconomic variables in Table 6. 
 Based on our theoretical framework, we adopt state macroeconomic variables that are 
likely to capture different aspects of state-level business cycles, including unemployment rate 
(Ln(state unemployment rate)), housing price index growth (FHFA HPI growth), local economic 
development (GSP growth), and local borrowing flexibility (Ln(state mortgage deduction)). Evi-
dence from both panel regressions and the spatial autoregressive (SAR) model seems to suggest 
that there are subtle differences in state macroeconomic variables that affect the financial capital 
of common equities (stocks) and REITs. Specifically, for stocks, we find that unemployment rate 
(Ln(state unemployment rate)), local economic development (GSP growth), and local borrowing 
flexibility (Ln(state mortgage deduction)) significantly predict State coverage ratio in the next 
quarter. All coefficient estimates have the expected signs. Lower local unemployment rate 
(Ln(state unemployment rate)), higher economic growth (GSP growth), and higher local borrow-
ing flexibility (Ln(state mortgage deduction)) are associated with higher financial capital (State 
coverage ratio) in the next quarter. However, we do not find evidence that supports a housing 
collateral channel, since the coefficient estimate on housing price index growth (FHFA HPI 
growth) is statistically insignificant. 
 On the other hand, local labor market conditions (Ln(state unemployment rate)) and local 
economic growth (GSP growth) are significant determinants of local financial capital (State cov-
erage ratio) of REITs. The coefficient estimates on local borrowing flexibility (Ln(state mortgage 
deduction)), and housing price index growth (FHFA HPI growth) are statistically insignificant.  
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 Negative spatial spillovers do not seem to be affected by the inclusion of state macroeco-
nomic variables rather than the local economic activity index, for both common equities (stocks) 
and REITs. The coefficient estimates on the spatial lagged financial capital (W × State coverage 
ratio) is -0.537 (-0.608) for stocks (REITs). The corresponding spatial multiplier is 0.65 (0.62) for 
stocks (REITs), which is comparable to 0.67(0.63) reported in Table 4 and 5. Therefore, the spatial 
spillover effects identified in our study are not subject to how we define the macroeconomic vari-
ables. That is, using individual state macroeconomic variables results in a similar degree of spatial 
spillovers as using index measures. However, using individual macroeconomic variables facilitates 
our interpretation of the mechanism of how local economic activities affect local financial capital 
conditions. 
 Finally, we include measures of regional inflation (Ln(Regional CPI)) and test equation 
(4). All state macroeconomic variables (as well as state and quarter fixed effects) remain in our 
sample. The results are reported in Table 7. 
 For stocks, the effect Ln(unemployment rate) on State Coverage Ratio is not affected by 
the inclusion of Ln(Regional CPI). However, the coefficient estimate on Ln(State Mortgage De-
duction) becomes insignificant once we include Ln(Regional CPI). Also, Ln(regional CPI) has a 
negative and significant impact on State coverage ratio in the next quarter. Some of the unexpected 
results here may be in part due to the lack of variation in CPI data across states that are within the 
same region. 
On the other hand, local labor market conditions (Ln(state unemployment rate)) and local 
economic growth (GSP growth) continue to be significant determinants of local financial capital 
conditions (State coverage ratio) of REITs while the other local macroeconomic variables are less 
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relevant. Interestingly, the relation between Ln(regional CPI) and State coverage ratio is positive 
but statistically insignificant for REITs. We expect this positive relation because equity real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) hold real estate as their underlying assets and are resistant to inflation 
(Glascock, Lu and So, 2002). Their inflation-hedging characteristic is especially attractive to in-
vestors when local inflation is high. Therefore, REITs distinguish themselves from stocks in that 
their financial capital conditions is positively, not negatively, correlated with local inflation. 
It is also worthwhile to note that the spatial spillover effects of stocks and REITs converge 
with the inclusion of regional and national macroeconomic variables. The coefficient estimate on 
the spatially lagged financial capital conditions (W × State coverage ratio), ρ, further decreases 
from -0.535 in Table 6, Panel A to -0.577 in Table 7, Panel A for stocks, and is about constant 
(from -0.608 in Table 6, Panel B to -0.606 in in Table 7, Panel B) for REITs. In terms of spatial 
multipliers, they are 0.63 for stocks and 0.62 for REITs, respectively. 
We mainly focus on state-level analysis because most local macroeconomic data is avail-
able only at state level. However, it does not imply that the competition effects identified in our 
analysis only applies to state-level data. In the U.S., large MSAs could span multiple states, and 
based on the summary statistics, personal income growth appears to be quite different at MSA-
level than state-level. It is likely that MSA-level data is able to capture different aspects of local 
economic activities than state-level data. Therefore, we re-estimate Table 6 with MSA-level data. 
The results are reported in Table 8. 
 The results in Table 8 are divided into four panels due to the availability of gross MSA 
product growth (from 2003Q1). The competition effect for scarce capital still exists at MSA level. 
And the magnitude of competition effect largely resembles state-level results. Personal income 
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growth appears to be an important determinant of MSA Coverage Ratio at least when spatial econ-
ometrics is applied, indicating that MSA-level data captures different features of local human cap-
ital than state-level data. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have developed a theoretical model to describe the capital usage behavior 
of REITs and stocks. We empirically test the comparative statics implications of this model, in 
order to answer the question: is there competition for scarce capital among firms in different 
states/MSAs?  
Overall, our findings are threefold. First, we find evidence of competition for scarce capital 
across state (MSA) borders. This evidence is further pronounced by the spatial multiplier effects 
(which in this case, these are actually spatial “diminisher” effects because they are smaller than 1). 
Second, state/MSA macroeconomic variables, especially local labor market conditions, economic 
development, and inflation, significantly predict capital usage in the next quarter. Finally, although 
both REITs and stocks are similar in that they demonstrate competition for scarce capital, REITs 
nevertheless maintain some characteristics that resemble their underlying real estate. 
There are several potential extensions and areas for future work that we may be worthwhile 
pursuing. Since market liquidity is affected by local economic conditions and financial capital con-
ditions, one could examine the existence of spatial spillovers of market liquidity across geographic 
neighbors. Our study also has implications for asset pricing. For instance, it has been documented 
that investors have a strong preference for local assets. And local equity returns are shown to ex-
hibit co-movement. Investor proximity effects, or local bias, might be explained by 
knowledge spillovers between investors, or common shock to productivity. Our theoretical model 
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and applications of spatial econometrics tools provide an ideal setting for studying the local bias 
phenomenon. Finally, as another extension to our work, one could also look at the locality of firm's 
assets instead of firm headquarters. We use firm headquarters to define firm location because most 
information transmission and decision-making occur at firm headquarters. However, for some 
companies such as REITs, this may not hold true universally. Specifically, for REITs, the majority 
of general and administration (G&A) expenses occur at the property-level. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
State-level 
State coverage ratio Quarterly state interest coverage ratio, which equals to the 
mean of interest coverage ratios of all firms headquartered in 
one state. Interest coverage ratio is calculated as income before 
extraordinary items (IBQ) divided by the sum of preferred div-
idends (DVPQ) and interest and related expenses (XINTQ). 
The data is obtained from Compustat quarterly database. 
Change in SCI (in percentage) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Quarterly average of the change in State Coincident Index, cal-
culated as the mean of monthly change in State Coincident In-
dex. State Coincident Index is constructed based on the local 
labor market and local economic development conditions. The 
data is available from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
(FRED) at monthly frequency.  
PSEA (in pct.) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Quarterly average of the ratio of State Leading Index to State 
Coincident Index. State Leading Index predicts the six-month 
growth rate of the state’s coincident index. In addition to the 
coincident index, State Leading Index incorporates other vari-
ables that lead the economy, i.e., state-level housing permits (1 
to 4 units), state initial unemployment insurance claims, deliv-
ery times from the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) 
manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread between the 
10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill. Data on 
the State Leading Index is available from Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia (FRED) at monthly frequency. 
Ln(state unemployment rate) 
Expected sign: (–) 
Natural logarithm of quarterly state-level unemployment rate 
(in percentage), which equals to the mean of the monthly state 
unemployment rate within a specific quarter. Data on unem-
ployment rate is downloaded from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). 
FHFA HPI growth (in percentage) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Quarterly change in the all-transactions price index of residen-
tial real estate in the state, obtained from Federal Housing Fi-
nance Agency (FHFA). 
GSP growth (in percentage) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Before 2005Q1, GSP growth is the annual growth rate of gross 
state product. From 2005Q1 and after, GSP growth is the quar-
terly growth rate of gross state product. Data on personal in-
come is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). 
Ln(state mortgage deduction) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Feenberg state marginal tax rate on mortgage, obtained from 
NBER website. 
State income growth State-level labor income quarterly growth, obtained from  the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
MSA-level 
MSA coverage ratio Quarterly MSA interest coverage ratio, which equals to the 
mean of interest coverage ratios of all firms headquartered in 
one MSA. The data is obtained from Compustat quarterly da-
tabase.  
Ln(MSA unemployment rate) 
Expected sign: (-) 
Natural logarithm of quarterly MSA-level unemployment rate 
(in percentage), which equals to the mean of the monthly state 
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unemployment rate within a specific quarter. Data on unem-
ployment rate is downloaded from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). 
GMP growth (in pct.) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Annual growth rate of gross domestic product by metropolitan 
area, obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). Data on GMP is available from 2003Q1. 
MSA income growth (in pct.) 
Expected sign: (+) 
MSA-level labor income annual growth, obtained from the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
MSA HPI growth (in pct.) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Quarterly change in the all-transactions price index of residen-
tial real estate in the metropolitan area, obtained from Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). 
Regional  
Ln(regional CPI) 
Expected sign: (+/–) 
Natural logarithm of the quarterly regional consumer price in-
dex, beginning from 1987Q1. 4 U.S. regions include Northeast, 
Midwest, South and West. Data on regional CPI is obtained 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
National 
Change in NCI (in percentage) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Quarterly average of the change in National Coincident Index, 
calculated as the mean of monthly change in National Coinci-
dent Index. National Coincident Index is constructed based on 
the national labor market and national economic development 
conditions. The data is available from Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia (FRED) at monthly frequency.  
PNEA (in pct.) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Quarterly average of the ratio of National Leading Index to Na-
tional Coincident Index. National Leading Index predicts the 
six-month growth rate of the U.S.’s coincident index. Data on 
the State Leading Index is available from Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia (FRED) at monthly frequency. 
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Table 1: States and Centroid coordinates 
This table reports the 23 states that host at least 15 common equities (stocks) or at least 1 equity real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) during each quarter. We follow common practice in spatial econometrics studies 
and exclude isolated islands. Four states or areas (Hawaii, HI; Alaska, AK; Virgin Islands, VI; Puerto Rico, 
PR) that are not in main U.S. are deemed as isolated islands and thus are dropped from the sample. Financial 
(firms with SIC codes 6000 – 6999) and utility (firms with SIC code 4000 – 4999) firms are excluded from 
the common equities (stocks). A comprehensive list of U.S. equity REITs defined by NAREIT can be 
downloaded from Dr. S. McKay Price’s website. Sample period for common equities (stocks) is from 
1985Q1 to 2014Q4. Sample period for REITs is from 1994Q1 to 2014Q3. Difference sample periods are 
adopted for stocks and REITs because of the structural change in REIT industry in the early 1990s (modern 
REIT era started from 1993, Feng, Price, and Sirmans, 2011). We exclude states with fewer than 15 firms 
to minimize potential measurement error (Korniotis and Kumar, 2013). We don’t have the same require-
ment for REITs because (i) REITs represent a relatively homogeneous asset class and, (ii) the sample size 
restriction – we have on average less than 200 REITs in each quarter. However, we do require a particular 
state to have at least one REIT in each quarter in order to maintain a balanced panel. We report state name, 
state abbreviation, latitude, longitude, stocks and REITs identifiers. Latitude and longitude are the geo-
graphic coordinates of a state’s centroid. Two identifiers equal to 1 if a state hosts at 15 stocks or at least 1 
REIT, and missing (“-”) otherwise.  
State Name State Abbrev. Latitude Longitude Stocks REITs 
Arizona AZ 34.21 -111.60 - 1 
California CA 37.15 -119.54 1 1 
Colorado CO 38.99 -105.51 1 1 
Connecticut CT 41.58 -72.75 1 1 
Florida FL 28.46 -82.41 1 1 
Georgia GA 32.63 -83.42 1 1 
Illinois IL 40.10 -89.15 1 1 
Indiana IN 39.90 -86.28 - 1 
Massachusetts MA 42.16 -71.49 1 1 
Maryland MD 38.95 -76.67 1 1 
Michigan MI 44.84 -85.66 1 1 
Minnesota MN 46.32 -94.20 1 - 
Missouri MO 38.35 -92.46 1 1 
North Carolina NC 35.54 -79.13 1 1 
New Jersey NJ 40.11 -74.67 1 1 
New York NY 42.91 -75.60 1 1 
Ohio OH 40.41 -82.71 1 1 
Pennsylvania PA 40.90 -77.83 1 1 
Tennessee TN 35.86 -86.35 1 1 
Texas TX 31.43 -99.28 1 1 
Virginia VA 37.52 -78.67 1 1 
Washington WA 47.42 -120.60 1 1 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (Update this table with balanced panel information) 
All variables are defined in Appendix. Summary statistics of the variables are reported for common equities 
(stocks) and equity real estate investment trusts (REITs). Financial (firms with SIC codes 6000 – 6999) and 
utility (firms with SIC code 4000 – 4999) firms are excluded from the common equities (stocks). A com-
prehensive list of U.S. equity REITs defined by NAREIT can be downloaded from Dr. S. McKay Price’s 
website. Sample period for common equities (stocks) is from 1985Q1 to 2014Q4. Sample period for REITs 
is from 1994Q1 to 2014Q3. Difference sample periods are adopted for stocks and REITs because of the 
structural change in REIT industry in the early 1990s (modern REIT era started from 1993, Feng, Price, 
and Sirmans, 2011). We exclude states with fewer than 15 firms (Korniotis and Kumar, 2013) and MSAs 
with fewer than 5 firms (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006) to minimize potential measurement error. We don’t 
have the same requirement for REITs because (i) REITs represent a relatively homogeneous asset class and, 
(ii) the sample size restriction – we have on average less than 200 REITs in each quarter. However, we do 
require a specific state (MSA) to have at least one REIT in each quarter in order to maintain a balanced 
panel. We report mean, median, standard deviation, 25 percentile and 75 percentile in Column 1 to 5, re-
spectively. 
Variable # Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. 25 Pct. 75 Pct. 
Stocks (financial and utility firms are excluded), 1985Q1 – 2014Q4 
State coverage ratio 2,400 5.06 5.17 16.73 -0.78 11.93 
MSA coverage ratio 3,572 6.53 5.66 16.63 -0.25 14.34 
Change in SCI (in pct.) 2,400 0.21 0.27 0.28 0.10 0.40 
Change in NCI (in pct.) 2,400 0.21 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.31 
PSEA (in pct.) 2,400 1.14 1.15 1.36 0.48 1.87 
PNEA (in pct.) 2,400 1.10 1.06 0.78 0.76 1.63 
Ln(state unemployment rate) 2,400 1.74 1.73 0.31 1.53 1.95 
Ln(MSA unemployment rate) 3,572 1.62 1.62 0.36 1.38 1.86 
FHFA HPI growth (in pct.) 2,400 0.91 0.97 1.66 0.19 1.70 
MSA HPI growth (in pct.) 3,572 0.86 0.95 2.32 -0.15 2.02 
GSP growth (in pct.) 2,400 4.27 4.46 3.15 1.41 6.73 
GMP growth (in pct.) 1,824 4.04 4.06 3.45 2.50 5.98 
State income growth (in pct.) 2,400 1.27 1.30 1.13 0.77 1.85 
MSA income growth (in pct.) 3,572 5.21 5.22 3.61 3.49 7.37 
Ln(state mortgage deduction) 2,400 0.80 0 0.91 0 1.69 
Ln(regional CPI) 2,240 5.13 5.14 0.23 4.96 5.33 
       
REITs, 1994Q1 – 2014Q3 
State coverage ratio 1,764 0.70 0.65 0.96 0.30 1.04 
MSA coverage ratio 1,428 1.33 0.71 2.44 0.31 1.46 
Change in SCI (in pct.) 1,764 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.08 0.37 
Change in NCI (in pct.) 1,764 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.15 0.29 
PSEA (in pct.) 1,764 0.82 0.98 1.07 0.38 1.45 
PNEA (in pct.) 1,764 0.87 0.99 0.69 0.64 1.24 
Ln(state unemployment rate) 1,764 1.73 1.69 0.32 1.50 1.93 
Ln(MSA unemployment rate) 1,428 1.64 1.62 0.39 1.36 1.90 
FHFA HPI growth (in pct.) 1,764 0.82 0.95 1.78 0.13 1.70 
MSA HPI growth (in pct.) 1,428 0.85 1.00 2.40 -0.11 2.05 
GSP growth (in pct.) 1,764 4.45 4.58 2.65 3.10 6.00 
GMP growth (in pct.) 816 3.97 4.08 3.38 2.41 5.79 
State income growth (in pct.) 1,764 1.13 1.16 1.12 0.65 1.68 
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MSA income growth (in pct.) 1,428 5.17 5.34 3.59 3.31 7.42 
Ln(state mortgage deduction) 1,764 0.67 0 0.86 0 1.58 
Ln(regional CPI) 1,764 5.24 5.24 0.15 5.12 5.38 
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Table 3: Correlation Table 
All variables are defined in Appendix. Pairwise correlation tables of the variables are reported for common equities (stocks) and equity real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) in Panel A and B, respectively. Financial (firms with SIC codes 6000 – 6999) and utility (firms with SIC code 4000 – 
4999) firms are excluded from the common equities. In the first row, number 1 – 11 represents State coverage ratio, Change in SCI, …, State income 
growth, respectively. * indicates the statistical significance at 1% level. 
Panel A – Stocks (financial and utility firms are excluded) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
State coverage ratio 1           
Change in SCI  0.10* 1          
Change in NCI 0.12* 0.84* 1         
PSEA 0.10* 0.91* 0.72* 1        
PNEA 0.13* 0.77* 0.89* 0.81* 1       
Ln(unemp) 0.08* -0.19* -0.18* -0.05 -0.05 1      
FHFA HPI growth -0.00 0.35* 0.28* 0.32* 0.28* -0.36* 1     
GSP growth -0.05 0.45* 0.40* 0.54* 0.54* -0.37* 0.41* 1    
Ln(stmort) 0.01 0.05* 0.00 0.05 -0.00 -0.14* 0.01 0.05 1   
Ln(regional CPI) 0.00 -0.26* -0.29* -0.43* -0.54* 0.22* -0.24* -0.72* -0.02 1  
State income growth 0.10* 0.50* 0.46* 0.44* 0.42* -0.23* 0.20* 0.33* 0.04 -0.26* 1 
 
Panel B – REITs 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
State coverage ratio 1           
Change in SCI  0.17* 1          
Change in NCI 0.16* 0.87* 1         
PSEA 0.17* 0.95* 0.83* 1        
PNEA 0.18* 0.83* 0.93* 0.86* 1       
Ln(unemp) -0.21* -0.26* -0.25* -0.16* -0.17* 1      
FHFA HPI growth 0.10* 0.38* 0.30* 0.36* 0.30* -0.34* 1     
GSP growth 0.19* 0.71* 0.61* 0.68* 0.57* -0.51* 0.44* 1    
Ln(stmort) -0.08* 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.09* -0.01 0.13* 1   
Ln(regional CPI) 0.25* -0.26* -0.28* -0.34* -0.42* 0.52* -0.22* -0.48* -0.14* 1  
State income growth 0.12* 0.54* 0.49* 0.50* 0.46* -0.29* 0.20* 0.49* 0.10* -0.24* 1 
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Table 4: Spatial Autoregressive Model with the Change in State and National Coincident Indexes 
In this table, we report regression results of panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of State Coverage Ratio at quarter t+1. Independent varia-
bles are the Change in State and National Coincident Indexes (Change in SCI, Change in NCI) at quarter t. 
All variables are defined in Appendix. Panel A exhibits the results for common equities (stocks). Panel B 
reports the results for equity real estate investment trusts (REITs). The magnitude of spatial spillover effect 
(feedback effect) is measured by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged outcome variable (W × 
State Coverage Ratio). W is the row-normalized inverse-distance matrix. The impact of spatial spillover 
effect (feedback effect) on macroeconomic effects is captured by the spatial multiplier, which equals to 
1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . Direct effect largely resembles the coefficient estimates of the panel regressions. Total effect, 
which approximately equals to the product of direct effect and spatial multiplier, is reported in parallel to 
the direct effect. Quarter fixed effect is included. t-statistics are reported beneath the coefficient estimates 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A – Stocks (financial and utility firms are excluded) 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio (𝜌) – – 
– 
-0.497 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.67 (t statistics) – – (-7.75)  
Change in SCI 3.477 * – – 3.104 * 2.033 * 
(t statistics) (1.86)  – – (1.67)  (1.65)  
Change in NCI -38.755  – – -34.765  -54.485  
(t statistics) (-0.07)  – – (-0.07)  (-0.17)  
 
Number of Obs 2400 2400 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 28% 33% 
State Fixed Effects No No 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Panel B – REITs 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio – – 
– 
-0.596 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.63 (t statistics) – – (-8.14)  
Change in SCI 0.545 *** – – 0.556 *** 0.340 *** 
(t statistics) (3.54)  – – (3.63)  (3.53)  
Change in NCI 5.704  – – -28.447  -17.369  
(t statistics) (1.54)  – – (-1.26)  (-1.26)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 19% 19% 
State Fixed Effects No No 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Table 5: Spatial Autoregressive Model with the Change in State Coincident Indexes 
In this table, we report regression results of panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of State Coverage Ratio at quarter t+1. Independent varia-
bles are the Change in State Coincident Indexes (Change in SCI) at quarter t. Change in National Coincident 
Index (Change in NCI) is excluded because of the inclusion of state fixed effects. All variables are defined 
in Appendix. Panel A exhibits the results for common equities (stocks). Panel B reports the results for 
equity real estate investment trusts (REITs). The magnitude of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) is 
measured by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged outcome variable (W × State Coverage 
Ratio). W is the row-normalized inverse-distance matrix. The impact of spatial spillover effect (feedback 
effect) on macroeconomic effects is captured by the spatial multiplier, which equals to 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . Direct 
effect largely resembles the coefficient estimates of the panel regressions. Total effect, which approximately 
equals to the product of direct effect and spatial multiplier, is reported in parallel to the direct effect. State 
and quarter fixed effects are included. t-statistics are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in parenthe-
ses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A – Stocks (financial and utility firms are excluded) 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio (𝜌) – – 
– 
-0.502 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.67 (t statistics) – – (-7.83)  
Change in SCI 3.544 * – – 3.171 * 2.075 * 
(t statistics) (1.89)  – – (1.71)  (1.69)  
 
Number of Obs 2400 2400 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 28% 33% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Panel B – REITs 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio – – 
– 
-0.597 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.63 (t statistics) – – (-8.16)  
Change in SCI 0.569 *** – – 0.577 *** 0.353 *** 
(t statistics) (3.68)  – – (3.78)  (3.70)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 19% 19% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Table 6: Spatial Autoregressive Model with the Change in State Macroeconomic Variables 
In this table, we report regression results of panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of State Coverage Ratio at quarter t+1. Independent varia-
bles are the state macroeconomic variables at quarter t. State macroeconomic variables include Log(Unem-
ployment rate), Gross State Product Growth, Log(State Mortgage Deduction), State House Price Index 
Growth, and State Income Growth. All variables are defined in Appendix. Panel A exhibits the results for 
common equities (stocks). Panel B reports the results for equity real estate investment trusts (REITs). The 
magnitude of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) is measured by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the 
spatial lagged outcome variable (W × State Coverage Ratio). W is the row-normalized inverse-distance 
matrix. The impact of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) on macroeconomic effects is captured by the 
spatial multiplier, which equals to 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . Direct effect largely resembles the coefficient estimates of 
the panel regressions. Total effect, which approximately equals to the product of direct effect and spatial 
multiplier, is reported in parallel to the direct effect. State and quarter fixed effects are included. t-statistics 
are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the 
coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A – Stocks (financial and utility firms are excluded) 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio – – 
– 
-0.535 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.65 (t statistics) – – (-8.34)  
Ln(unemployment rate) -12.168 *** – – -13.180 *** -8.393 *** 
(t statistics) (-5.58)  – – (-6.08)  (-5.98)  
Gross State Product Growth 0.155  – – 0.116  0.074  
(t statistics) (0.79)  – – (0.63)  (0.63)  
Ln(State Mortgage Deduction) 7.680 ** – – 9.320 *** 5.929 *** 
(t statistics) (2.18)  – – (2.86)  (2.88)  
State House Price Index Growth 0.154  – – 0.102  0.065  
(t statistics) (0.58)  – – (0.41)  (0.41)  
State Income Growth 0.281  – – 0.257  0.163  
(t statistics) (0.70)  – – (0.69)  (0.69)  
 
Number of Obs 2400 2400 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 35% 35% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Panel B – REITs 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio – – 
– 
-0.608 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.62 (t statistics) – – (-8.30)  
Ln(Unemployment rate) -0.469 ** – – -0.568 *** -0.344 *** 
(t statistics) (-2.49)  – – (-3.04)  (-3.04)  
Gross State Product Growth 0.051 *** – – 0.045 *** 0.027 *** 
(t statistics) (3.48)  – – (3.34)  (3.25)  
Ln(State Mortgage Deduction) -0.036  – – -0.020  -0.012  
(t statistics) (-0.44)  – – (-0.26)  (-0.26)  
State House Price Index Growth 0.023  – – 0.024  0.015  
(t statistics) (1.25)  – – (1.43)  (1.43)  
State Income Growth -0.013  – – -0.007  -0.004  
(t statistics) (-0.42)  – – (-0.23)  (-0.23)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 20% 20% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
  
108 
 
Table 7 – Regional Inflation and Local Liquidity Spillover Effects 
In this table, we report regression results of panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of State Coverage Ratio at quarter t+1. Independent varia-
bles are the state, regional, and national macroeconomic variables at quarter t. State macroeconomic varia-
bles include Log(Unemployment rate), Gross State Product Growth, Log(State Mortgage Deduction), State 
House Price Index Growth, and State Income Growth. Regional macroeconomic variable is Log(Regional 
CPI), which is a proxy for local inflation. (Since we couldn’t find inflation measure at state level, regional 
CPI is by far the most accurate measure of local inflation; due to data availability of Log(Regional CPI), 
our analysis of common equities in Panel A and B starts from 1987Q1 and has 2,240 observations). All 
variables are defined in Appendix. Panel A exhibits the results for common equities (stocks). Panel B re-
ports the results for equity real estate investment trusts (REITs). The magnitude of spatial spillover effect 
(feedback effect) is measured by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged outcome variable (W × 
State Coverage Ratio). W is the row-normalized inverse-distance matrix. The impact of spatial spillover 
effect (feedback effect) on macroeconomic effects is captured by the spatial multiplier, which equals to 
1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . Direct effect largely resembles the coefficient estimates of the panel regressions. Total effect, 
which approximately equals to the product of direct effect and spatial multiplier, is reported in parallel to 
the direct effect. State and quarter fixed effect is included. t-statistics are reported beneath the coefficient 
estimates in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
Panel A – Stocks (financial and utility firms are excluded) 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio – – 
– 
-0.577 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.63 (t statistics) – – (-8.59)  
Ln(Unemployment rate) -11.831 *** – – -12.742 *** -7.890 *** 
(t statistics) (-5.07)  – – (-5.50)  (-5.42)  
Gross State Product Growth 0.138  – – 0.088  0.055  
(t statistics) (0.66)  – – (0.45)  (0.46)  
Ln(State Mortgage Deduction) 5.915  – – 6.858 * 4.250 * 
(t statistics) (1.46)  – – (1.83)  (1.83)  
State House Price Index Growth 0.185  – – 0.076  0.047  
(t statistics) (0.62)  – – (0.27)  (0.27)  
State Income Growth 0.234  – – 0.215  0.133  
(t statistics) (0.54)  – – (0.54)  (0.53)  
Ln(Regional CPI) -22.837 *** – – -34.954 *** -21.610 *** 
(t statistics) (-4.15)  – – (-6.44)  (-6.83)  
 
Number of Obs 2240 2240 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 35% 35% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Panel B – REITs 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio – – 
– 
-0.606 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.62 (t statistics) – – (-8.28)  
Ln(Unemployment rate) -0.417 ** – – -0.521 *** -0.317 *** 
(t statistics) (-2.15)  – – (-2.72)  (-2.72)  
Gross State Product Growth 0.052 *** – – 0.046 *** 0.028 *** 
(t statistics) (3.56)  – – (3.40)  (3.37)  
Ln(State Mortgage Deduction) -0.035  – – -0.020  -0.012  
(t statistics) (-0.44)  – – (-0.26)  (-0.26)  
State House Price Index Growth 0.026  – – 0.027  0.016  
(t statistics) (1.38)  – – (1.55)  (1.55)  
State Income Growth -0.013  – – -0.006  -0.004  
(t statistics) (-0.39)  – – (-0.21)  (-0.21)  
Ln(Regional CPI) 2.816  – – 2.567  1.562  
(t statistics) (1.18)  – – (1.11)  (1.11)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 20% 20% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Table 8 – MSA Level Analysis for Stocks (38 MSAs) and REITs (17 MSAs)  
In this table, we report regression results of panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of MSA Coverage Ratio at quarter t+1. Independent varia-
bles are the MSA macroeconomic variables at quarter t. MSA macroeconomic variables include Log(MSA 
Unemployment rate), MSA Income Growth, and MSA House Price Index Growth. Gross MSA Product 
Growth is available from 2003Q1 and is included in Panel C and D. All variables are defined in Appendix. 
Panel A (C) exhibits the results for common equities (stocks). Panel B (D) reports the results for equity real 
estate investment trusts (REITs). The magnitude of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) is measured by 
the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged outcome variable (W × State Coverage Ratio). W is the 
row-normalized inverse-distance matrix. The impact of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) on macro-
economic effects is captured by the spatial multiplier, which equals to 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . Direct effect largely 
resembles the coefficient estimates of the panel regressions. Total effect, which approximately equals to 
the product of direct effect and spatial multiplier, is reported in parallel to the direct effect. State and quarter 
fixed effects are included. t-statistics are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A – Stocks (financial and utility firms are excluded) 1991Q3 – 2014Q4 
Model GLS - MSA Coverage Ratio SAR - State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × MSA Coverage Ratio – – 
– 
-0.379 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.73 (t statistics) – – (-5.99)  
Log(MSA Unemployment rate) -7.241 *** – – -7.085 *** -5.120 *** 
(t statistics) (-4.12)  – – (-4.01)  (-3.95)  
Gross MSA Product Growth – – – – – – – – 
(t statistics) – – – – – – – – 
MSA Income Growth 0.191  – – 0.231 ** 0.167 ** 
(t statistics) (1.64)  – – (2.10)  (2.09)  
MSA House Price Index Growth 0.168  – – 0.174  0.126  
(t statistics) (1.18)  – – (1.31)  (1.30)  
 
Number of Obs 3572 3572 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 14% 14% 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Panel B – Stocks (financial and utility firms are excluded) 2003Q1 – 2014Q4 
Model GLS - MSA Coverage Ratio SAR - State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × MSA Coverage Ratio – – 
– 
-0.410 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.71 (t statistics) – – (-4.63)  
Log(MSA Unemployment rate) -4.611  – – -4.672  -3.312  
(t statistics) (-1.46)  – – (-1.57)  (-1.56)  
Gross MSA Product Growth 0.492 *** – – 0.512 *** 0.362 *** 
(t statistics) (2.73)  – – (2.85)  (2.79)  
MSA Personal Income Growth 0.207  – – 0.245  0.174  
(t statistics) (1.22)  – – (1.51)  (1.50)  
MSA House Price Index Growth 0.258  – – 0.259 * 0.183 * 
(t statistics) (1.60)  – – (1.73)  (1.71)  
 
Number of Obs 1824 1824 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 11% 11% 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Panel C – U.S. Equity REITs 1994Q1 – 2014Q4 
Model GLS - MSA Coverage Ratio SAR - State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × MSA Coverage Ratio – – 
– 
-0.736 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.58 (t statistics) – – (-8.85)  
Log(MSA Unemployment rate) -0.887  – – -0.743 ** -0.412 ** 
(t statistics) (-1.22)  – – (-2.04)  (-2.02)  
Gross MSA Product Growth – – – – - - - - 
(t statistics) – – – – - - - - 
MSA Personal Income Growth 0.080 * – – 0.086 *** 0.047 *** 
(t statistics) (1.87)  – – (3.23)  (3.23)  
MSA House Price Index Growth -0.027  – – -0.024  -0.013  
(t statistics) (0.94)  – – (-0.83)  (-0.83)  
 
Number of Obs 1428 1428 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 17% 17% 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Panel D – U.S. Equity REITs 2003Q1 – 2014Q4 
Model GLS - MSA Coverage Ratio SAR - State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × MSA Coverage Ratio – – 
– 
-0.736 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.58 (t statistics) – – (-6.42)  
Log(MSA Unemployment rate) -1.526 ** – – -1.589 *** -0.884 ** 
(t statistics) (-2.27)  – – (-2.58)  (-2.54)  
Gross MSA Product Growth -0.031  – – -0.035  -0.020  
(t statistics) (-0.89)  – – (-1.04)  (-1.03)  
MSA Personal Income Growth 0.055 * – – 0.067 ** 0.037 ** 
(t statistics) (1.72)  – – (2.26)  (2.23)  
MSA House Price Index Growth -0.045  – – -0.047 * -0.026  
(t statistics) (-1.46)  – – (-1.65)  (-1.63)  
 
Number of Obs 816 816 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 8% 8% 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Table A-1: MSAs and Centroid coordinates 
This table reports the 40 states that host at least 5 common equities (stocks) or at least 1 equity real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) during each quarter. We follow common practice in spatial econometrics studies 
and exclude isolated islands. Four states or areas (Hawaii, HI; Alaska, AK; Virgin Islands, VI; Puerto Rico, 
PR) that are not in main U.S. are deemed as isolated islands and thus are dropped from the sample. Financial 
(firms with SIC codes 6000 – 6999) and utility (firms with SIC code 4000 – 4999) firms are excluded from 
the common equities (stocks). A comprehensive list of U.S. equity REITs defined by NAREIT can be 
downloaded from Dr. S. McKay Price’s website. Sample period for common equities (stocks) is from 
1991Q1 to 2014Q4. Sample period for REITs is from 1994Q1 to 2014Q3. Difference sample periods are 
adopted for stocks and REITs because of the structural change in REIT industry in the early 1990s (modern 
REIT era started from 1993, Feng, Price, and Sirmans, 2011). We exclude MSAs with fewer than 5 firms 
to minimize potential measurement error (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006). We don’t have the same requirement 
for REITs because (i) REITs represent a relatively homogeneous asset class and, (ii) the sample size re-
striction – we have on average less than 200 REITs in each quarter. However, we do require a particular 
MSA to have at least one REIT in each quarter in order to maintain a balanced panel. We report Core-based 
statistical area (CBSA) code, MSA name, latitude, longitude, stocks and REITs identifiers. Latitude and 
longitude are the geographic coordinates of a MSA’s centroid. Two identifiers equal to 1 if a state hosts at 
5 stocks or at least 1 REIT, and missing (“-”) otherwise.  
CBSA 
Code 
MSA Name Latitude Longitude Stocks REITs 
10420 Akron, OH 41.148687 -81.349463 1 - 
12060 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Ro-
swell, GA 
33.692817 -84.399584 1 1 
12420 Austin-Round Rock, TX 30.26263 -97.65444 1 - 
12580 
Baltimore-Columbia-Tow-
son, MD 
39.38291 -76.67397 1 1 
13820 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 33.463808 -86.813922 1 1 
15380 
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Ni-
agara Falls, NY 
42.910628 -78.736284 1 - 
16740 
Charlotte-Concord-Gas-
tonia, NC-SC 
35.188911 -80.867193 1 1 
17140 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 39.071527 -84.427435 1 - 
17460 Cleveland-Elyria, OH 41.252857 -82.011552 1 1 
18140 Columbus, OH 39.968129 -82.836654 1 - 
19740 
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, 
CO 
39.565082 -104.95793 1 1 
24660 Greensboro-High Point, NC 36.025838 -79.791694 - 1 
26420 
Houston-The Woodlands-
Sugar Land, TX 
29.77094 -95.36936 1 1 
26900 
Indianapolis-Carmel-An-
derson, IN 
39.747438 -86.206134 1 1 
27260 Jacksonville, FL 30.236739 -81.791904 1 1 
28140 Kansas City, MO-KS 38.937168 -94.444393 1 1 
29820 
Las Vegas-Henderson-Par-
adise, NV 
36.215107 -115.01474 1 - 
31140 
Louisville/Jefferson 
County, KY-IN 
38.336708 -85.670868 1 - 
32820 Memphis, TN-MS-AR 35.007684 -89.815236 - 1 
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33340 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-
West Allis, WI 
43.176649 -88.172225 1 - 
33460 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-
Bloomington, MN-WI 
45.064989 -93.345578 1 - 
34980 
Nashville-Davidson--
Murfreesboro--Franklin, 
TN 
36.089099 -86.724429 1 1 
36420 Oklahoma City, OK 35.429871 -97.503839 1 - 
36540 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, 
NE-IA 
41.290028 -95.999126 1 - 
36740 
Orlando-Kissimmee-San-
ford, FL 
28.434477 -81.363084 1 1 
37100 
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-
Ventura, CA 
34.471498 -119.07831 1 1 
38060 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, 
AZ 
33.185712 -112.07047 1 - 
38300 Pittsburgh, PA 40.439032 -79.830876 1 - 
38900 
Portland-Vancouver-Hills-
boro, OR-WA 
45.598479 -122.47884 1 - 
39580 Raleigh, NC 35.719731 -78.500937 1 1 
40060 Richmond, VA 37.462382 -77.474738 1 - 
40380 Rochester, NY 42.913265 -77.584367 1 - 
41180 St. Louis, MO-IL 38.735246 -90.350178 1 - 
41620 Salt Lake City, UT 40.451241 -113.0348 1 - 
41700 
San Antonio-New Braun-
fels, TX 
29.428709 -98.602203 1 - 
41740 San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 33.033927 -116.73521 1 1 
41940 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa 
Clara, CA 
36.910326 -121.37691 1 - 
45300 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater, FL 
28.153512 -82.40742 1 - 
46140 Tulsa, OK 36.250412 -96.166232 1 - 
47260 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-
Newport News, VA-NC 
36.718108 -76.356805 1 - 
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Table A-2: Spatial Autoregressive Model with the Predicted Economic Activity Indexes 
In this table, we report regression results of panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of State Coverage Ratio at quarter t+1. Independent varia-
bles are the Predicted State and National Economic Activities (PSEA, PNEA) at quarter t. All variables are 
defined in Appendix. Panel A exhibits the results for common equities (stocks). Panel B reports the results 
for equity real estate investment trusts (REITs). The magnitude of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) 
is measured by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged outcome variable (W × State Coverage 
Ratio). W is the row-normalized inverse-distance matrix. The impact of spatial spillover effect (feedback 
effect) on macroeconomic effects is captured by the spatial multiplier, which equals to 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . Direct 
effect largely resembles the coefficient estimates of the panel regressions. Total effect, which approximately 
equals to the product of direct effect and spatial multiplier, is reported in parallel to the direct effect. Quarter 
fixed effect is included. t-statistics are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A – Stocks (financial and utility firms are excluded) 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio (𝜌) – – 
– 
-0.498 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.67 (t statistics) – – (-7.77)  
PSEA 0.797 ** – – 0.764 ** 0.500 ** 
(t statistics) (2.15)  – – (2.07)  (2.04)  
PNEA 3.520  – – 3.638  2.339  
(t statistics) (0.08)  – – (0.08)  (0.08)  
 
Number of Obs 2400 2400 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 33% 33% 
State Fixed Effects No No 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Panel B – REITs 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio – – 
- 
-0.592 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.63 (t statistics) – – (-8.08)  
PSEA 0.122 *** – – 0.119 *** 0.073 *** 
(t statistics) (2.97)  – – (2.91)  (2.84)  
PNEA 0.277  – – -3.506  -2.147  
(t statistics) (1.16)  – – (-1.29)  (-1.29)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 19% 19% 
State Fixed Effects No No 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Table A-3: Spatial Autoregressive Model with the Predicted Economic Activity Indexes 
In this table, we report regression results of panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of State Coverage Ratio at quarter t+1. Independent varia-
bles are the Predicted State Economic Activities (PSEA) at quarter t. Predicted National Economic Activi-
ties (PNEA) proxy is excluded because of the inclusion of state fixed effects. All variables are defined in 
Appendix. Panel A exhibits the results for common equities (stocks). Panel B reports the results for equity 
real estate investment trusts (REITs). The magnitude of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) is measured 
by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged outcome variable (W × State Coverage Ratio). W is 
the row-normalized inverse-distance matrix. The impact of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) on 
macroeconomic effects is captured by the spatial multiplier, which equals to 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . Direct effect 
largely resembles the coefficient estimates of the panel regressions. Total effect, which approximately 
equals to the product of direct effect and spatial multiplier, is reported in parallel to the direct effect. State 
and quarter fixed effects are included. t-statistics are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in parenthe-
ses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A – Stocks (financial and utility firms are excluded) 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio (𝜌) – – 
– 
-0.504 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.67 (t statistics) – – (-7.86)  
PSEA 0.803 ** – – 0.770 ** 0.503 ** 
(t statistics) (2.16)  – – (2.09)  (2.06)  
 
Number of Obs 2400 2400 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 33% 33% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Panel B – REITs 
Model GLS – State Coverage Ratio SAR – State Coverage Ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State Coverage Ratio – – 
– 
-0.593 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.63 (t statistics) – – (-8.09)  
PSEA 0.128 *** – – 0.124 *** 0.076 *** 
(t statistics) (3.09)  – – (3.04)  (2.98)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 19% 19% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Essay 3 
REIT Liquidity Spillover Effects and Competition for Scarce Capital  
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1. Introduction 
It is widely believed that REIT liquidity can be impacted by macroeconomic factors. 
However, the detailed mechanisms and processes of this relationship have not been extensively 
studied. States that share a common border, or that are otherwise reasonably close geographically, 
can exhibit various patterns of interaction with each other relative to information that can affect 
REIT pricing. For instance, REITs with headquarters in Connecticut can be affected by state-level 
macroeconomic news in nearby New York or Massachusetts. This can affect the liquidity of 
Connecticut REITs and cause either more or less demand for these REITs. Coval and Moskowitz 
(2001) demonstrate this effect relative to mutual fund investing. They find that having locally 
specialized knowledge allows local investors to earn superior investment return. On the other hand, 
competition for scarce financial capital (Nordlund, 2016; Wang, Cohen, and Glascock, 2017) 
indicates that improvement in a particular state’s market liquidity condition might have detrimental 
effect on its geographic neighbors, especially when the aggregate level of liquidity is low. We 
combine these ideas of geographic effects via macroeconomic variables and local 
knowledge/competition in this research. We look specifically at how state-level macroeconomic 
factors affect market liquidity for REITs.  
Several recent studies have devoted attention to national and state-level macroeconomic 
variables’ effects on REITs’ liquidity, both funding liquidity and market liquidity. The reinforcing 
relationship between funding liquidity and market liquidity of firms has been intensively studied 
at national level for U.S. equities and national macroeconomic factors seem to affect firms’ market 
liquidity only through funding liquidity (see the work of Brunnermeier and Peterson, 2009; and 
Glascock and Lu-Andrews, 2014). This effect, which became known as the channel effect between 
market liquidity and funding liquidity, is not well established at the state level. In this research, we 
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address this issue by asking whether or not the channel effect exists at state level and, if so, how 
can we assess and interpret its spillover benefits or costs across geographic boundaries. Our 
empirical results confirm, consistent with evidence at the national level, that state macro-economic 
factors affect state market liquidity through state funding liquidity.  
 A key part of our effort is to examine the feedback effects, or “endogenous” local effects, 
between neighboring geographic units. These feedback effects are of vital importance because they 
capture an alternative causation channel which did not receive enough attention in the existing 
literature. As suggested by Marshall (1890) and Manski (1993), there are at least two causation 
channels. One is common exposure to some unobserved factor X, where X affects A and B 
independently (𝑋 → 𝐴, 𝑋 → 𝐵). The other is dependent on the interactions between A and B, where 
X either indirectly affects A through B, or affects B through A (𝑋 → 𝐵 → 𝐴 𝑜𝑟 𝑋 → 𝐴 → 𝐵).1 The 
former channel (direct effects) has been studied extensively in the existing literature while the 
latter (indirect effects) has been largely neglected.2 One exception, however, is the recent work by 
Dougal, Parsons, and Titman (2015), whereby the authors find that, at least for investment 
opportunities, these interactions are important. Firm A’s investment opportunities are improved 
given that another local Firm B within/across industries has a banner year. Therefore, local firms 
behave similarly not because of a systematic exogenous factor, but rather because the endogenous 
choices of local companies influence each other, or the “endogenous” local effects. Since the local 
information environment and competition for scarce capital largely influence and shape local 
                                                          
1 One example regarding these interactions would be the knowledge spillovers across employees and firms. For 
instance, an employee at firm A learns or develops new skills, and, through social interactions, these skills diffuse to 
employees of firm B. That is, employees of firm B are treated indirectly through “endogenous” interactions. 
2 Feedback effects and indirect effects are used interchangeably in this study. 
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liquidity, we believe these feedback effects, or “endogenous” local effects, are especially important 
in our research. 
 In order to empirically estimate the feedback effects, we enhance our work and extend 
previous work by using spatial econometric methods to mitigate biases that may be present due to 
cross-sectional heterogeneity. Spatial econometric methods, including the Spatial Autoregressive 
Model and Spatial Durbin’s Model, have a wide range of applications in finance and economics 
studies. For instance, Cohen (2010) examines the importance of “broader” economic effects of 
transportation infrastructure on productivity by applying the spatial multiplier effect, which is later 
further explored and clarified in Small and Steimetz (2012). However, in our analysis of cross-
state REIT liquidity, we find a negative and statistically significant spatial spillover effect for 
market liquidity. Our results are likely to be explained by market competitiveness (Industry 
Spillovers with respect to the competition for scarce capital) rather than the traditional knowledge 
spillover-based explanation.3  We find that funding liquidity (State coverage ratio), economic 
development (Gross State Product), and state housing collateral (State House Price Index Growth) 
are the most important state-level determinants of REITs’ liquidity.  
 We have three key findings in this paper. First, state macroeconomic factors provide 
explanatory power for market liquidity. Second, there is a reinforcing relation between funding 
and market liquidity at state-level. Third, we observe negative spatial spillover effects for market 
liquidity.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 summarizes existing literature; 
section 3 develops empirical models; section 4 provides a discussion of the data and the 
                                                          
3 One can refer to Capello (2009) to see how to classify different spillover effects. 
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construction of the variables; section 5 gives the empirical results and a discussion of those 
implications; and, section 6 the conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
 Recent findings suggest that assets’ liquidity varies with economic conditions and across 
geographic locations. Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009, hereafter BP) propose a theoretical 
framework which suggests a mutually reinforcing relation between funding liquidity and market 
liquidity of publicly listed U.S. stocks. They define the market liquidity of an asset as the difference 
between the transaction price and the fundamental value while funding liquidity refers to 
speculators’ scarcity (or shadow cost) of capital. 
 The solution of their model leads to two types of equilibriums, one is a liquid equilibrium 
and the other is a low-liquidity/high margin equilibrium. In the latter case, margin increases with 
volatility and speculators reduce positions due to funding problems, causing market illiquidity 
(destabilizing). On the other hand, losses on existing positions held by speculators would amplify 
the funding problems and speculators will again reduce shares and thus prices further move away 
from fundamentals. The former scenario is referred to as margin spiral and the latter is named the 
loss spiral in BP. Both scenarios constitute the broader picture of liquidity spirals in Figure 1. 
 Empirically, BP find that during recession periods, when margin requirements may be high, 
investors trading on margin undergo a funding liquidity shock and this then affects market 
liquidity. More generally, BP’s model applies to all asset classes, or the commonality of liquidity 
across assets. Speculators optimally invest in securities that provide them with the greatest 
expected profit (i.e., illiquidity) per capital use and thus shocks to speculators’ funding liquidity 
affect all securities. Therefore, market liquidity is correlated across stocks, and stocks and bonds 
and this commonality is driven at least in part by BP’s funding-liquidity mechanism (Chordia, Roll 
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and Subrahmanyam, 2005; BP, 2009). Moreover, funding constraints are more likely to be hit 
during market downturns and thus business cycles are likely to affect market liquidity by 
influencing fundamental volatility. Later research provides support for BP’s thesis (see for 
example, Jensen and Moorman, 2010; Naes et al., 2011). Loughran and Schultz (2005) find that 
after adjusting for size and other factors, the shares of rural firms trade much less often than urban 
firms. Their finding suggests that access to local information and social factors can also affect 
liquidity cross-sectionally. 
 REITs are known for their unique corporate structure and regulatory driven payout policy. 
Given their high payout policy, REITs have to access capital markets frequently and thus they may 
be more sensitive to the changes in capital markets, which vary with macroeconomic conditions. 
Glascock and Lu-Andrews (2014) confirm BP’s thesis using U. S. equity REITs. In their work, 
they specifically test the channel effect exhibited in Figure 2. 
 In order to empirically test the channel effects, they use aggregated Amihud’s (2002) 
Illiquidity (ILLIQ) and aggregated Turnover ratio as measures of market liquidity and debt service 
coverage ratio, loan-to-value ratio, number of loans, and TIGHTEN to proxy for funding liquidity. 
The national macroeconomic variables used in their study are the rate of growth in Industrial 
production (IPG), the change in realized inflation rate (CPI), the change in unemployment rate 
(UNEMP), the change in GDP (GDP_CHANGE) and several variables that capture the condition 
of the credit market. These variables are adopted from Chen et al. (1986), Ferson and Harvey 
(1999), and Watanabe (2004). Interestingly, although IPG, CPI and credit market variables seem 
to have strong predictability on nationwide funding liquidity measures, GDP_CHANGE and 
UNEMP are silent. This result necessitates our study at state level because macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP_CHANGE and UNEMP are likely to affect funding liquidity locally, not 
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nationwide. Moreover, by examining the macroeconomic effects on funding liquidity across 
different business phases, Glascock and Lu-Andrews (2014) find that the effects tend to be time-
varying and behave differently between expansions and recessions. They also confirm that the 
market liquidity risk is associated with funding liquidity as well. Overall, their work suggests a 
channel through which macroeconomic factors affect REITs’ funding liquidity and thus indirectly 
affect REIT market liquidity. The key outcome of their research is that increases in debt to equity 
reduce market liquidity for REIT stocks, which motivates our designation of the aggregated 
coverage ratio. We are specifically investigating how the financial leverage of real estate REIT 
firms and market trading liquidity at state level, as have been suggested by Glascock and Lu-
Andrews (2014). 
 Finally, while evidence has accumulated for the influence of national macroeconomic 
effects, the effects, if any, of state-level variables on market and funding liquidity is not well 
established. Recent work shows that where a firm is headquartered, and the distance from 
shareholders, lenders, stakeholders, and other firms, matters. Bernile et al. (2015) are among the 
first to examine whether state-level economic conditions affect the liquidity of stocks issued by 
local firms. They study stocks’ liquidity at local level for several reasons. First, while national 
monetary policy variables have been shown to be significant predictors of capital market liquidity, 
the other real national economic factors do not seem to have strong effects on securities’ liquidity. 
Secondly, studies on the “Local bias” have shown that a significant portion of the ownership and 
trading of stocks are local. The extent of the “Local bias” and localized trading behavior make 
investors’ portfolio risk, return and trading liquidity subject to local business cycle, either due to 
investors’ local informational advantage or due to some behavioral bias (i.e., “Familiarity bias”). 
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Moreover, local economic conditions are likely to affect the risk aversion of local investors and 
thus they should affect investors’ willingness to trade.  
 In order to study the local macroeconomic effect on stocks’ trading liquidity, Bernile et al. 
(2015) adopt the theoretical framework of Vayanos and Wang (2012a, hereby VW), which can be 
expressed as, 
λ =
𝛼𝜎2
1−𝜋
, 
 where λ represents illiquidity, 𝛼 is the investor risk aversion, 𝜎2 is the volatility of risky 
assets, and π is the fraction of liquidity suppliers. Based on this model, VW indicate that asset 
liquidity levels decrease when investors’ level of risk aversion and asset return volatility are higher, 
and when there are fewer liquidity suppliers. Motivated by VW, Bernile et al. (2015) propose and 
empirically test the two following hypotheses. First, they test if there is a positive relation between 
local economic conditions and the subsequent liquidity of local stocks; Second, whether the 
relation between local economic conditions and local liquidity is amplified when 1) the shareholder 
base is more local, 2) there are larger differences in trading of local stocks by local and nonlocal 
investors, 3) local funding constraints are more binding, and 4) the local information environment 
is more opaque. Their results support the point of view that local labor market situation, local labor 
income growth and local housing collateral ratio significantly predict local security liquidity. And 
this local macroeconomic effect is particularly strong for firms whose shares are mostly owned 
and traded by local investors, such as small firms (non-S&P 500 firms) and rural firms (Loughran 
and Schultz, 2005). Interestingly, funding constraint are shown to not only amplify 
macroeconomic effects on securities’ market liquidity, but explains most of it. Potential a 
simultaneity issue might bias the authors’ results here since it can either be the case that state 
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funding constraint amplifies macroeconomic effects on stocks’ liquidity (direct local 
macroeconomic effect), or that macroeconomic variables only affect stocks’ liquidity through 
funding liquidity (indirect local macroeconomic effect, the channel effect).  
However, Bernile et al. (2015) do not establish a clear channel effect between funding 
liquidity and market liquidity, nor do they address the interaction causation channel (Manski, 1993; 
Dougal, Parsons, and Titman, 2015). Many reasons could explain the importance of introducing 
spatial analysis tools into the study of liquidity. For instance, as mentioned in the first paragraph, 
Loughran and Schultz (2005) notice the significant difference between the liquidity condition of 
U.S. rural and urban-based companies. Dougal, Parsons, and Titman (2015) find significant 
“endogenous” local effects on firms’ investment opportunities. Moreover, Cooper and 
Ovtchinnikov (2015) propose and use a geographical-based vibrancy index and find that firm 
location characteristics along with geographic distance drive firm policies and profitability. They 
also find the local effects are strong and add additional and higher explanatory power than do 
industry effects. Last but not least, when the market liquidity condition of neighboring states are 
indirectly affected by the liquidity/economic condition of a particular state, coefficient estimates 
of panel regression estimates will be biased due to the violation of Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption (SUTVA), which assumes that spillovers do not exist (Nordlund, 2016). 
 Spatial Spillover effects are widely studied in the Economics literature, as an important 
source of pure externalities, producing non-compensated benefits (or costs) for receivers. 
Moreover, they highlight the role played by geographic proximity in the complex processes of 
local endogenous interactions. Different types of spatial spillovers have been pinpointed in the 
literature, including, but not limited to, Knowledge Spillovers, Industry Spillovers, and Growth 
Spillovers (Capello, 2009). 
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Knowledge Spillovers refer to the cases where knowledge created by one firm spreads to 
the other firms, thus creating value for those firms (Fischer, 2006). Knowledge or technology 
producers do not capture the complete knowledge value because knowledge spills over the firm 
and becomes available to other firms. Due to its value enhancing nature, the expected effects of 
Knowledge Spillovers are always positive (Almenida and Kogut, 1999; Maier and Sedlacek, 2005; 
Fischer, 2006). 
 The second type of spillovers that are extensively examined by researchers are the Industry 
Spillovers. They are defined as the situation in which firms located in the same geographic area 
experience productivity shocks at the presence of one productive and dynamic firm. The expected 
effects of Industry Spillovers could be positive as well as negative. One the one hand, exchange of 
knowledge and ideas, technological innovations and good managerial practice (Griliches, 1992), 
and labor market pooling effects could lead to positive externalities. On the other hand, due to the 
comparative advantage of new entrée and higher costs of local inputs, market competitiveness 
would increase for local firms and thus lead to negative externalities (Capello, 2009; Alvarez, 
Arias, and Orea, 2006). Industry Spillovers are broader than Knowledge Spillovers and capture 
more interaction mechanisms among firms than information exchange.  
 Growth Spillovers, a situation in which one region’s growth is affected by characteristics 
of neighboring regions, is the most general version of spatial spillovers. Similar to the Industry 
Spillovers, Growth Spillovers might have positive or negative effects. On the one hand, greater 
regional income generates greater internal savings and more job opportunities and neighboring 
regions can benefit from capital and labor accessibility (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1957). On the other 
hand, the effects of Growth Spillovers can be negative since outflows of labor force to the other 
regions may offset unemployment in one region.  
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 Our paper is closely related to the national-level analysis of Glascock and Lu-Andrews 
(2014), and the state-level analysis of Bernile et al. (2015) in that we examine the channel through 
which state-level macroeconomic dynamics affect US equity REITs’ funding liquidity and thus 
affect their market liquidity. Considering the existence of potential spatial heterogeneity across 
state borders, we apply both panel regression methods, with state and quarter fixed effects, and 
spatial econometrics tools to capture the spillover effect of funding liquidity and market liquidity. 
Thus, we follow a recent trend in the literature of applying spatial econometrics techniques to 
better analyze local data (see for example Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Cohen and Paul, 2004; Case, 
Clapp, Dubin, and Rodriguez, 2004; Lesage and Pace, 2009; and Cohen, 2010). 
3. Empirical Model 
3.1. Panel Predictive Regression on Liquidity Variables 
Initially, we follow Glascock and Lu-Andrews (2014) and Bernile et al. (2015) by using 
the following panel regression models. First, we regress natural logarithm of state market liquidity 
measures on the lagged changes in state and national coincident indexes (Change in SCI and 
Change in NCI), 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠,𝑡,                 (1)                       
where t = 1994Q1, 1994Q2, …, 2014Q4, and s = 1, 2, …, N (N is the total number of states 
with REIT headquarters; r is the number of geographic regions for which CPI data are available; 
there are 4 such regions in the U.S). In the first predictive regression, two market illiquidity 
measures are adopted in this study. One is the negative natural logarithm of State Amihud 
Illiquidity, -Log(State Amihud Illiquidity), and the other is the negative logarithm of State Relative 
Spread, -Log(State Relative Spread). Both variables are constructed as the value-weighted mean 
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of all REITs located within a specific state, where the weight assigned to each REIT is the inverse 
of the REIT’s market capitalization from last month (Bernile et al., 2015). The other variables are 
as defined in the Appendix. We include quarter fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 , to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity across states and general price changes over time. 
In our next set of regressions, we regress state market liquidity measures on the lagged 
state-level macroeconomic factors with state and quarter fixed effects, 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠,𝑡,                                          (2) 
 since Change in NCI is excluded, we include both state fixed effects, 𝜇𝑠, and quarter fixed 
effects, 𝛿𝑡.  
In order to examine the state-level channel effect between market liquidity and funding 
liquidity, which was explored in a national-level analysis of Glascock and Lu-Andrews (2014), we 
regress state market liquidity measures (-Log(State Amihud Illiquidity) or -Log(State Relative 
Spread)) on changes in state (and national) coincident index(es) with state and quarter fixed 
effects.4 It is calculated as the natural logarithm of the mean of the interest coverage ratios of all 
the firms headquartered within a particular state. 
 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑠,𝑡 + 
                                              𝛽2𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝐶𝐼𝑡(+𝜇𝑠) + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠,𝑡,                                                   (3) 
 where State Coverage Ratio is our proxy of state-level funding liquidity. It is calculated as 
the natural logarithm of the mean of the interest coverage ratios of all the firms headquartered 
within a particular state. 
                                                          
4 State fixed effects are excluded when Change in NCI is included. 
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Last, in order to disentangle the effects of individual state macroeconomic variables, we 
re-estimate Equation (1), (2), and (3) by regressing state market liquidity measures (-Log(State 
Amihud Illiquidity) or -Log(State Relative Spread)) on state funding liquidity and state and regional 
macroeconomic variables (𝑋𝑠,𝑡) with state and quarter fixed effects, 
      𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑋𝑠,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑃𝐼)𝑅,𝑡 + 
                              +𝜇𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜏𝑠,𝑡,            (4) 
where 𝑋𝑠,𝑡  include the natural logarithm of quarterly state unemployment rate, 
Log(Unemployment rate), quarterly change in gross state product, Gross State Product Growth, 
quarterly change in state personal income, State Personal Income Growth, the natural logarithm 
of quarterly state mortgage deduction, Log(State Mortgage Deduction), and quarterly change in 
FHFA state house price index, State House Price Index Growth. Log(Regional CPI) is included to 
test the effect of local inflation on the market liquidity proxies. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. 
3.2. Spatial Lag and Spatial Multiplier 
In order to examine the issue of cross-state spillovers, we need to adapt our state-level 
models described above. A useful tool for this analysis is spatial econometrics, which typically 
includes a spatial autoregressive model (hereby SAR model) and a spatial Durbin model (hereby 
SDM model). SAR model is a formulation of the idea of spatial spillovers – levels of the outcome 
variable y (i.e., local liquidity) depend on the levels of y in neighboring geographic units. On the 
flip side, SDM model says that, in addition to the levels of y in neighboring geographic units, the 
levels of x (i.e., local macroeconomic variables) in neighboring geographic units are also correlated 
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with y. Within the context of liquidity spillovers, common forms of a spatial autoregressive model 
and spatial Durbin's model can be expressed as follows, respectively.5 
𝑌 = 𝜌𝑊𝑌 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢              (5a) 
𝑌 = 𝜌𝑊𝑌 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑊𝑋𝜃 + 𝑢            (5b) 
Here Y represents a vector of state-level market liquidity measures and X represents a 
matrix of State Coverage Ratio and lagged state macroeconomic variables, and N is the number of 
states and T the number of time periods covered by the data.6 There are 21 states and the time 
periods range from the first quarter of 1994 to the fourth quarter of 2014. 𝜌 , 𝜃 , and 𝛽  are 
parameters to be estimated. W is the spatial weighting matrix, which typically includes contiguity 
matrix (where all contiguous neighbors receive equal weight) or the inverse-distance matrix 
(where the weight equals the inverse of the distance between geographic unit i and j normalized 
by the row sum). While the weights for the SAR model can be different from the weights for the 
SDM model, often in practice the same weights matrices are used for both. 𝑊𝑌 is a matrix of 
spatial lags, and it represents the weighted average of other jurisdictions' endogenous variable 
(which is the market liquidity measures, -Log(State Amihud Illiquidity) or -Log(State Relative 
Spread). It has been shown (e.g., Kelejian and Prucha, 1998) that Equation (5a) and (5b) can be 
estimated by instrumental variables techniques.7 For Equation (5a), 𝑋 is the appropriate instrument 
for itself, 𝑊𝑋  is the instrument for 𝑊𝑌 . Similarly, for Equation (5b), 𝑋  is the appropriate 
                                                          
5 (Cohen, 2010). 
6 We create a balanced panel of state-level liquidity measures and state-level macroeconomic factors by keeping states 
with more than 1 REIT headquarters throughout our sample period 1994-2014. A REIT does not necessarily have to 
exist through the whole sample period to be included in our computation of the state-level centroid. The reasons are 
twofolds. First, all the measures are aggregated at the state-level. Thus a single firm enter or exit the sample have very 
limited effect. Second, using the row-normalized contiguity matrix, which is not dependent on firms' geographic 
coordinates, yields similar evidence. 
7 Also refer to as the Gershgorin’s Theorem (Cohen, 2002). 
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instrument for itself, 𝑊𝑋 is the instrument for itself, and 𝑊2𝑋 is the instrument for 𝑊𝑌. The 
coefficient estimate, 𝜌, represents the effect on a state’s market liquidity as a result of a change in 
the weighted average of all other states’ market liquidity. Also, each element of the vector of 
coefficient estimates, 𝜃 , represents the effect on a state’s market liquidity of a change in the 
weighted average of one of the macroeconomic variables in X.  
To illustrate the spatial multiplier effect, consider a simplified example with only two 
neighboring states (j=1), New York and Connecticut, in one quarter, t. Suppose X is the percentage 
change in the gross state product (Gross State Product Growth) and Y is the market liquidity (-
Log(State Amihud Illiquidity)). Then the two rows of observations in Equation (5a) would be 
written as: 
𝑌𝐶𝑇 = 𝜌𝑌𝑁𝑌 + 𝑋𝐶𝑇𝛽 + 𝑢𝐶𝑇             (6a) 
𝑌𝑁𝑌 = 𝜌𝑌𝐶𝑇 + 𝑋𝑁𝑌𝛽 + 𝑢𝑁𝑌                                   (6b) 
If 𝑋𝐶𝑇 increases by 1%, this leads to a 𝛽% rise or fall in 𝑌𝐶𝑇. But this increase in 𝑌𝐶𝑇 leads 
to a 𝜌𝛽% change in 𝑌𝑁𝑌, which this leads to another 𝜌
2𝛽% change in 𝑌𝐶𝑇, and so on and so forth. 
This spatial multiplier effect is just β[1 + ρ + 𝜌2 + 𝜌3 + ⋯ ] and can be expressed as 𝛽
1
1−𝜌
. It is 
straightforward to generalize this to the case involving multiple geographic units. Using the 
example from Table 7, Panel A if the direct effect on Gross State Product Growth, 𝛽𝑔𝑠𝑝 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ =
0.099, 𝜌 = −0.372 , then the total effect (including the spatial multiplier effect) is 0.099 ×
1
1−(−0.372)
≈ −0.073. Had we ignored the indirect (spatial) effects, this would have led to an 
overestimation of the impact by approximately 37% and a clear violation of Stable Unit Treatment 
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Value Assumption (SUTVA). 8  The spatial spillover effects arise through the endogenous 
interactions between neighboring states, and with our spatial econometrics approach, we are able 
to identify the causal effects of states’ changes in funding liquidity on a particular state’s funding 
liquidity. 
4. Data 
 In this paper, we use both national and state-level data to examine how macroeconomic 
conditions can affect equity REITs' market and funding liquidity. A detailed explanation on 
variables can be found in the Appendix.  
We use the negative natural logarithm of State Amihud Illiquidity, -Ln(state Amihud 
Illiquidity), or the negative natural logarithm of State Relative Spread, -Ln(state relative spread) 
to proxy for state market liquidity conditions.9 -Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) is our main market 
liquidity variable, it can be computed as the logarithm of the average of quarterly average of 
absolute daily return to the product of absolute daily price and daily volume for all REITs in a 
particular state, weighted by the shares of market capitalization. 
Specifically, for individual REIT i headquartered in state s in quarter q, 
𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞 =
1
𝐷𝑖,𝑠,𝑞
∑
|𝑅𝑖,𝑠,𝑞,𝑑|
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑠,𝑞,𝑑
𝐷𝑖,𝑠,𝑞
𝑞=1 ,              (7) 
where 𝐷𝑖,𝑠,𝑞 represents the trading days available for firm i headquartered in state s within 
a quarter q, 𝑅𝑖,𝑠,𝑞,𝑑  is the daily stock return, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑠,𝑞,𝑑  is the daily trading volume. The relative 
spread measure is the ratio of the daily closing bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint of the daily 
                                                          
8 The overestimation would be 59% relative to panel regression estimate (
−0.035−(−0.022)
−0.022
= 59%). 
9 We also consider alternative market liquidity measures such as turnover and trading volume for our analysis. We 
found similar results and will provide them upon request. 
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closing bid-ask spread. Suppose there are a total of N REITs headquartered in state s. Then for 
state s in quarter q, we compute the -Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) and -Ln(state relative spread) as, 
−𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑠,𝑞 = −𝐿𝑛(∑
𝑀𝑘𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑠,𝑞−1
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀𝑘𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑠,𝑞−1
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞
𝑁
𝑖=1 ),         (8) 
where 𝑀𝑘𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑠,𝑞−1 represents the market capitalization of REIT i headquartered in state 
s within a quarter q-1. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀𝑘𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑠,𝑞−1  represents the market capitalization of all REITs 
headquartered in state s within a quarter q. 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞 is either Amihud Illiquidity or relative spread 
of REIT i headquartered in state s within a quarter q. Daily and monthly stock price data obtained 
from CRSP are used to compute -Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) and -Ln(state relative spread). -
Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) and -Ln(state relative spread) and state market liquidity condition are 
positively correlated. To be specific, higher value of Log(State Amihud Illiquidity) or Log(State 
Relative Spread) indicates higher state market liquidity. 
We aggregate the firm-level interest coverage ratio at state level to obtain our funding 
liquidity measure, State Coverage Ratio. Details regarding the computation of State Coverage 
Ratio can be found in Appendix. COMPUSTAT quarterly items are used to calculate firm-level 
interest coverage ratio. We follow Wang, Cohen, and Glascock (2017) and use State Coverage 
Ratio as the main variable of state funding liquidity because it captures the easiness of an equity 
REIT investor getting access to capital to some extent. 
Specifically, for an individual REIT i headquartered in state s in quarter q,  
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑠,𝑞 =
𝐼𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞
𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞+𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞
,             (9) 
 where 𝐼𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞 is the income before extraordinary items of REIT i headquartered in state s 
in quarter q. 𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞  is the preferred dividends, and 𝑋𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑠,𝑞  is the interest and related 
134 
 
expenses. Then we aggregate REIT level interest coverage ratio at state level to obtain State 
Coverage Ratio. Suppose that there are a total of N REITs headquartered in state s, then for state s 
in quarter q, we compute State Coverage Ratio as, 
 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠,𝑞 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑠,𝑞
𝑁
𝑖=1 ,        (10) 
 Quarterly financial statement data and most current obtained from Compustat quarterly 
database is used to compute State Coverage Ratio. We use State Coverage Ratio as the proxy for 
state funding liquidity because it captures the easiness of a REIT getting access to capital to some 
extent. 
We use state centroid as the location of a state representative REIT in order to mitigate the 
concern that headquarter location choice is endogenous to the REITs. Since state borders were 
settled far back to the 19 century (prior to most listed securities were issued), it is less of a concern 
that our spatial weighting matrix might be endogenous by itself. The latitude and longitude 
coordinates of each state centroid in our sample are reported in Table 1. 
Data on the state unemployment rate and regional consumer price index are obtained from 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); data on gross state product and quarterly state income 
growth are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).10 Marginal tax rates and 
state mortgage deduction are acquired from the Feenberg Taxism database on NBER's website.11 
National macroeconomic data are acquired from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Database 
(FRED). We also download State and National Coincident Indexes from Federal Reserve Bank of 
                                                          
10 Based on our communications with individuals at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, this regional data is the closest available measure of state-level inflation. Quarterly GSP Rate is 
available from 2005Q2, before 2005Q2, we use annual GSP Rate. We also download national macroeconomic data 
from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Database (FRED). 
11 http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/ 
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Philadelphia (FRED).12 Quarterly change in the coincident indexes are calculated as the mean of 
monthly changes within a specific quarter. Summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis 
are reported in Table 2. We also report pairwise correlation tables of all variables used in our 
analysis in Table 3. 
Since REITs represent a relatively homogeneous asset class with real estate as their 
underlying assets, we only require a state to have at least one REIT in each quarter to be included 
in our sample (even though most states in our sample host more than one REIT per quarter) in 
order to maintain a balanced panel for spatial analysis. We ended up with 21 states with 367 unique 
REITs defined by permanent security identification number (PERMNO) from 1994-2014. Over 
the entire sample period, California and New York are the states with the most and second most 
REIT headquarters. With 81 and 43 REITs currently or used to locate in California and New York, 
respectively. Missouri has the only 4 REIT headquarters. An average state in our sample has 
approximately 17 REIT headquarters per quarter.  
5. Empirical Results 
 Our findings naturally fall into three categories. Part 1 briefly discusses the predicted 
effects of macroeconomic variables and funding liquidity measure, State Coverage Ratio, on the 
market liquidity measures, -Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) and -Ln(state relative spread). Part 2 
shows the interpretation of spatial lag and spatial multiplier, and the distinction between the Spatial 
Autoregressive (SAR) Model and Spatial Durbin's (SDM) Model. Part 3 estimates the predictive 
panel regressions, SAR and SDM Models and report regression results. 
5.1. Macroeconomic effects on local funding liquidity 
                                                          
12 See Crone (2002) for details on the construction of the state economic indices. 
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The predicted effects of state macroeconomic variables and State Coverage Ratio on the 
market liquidity measures are reported in the Appendix. We follow Bernile, Korniotis, Kumar, and 
Wang (2015) and include information of local business cycle, i.e., income growth (PI growth), 
unemployment rate (Ln(state unemployment rate)), and housing price index growth (FHFA HPI 
growth), into our analysis of local macroeconomic effects on the market liquidity (-Ln(state 
Amihud Illiquidity) or -Ln(state relative spread)) of local REITs. Unemployment rate (Ln(state 
unemployment rate)) and income growth (PI growth) capture local (state-level) labor market 
conditions and return to human capital, respectively. Ceteris paribus, lower unemployment rate 
(Ln(state unemployment rate)) and higher income growth (PI growth) lead to higher market 
liquidity (-Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) or -Ln(state relative spread)) in the next quarter. Housing 
price index growth (FHFA HPI growth) reflects funding liquidity to some extent because it 
measures local household’s borrowing capacity conditional on their housing equity. Therefore, 
higher housing price index growth (FHFA HPI growth) positively predicts future market liquidity 
(-Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) or -Ln(state relative spread)).  
In addition to Bernile, Korniotis, Kumar, and Wang (2015), we include variables that 
capture local economic development (GSP growth), local borrowing flexibility (Ln(state mortgage 
deduction)), and local inflation (Regional CPI). Moreover, in order to examine the combined effect 
of economic activity on local market liquidity, we obtain state and national coincident indexes 
(Change in SCI, Change in NCI) from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (FRED).13 Based on 
the theoretical model developed in Section 3, we predict that larger increase in economic 
development (GSP growth) and economic activities (Change in SCI, Change in NCI), higher level 
                                                          
13 Since market liquidity proxies are forward-looking, we also adopt predicted economic activities proxies into our 
analysis. We found similar results and will provide them upon request. 
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of borrowing flexibilities (Ln(state mortgage deduction)), and lower price level (Regional CPI) 
indicate higher market liquidity (-Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) or -Ln(state relative spread)) in the 
next quarter.  
 To empirically test the reinforcing relation between market and funding liquidity, or the 
Channel Effect (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Glascock and Lu-Andrews, 2014), we employ 
State Coverage Ratio as a measure of funding liquidity. Since market liquidity tends to comove 
with funding liquidity, we predict that State Coverage Ratio at quarter t positively predicts market 
liquidity (-Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) or -Ln(state relative spread)) in the next quarter. 
5.2. Spatial lag, and spatial multiplier, and spatial econometrics models 
In this section, we extend panel regression analysis in estimating the spatial autoregressive 
model (Hereafter SAR model) and the spatial Durbin's model (Hereafter SDM model). SAR and 
SDM models are two of the most commonly used models in studies applying Spatial Econometrics. 
The main difference between SAR and SDM is that SAR (equation 5a) assumes only the dependent 
variable has spatial dependence while SDM (equation 5b) assumes both the dependent variable 
and certain independent variables (i.e., in our example, state macroeconomic variables) have 
spatial dependence. In our study, SDM is potentially more robust to cross-sectional heterogeneity 
than SAR but is subject to multicollinearity issue. We present both SAR and SDM results in the 
next subsection.  
We use a row-normalized inverse distance matrix. First, data on the centroid location is 
obtained for each state (shown in Table 1). Then we calculate the average distance between 
centroids in states i and j as haversine distance (earth surface is approximately spherical). The 
haversine formula is expressed as: 
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𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 2𝑟 ∙ arcsin (√𝑠𝑖𝑛2 (
𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗−𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖
2
) + cos(𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖) cos (𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗)𝑠𝑖𝑛2(
𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑗−𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖
2
)),                      (11) 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑗  is the geographic distance between state i’s centroid (state i’s latitude and 
longitude coordinates are 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖 and 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖, respectively) and state j’s centroid (state j’s latitude and 
longitude coordinates are 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑗 and 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑗, respectively). r is the earth radius (r = 6,378 kilometers, 
or 3,959 miles). It is worthwhile noticing that the centroid of each state were exogenously 
determined and are not subject to selection biases. Each weight in the inverse distance matrix can 
be expressed as 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑑𝑖,𝑗
∑ 𝑑𝑖,𝑚
𝑁−1
𝑚=1
, where 𝑑𝑖,𝑗 is the distance between the centroids of states i and j, 
𝑑𝑖,𝑚 is the distance between the centroids of state i and any state m (excluding state i), and N is the 
total number of states.  
In order to show how the coefficient estimates can vary across panel regressions and spatial 
autoregressive (SAR) model, we report panel regression results, direct effects, which are similar 
to the panel regression results, and total effects, which equals the sum of direct effects and indirect 
effects caused by the spatial multiplier, which captures the feedback effects of dependent variables 
between neighboring states. We also report the spatial multiplier next to the spatial rho. According 
to our discussion in the model section, the spatial multiplier is 
1
1−𝜌
. We estimate the spatial 
multiplier utilizing this equation. 
5.3. Regression results and interpretation 
 We test the sign and significance of equation (1) using panel regressions and spatial 
autoregressive models (equation 5a) in Table 4. By regressing the measure of state market liquidity 
(-Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) or -Ln(state relative spread)) on the change in state and national 
coincident indexes (Change in SCI, Change in NCI), with quarterly fixed effects. We find that -
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Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity)  is more influenced by state-level economic activities (Change in SCI) 
than national ones (Change in NCI). The coefficient estimates on the Change in SCI is statistically 
significant and economically meaningful, while the coefficient estimates on the Change in NCI is 
significant in the panel regression analysis but insignificant in the spatial analysis. However, -
Ln(state relative spread) seems to be affected by both state-level economic activities (Change in 
SCI) and national ones (Change in NCI). 
We predict that there is cross-sectional heterogeneity in market liquidity of state 
representative REITs. Some states might compete with their neighbors by drawing funding 
liquidity away from their neighbors, and competition for funding liquidity is likely to cause 
negative spillovers (externalities) on the market liquidity of their neighbors, through the impact of 
channel effect. 
 Empirically, we apply SAR and SDM model to test this conjecture. We find that the impact 
of market liquidity across state borders is asymmetric, with some states more influential in the 
equity markets than their geographic neighbors. We find a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on the spatial lagged market liquidity measure, 𝑊 × [−𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑)] 𝑜𝑟 𝑊 ×
[−𝐿𝑛(𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)] (𝜌).14  
 A negative spillover effect also indicates overestimation of the effect of local economic 
activities on the market liquidity for REITs. In the SAR model, coefficient estimates of the direct 
effect largely resemble those of the panel regressions. For instance, the direct effect of Change in 
                                                          
14 Notice that the market liquidity measure of state i itself always receives a spatial weight of 0; therefore, 𝜌 only 
captures the effect of neighboring states’ market liquidity on state i’s market liquidity. And neighboring states receive 
larger weights because of the segmentation of capital markets. 
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SCI is 1.588 (0.606) when -Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) (-Ln(state relative spread)) is used as 
dependent variable. The corresponding panel regression coefficient estimate is 1.619 (0.629).  
Spatial spillover effects unveil the real impact of Change in SCI on the market liquidity 
measures, through the spatial multiplier. Spatial multiplier equals to the inverse of one minus the 
coefficient estimate on the spatial lagged market liquidity measure, or 1 1 − 𝜌⁄ , since 𝜌 is negative, 
spatial multiplier is less than 1. And the total effect, or the sum of the direct effect and indirect 
(spillover) effect, is the product of direct effect and spatial multiplier.15 Total effect is the true 
impact of local economic activities on the market liquidity. In our study, the direct effect (and the 
panel regression estimates) is biased upward relative to the total effect and thus is inaccurate. The 
total effect of Change in SCI is 1.280 (0.456) when -Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) (-Ln(state relative 
spread)) is used as dependent variable, which is considerably smaller than the corresponding direct 
effect of 1.588 (0.606), and the panel regression coefficient estimate of 1.619 (0.629). 
 In order to further examine the relation between state economic activities and state market 
liquidity, we exclude Change in NCI and use state and quarter fixed effects instead. By including 
state fixed effects, we could examine whether the spatial spillovers are driven by unknown state-
level characteristics. However, since regional and national macroeconomic variables do not vary 
across states, they are excluded after state fixed effects are adopted. Results with state fixed effects 
for equation (2) are reported in Table 5. 
 Results in Table 5 largely resemble those reported in Table 4. The coefficient estimates of 
the spatial lagged market liquidity measure (𝑊 × [−𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑)] 𝑜𝑟 𝑊 × [−𝐿𝑛(𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)]) and 
                                                          
15 Same rationale applies to the other macroeconomic variables. 
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the Change in SCI are statistically significant and economically meaningful. Therefore, our results 
are not likely to be driven by state-level omitted variables. 
 In Table 6, we examine the reinforcing relation between market and funding liquidity, or 
the Channel Effect. That is, capital accessibility of local REITs would positively predicts local 
market liquidity. The empirical framework is expressed as equation (3). We re-estimate Table 4 
and 5, but with inclusion of State Coverage Ratio as a measure of funding liquidity. Consistent 
with the Channel Effect documented at the national level, we find a positive relation between state-
level market and funding liquidity. The coefficient estimates on State Coverage Ratio are positive 
and statistically significant. 
 However, the usage of changes in state (national) coincident indexes (Change in SCI, 
Change in NCI) ignores the specifics of how state-level macroeconomic variables affect state 
funding liquidity. For instance, whether Change in SCI takes effect on future State coverage ratio 
through local labor market conditions, local economic development, or collateral channel is not 
well understood. Relatedly, one may argue that interpretation of the composite indexes is not as 
intuitive as individual macroeconomic variables. Admittedly, with limitations imposed on a single 
index of local economic activities, we couldn’t restrict our analysis to the state and national 
composite indexes. Moreover, since the usage of state fixed effects might conceal valuable 
information of regional or national economic activities. Therefore, we substitute Change in SCI in 
Table 4 – 6 with state-level macroeconomic variables and regional inflation (Ln(Regional CPI)). 
Equation (4) is estimated in Table 7. State and quarter fixed effects are included. The results are 
reported in Table 7. 
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 According to our theoretical framework, we adopt state macroeconomic variables that are 
likely to capture different aspects of state-level business cycle, including income growth (PI 
growth), unemployment rate (Ln(state unemployment rate)), housing price index growth (FHFA 
HPI growth), local economic development (GSP growth), and local borrowing flexibility (Ln(state 
mortgage deduction)). We find that local economic development (GSP growth), local housing 
price index growth (FHFA HPI growth), and local inflation (Regional CPI) significantly predict 
REITs’ market liquidity. Specifically, higher local economic development (GSP growth), higher 
local housing price index growth (FHFA HPI growth), and lower local inflation (Regional CPI) 
are associated with higher market liquidity (-Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) or -Ln(state relative 
spread)) in the next quarter. The effects of local labor market conditions (Ln(state unemployment 
rate)) and return to local human capital (Income growth) on local market liquidity are statistically 
insignificant.  
 Negative spatial spillovers do not seem to be affected by the inclusion of state 
macroeconomic variables rather than local economic activity index. Coefficient estimate on the 
spatial lagged market liquidity, or ρ, is -0.366 (-0.462) when -Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) (or -
Ln(state relative spread)) is used as the dependent variable. The corresponding spatial multiplier 
is 0.73 (0.68), which are comparable to those reported in Table 4 – 6 (0.75 to 0.81). Therefore, the 
spatial spillover effects identified in our study are not subject to how we define the macroeconomic 
variables. That is, using individual state macroeconomic variables returns the similar degree of 
spatial spillovers as using index measures. However, using individual macroeconomic variables 
facilitates us to better interpreting the mechanism of how local economic activities affect local 
funding liquidity. The Channel Effect is also robust to the inclusion of individual local 
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macroeconomic variables (Panel C and D), as we observe a positive and significant relation 
between State Coverage Ratio and market liquidity proxies. 
 It is likely that our previous results are driven by the spatial dependence of independent 
variable(s), or the state macroeconomic variables. In order to mitigate this concern, we repeat our 
analysis in Table 4 – 6 with Spatial Durbin’s (SDM) model. We do not include individual 
macroeconomic variables due to rising concern of multicollinearity bias. Only the coefficient 
estimate on the spatial lagged market liquidity, or ρ, and the direct effect are reported in this Table 
8. State-level macroeconomic variables, such as State Coverage Ratio and Δ SCI are assumed to 
have spatial dependence. Quarter fixed effects are included. Overall, our results do not seem to be 
affected by the spatial dependence of independent variable(s). 
 Thus far, we find that there is spatial dependence of state market liquidity by using different 
model specifications, and it is not affected by the spatial dependence of local macroeconomic 
variables. We interpret this negative spatial spillover effects by examining different subperiods (5-
year, 10-year) and the Great Recession. We assume that there is, in general, a declining trend in 
the absolute value of market liquidity spillover effects across state borders. However, its absolute 
value is likely to increase when the market experiences a negative liquidity shock, such as the 
Great Recession during 2008 – 2009.  
 First, we examine subperiods of different length (5-year, 10-year) over a 20-year period 
(1994Q1 – 2013Q4). The dependent variable is -Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity). We didn’t observe a 
declining trend in the coefficient estimate on the spatial lagged market liquidity, or ρ, with 5-year 
subperiods. When using the 10-year subperiods, we find that the liquidity spillover effect, which 
is measured by ρ, is smaller in the second subperiod than the first, but is still comparable. 
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 Next, we specifically look at the 6-quarter period that is within the Great Recession defined 
by NBER website.16 The dependent variable is -Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity). Interestingly, the 
magnitude of the liquidity spillover effect across state borders more than tripled in absolute value 
during the Great Recession (from -0.246 in Table 6 to -0.838 in Table 10). Based on Wang, Cohen, 
and Glascock (2017), when market is illiquid, REITs from different states compete more fiercely 
for scarce capital. And liquidity suppliers might favor REITs with better access to the capital 
markets than their geographic neighbors, resulting in a competition effect on market liquidity 
across state borders. Therefore, the negative liquidity spillover effect is likely to be explained by 
the competition for scarce capital between REITs from different states. The results are reported in 
Table 10. 
 Finally, in order to explicitly establish the relation between local economic activities, 
funding and market liquidity, we conduct a two-stage least squares analysis. Instrumental variables 
are the change in state coincident index (Change in SCI) and Governor, a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 when the state governor is republican, and 0 otherwise. Republican governors are more 
likely to adopt a tight local fiscal policy, and negatively affect the amount of capital that is available 
to the local markets. 
 In the first stage, we regress State Coverage Ratio on Change in SCI and Governor, with 
inclusion of state and quarter fixed effects. Both panel regression and spatial autoregressive models 
are estimated, and Change in SCI appears to have a significant impact on State Coverage Ratio, 
while Governor has no statistically meaningful effect. There is negative and significant spillovers 
                                                          
16 From Dec, 2007 – Jun, 2009, our period starts from 2008Q1 – 2009Q2. 
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on State Coverage Ratio across neighboring states, indicating overestimation of coefficients when 
applying panel regression model. 
 In the second stage, we regress the negative natural logarithm of State Amihud Illiquidity 
on the predicted value of State Coverage Ratio from the first stage using SAR model and Change 
in SCI. State and quarter fixed effects are included. We find that, while the coefficient on Change 
in SCI is not significant, the predicted value of State Coverage Ratio has a positive and significant 
impact on the local market liquidity condition. Therefore, local macroeconomic variables affect 
market liquidity only through funding liquidity. 
Overall, our findings are threefold. First, there are negative market liquidity spillovers for 
REITs across state borders. Second, state macroeconomic variables, especially local economic 
development (GSP growth), local housing price index growth (FHFA HPI growth), and local 
inflation (Regional CPI), significantly predict state market liquidity of REITs in the next quarter. 
Third, the negative market liquidity spillover across state borders is explained by the competition 
for scarce capital, and is much greater during the Great Recession. 
6. Conclusions 
 We examine the funding liquidity and market liquidity of U.S. equity REITs at the state 
level. We confirm that a reinforcing relation between both types of liquidity measures exists at the 
state level (that is, a channel effect), and that they are both affected state macroeconomic factors. 
We employ a spatial econometric analysis and find robust and significantly negative spillover 
effects of market liquidity, i.e., market liquidity of neighboring state(s) can affect market liquidity 
of a specific state. We find similar evidence when we include the funding liquidity measure as an 
independent variable. We also find that adjusting the parameter estimates on state macroeconomic 
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factors for the spatial multiplier can dramatically change their estimates of economic magnitude.  
This underscores the importance of using spatial modeling to avoid potential biased estimates of 
state macroeconomic effects on liquidity of REITs. Our results indicate that the competition for 
scarce capital across state borders shapes market liquidity at state level. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
State-level  
-Ln(State Amihud Illiquidity) 
 
 
Negative natural logarithm of the value-weighted state 
portfolio Amihud Illiquidity measure of REITs headquartered 
in the state, positively associated with the state’s market 
liquidity condition. We compute the average of Amihud 
Illiquidity measures of all REITs headquartered in one state 
weighted by their market capitalization of the last quarter to get 
Amihud Illiquidity for that particular state. The data is obtained 
from CRSP daily database. 
-Ln(State Relative Spread) Negative natural logarithm of the value-weighted state 
portfolio relative spread of REITs headquartered in the state, 
positively associated with the state’s market liquidity 
condition. We compute the average of Relative Spread of all 
REITs headquartered in one state weighted by their market 
capitalization of the last quarter to get relative spread of that 
particular state.  The data is obtained from CRSP daily 
database. 
State coverage ratio 
Expected sign: (+) 
Quarterly state interest coverage ratio, which equals to the 
mean (median) of interest coverage ratios of all REITs 
headquartered in one state. Interest coverage ratio is calculated 
as income before extraordinary items (IBQ) divided by the sum 
of preferred dividends (DVPQ) and interest and related 
expenses (XINTQ). The data is obtained from Compustat 
quarterly database. 
Change in SCI (in percentage) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Quarterly change in State Coincident Index, calculated as the 
mean of monthly change in State Coincident Index. State 
Coincident Index is constructed based on the local labor market 
and local economic development conditions. The data is 
downloaded from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
(FRED). 
Ln(state unemployment rate) 
Expected sign: (–) 
Natural logarithm of quarterly state-level unemployment rate 
(in percentage), which equals to the mean (median) of the 
monthly state unemployment rate within a specific quarter. 
Data on unemployment rate is downloaded from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
FHFA HPI growth (in percentage) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Quarterly change in the all-transactions price index of 
residential real estate in the state, obtained from Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). 
GSP growth (in percentage) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Before 2005Q1, GSP growth is the annual growth rate of gross 
state product. From 2005Q1 and after, GSP growth is the 
quarterly growth rate of gross state product. Data on personal 
income is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). 
PI growth (in percentage) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Quarterly state-level personal income growth rate. Data on 
personal income is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA). 
Ln(state mortgage deduction) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Feenberg state marginal tax rate on mortgage, obtained from 
NBER website. 
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Regional  
Ln(regional CPI) 
Expected sign: (–) 
Natural logarithm of the quarterly regional consumer price 
index, beginning from 1987Q1. 4 U.S. regions include 
Northeast, Midwest, South and West. Data on regional CPI is 
obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
National  
Change in NCI (in percentage) 
Expected sign: (+) 
Quarterly change in National Coincident Index, calculated as 
the mean of monthly change in National Coincident Index. 
National Coincident Index is constructed based on the national 
labor market and national economic development conditions. 
The data is downloaded from Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia (FRED). 
Other  
State Republican Governor 
Expected sign: (–) 
An indicator variable that equals 1 when the state governor is 
republican (more likely to have a constrained state fiscal 
policy) and 0 otherwise. 
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Figure 1: Liquidity Spirals 
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Figure 2: Liquidity Channel Effect 
  
Channel 
Effect 
Micro Level: the two forces (market liquidity 
and funding liquidity) are re-enforcing. 
Macro Level: These forces are affected by 
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Table 1: States and Centroid coordinates 
This table reports the 21 states that host at least 1 equity real estate investment trusts (REITs) during each 
quarter. We follow common practice in spatial econometrics studies and exclude isolated islands. Four 
states or areas (Hawaii, HI; Alaska, AK; Virgin Islands, VI; Puerto Rico, PR) that are not in main U.S. are 
deemed as isolated islands and thus are dropped from the sample. A comprehensive list of U.S. equity 
REITs defined by NAREIT can be downloaded from S. McKay Price’s website. Sample period is from 
1994Q1 to 2014Q3. The sample starts from 1994Q1 because of the structural change in REIT industry in 
the early 1990s (modern REIT era started from 1993, Feng, Price, and Sirmans, 2011). We exclude states 
with fewer than 1 REIT in each quarter in order to maintain a balanced panel for spatial analysis. We only 
require a state to have 1 REIT each quarter because (i) REITs represent a relatively homogeneous asset 
class and, (ii) the sample size restriction – we have on average less than 200 REITs in each quarter. We 
report state name, state abbreviation, latitude, longitude. Latitude and longitude are the geographic 
coordinates of a state’s centroid. 
State Name State Abbrev. Latitude Longitude 
Arizona AZ 34.21 -111.60 
California CA 37.15 -119.54 
Colorado CO 38.99 -105.51 
Connecticut CT 41.58 -72.75 
Florida FL 28.46 -82.41 
Georgia GA 32.63 -83.42 
Illinois IL 40.10 -89.15 
Indiana IN 39.90 -86.28 
Massachusetts MA 42.16 -71.49 
Maryland MD 38.95 -76.67 
Michigan MI 44.84 -85.66 
Missouri MO 38.35 -92.46 
North Carolina NC 35.54 -79.13 
New Jersey NJ 40.11 -74.67 
New York NY 42.91 -75.60 
Ohio OH 40.41 -82.71 
Pennsylvania PA 40.90 -77.83 
Tennessee TN 35.86 -86.35 
Texas TX 31.43 -99.28 
Virginia VA 37.52 -78.67 
Washington WA 47.42 -120.60 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
All variables are defined in Appendix. Summary statistics of the variables are reported for equity real estate 
investment trusts (REITs). A comprehensive list of U.S. equity REITs defined by NAREIT can be 
downloaded from S. McKay Price’s website. Sample period is from 1994Q1 to 2014Q3. We require a 
particular state to have at least one REIT in each quarter in order to maintain a balanced panel. We report 
number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, 25 percentile and 75 percentile in Column 1 to 
6, respectively. 
Variable # Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. 25 Pct. 75 Pct. 
REITs, 1994Q1 – 2014Q3 
-Ln(state Amihud Illiquidity) 1,764 4.53 4.62 2.38 3.20 6.19 
-Ln(state relative spread) 1,764 6.26 6.35 1.55 4.77 7.61 
State coverage ratio 1,764 0.70 0.65 0.96 0.30 1.04 
Change in SCI (in pct.) 1,764 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.08 0.37 
Change in NCI (in pct.) 1,764 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.15 0.29 
Ln(state unemployment rate) 1,764 1.73 1.69 0.32 1.50 1.93 
FHFA HPI growth (in pct.) 1,764 0.82 0.95 1.78 0.13 1.70 
GSP growth (in pct.) 1,764 4.45 4.58 2.65 3.10 6.00 
PI growth (in pct.) 1,764 1.13 1.16 1.12 0.65 1.68 
Ln(state mortgage deduction) 1,764 0.67 0 0.86 0 1.58 
Ln(regional CPI) 1,764 5.24 5.24 0.15 5.12 5.38 
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Table 3: Correlation Table 
All variables are defined in Appendix. Pairwise correlation tables of the variables are reported for equity real estate investment trusts (REITs). In 
the first row, number 1 – 11 represents -Ln(Amihud), -Ln(spread), …, Ln(regional CPI), respectively. * indicates the statistical significance at 1% 
level. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
-Ln(Amihud) 1           
-Ln(spread) 0.75* 1          
State coverage ratio -0.07* -0.19* 1         
Change in SCI  -0.01 -0.07* 0.17* 1        
Change in NCI -0.02 -0.06* 0.16* 0.87* 1       
Ln(unemp) 0.21* 0.51* -0.21* -0.26* -0.25* 1      
FHFA HPI growth -0.02 -0.10* 0.10* 0.38* 0.30* -0.34* 1     
GSP growth -0.17* -0.30* 0.19* 0.71* 0.61* -0.51* 0.44* 1    
PI growth -0.07* -0.13* 0.12* 0.54* 0.49* -0.29* 0.20* 0.49* 1   
Ln(stmort) -0.21* -0.15* -0.08* 0.02 -0.05 -0.09* -0.01 0.13* 0.10* 1  
Ln(regional CPI) 0.51* 0.80* 0.25* -0.26* -0.28* 0.52* -0.22* -0.48* -0.24* -0.14* 1 
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Table 4: Spatial Autoregressive Model with the Change in State and National Coincident Indexes 
In this table, we report regression results of panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. 
The dependent variable is the negative natural logarithm of State Amihud Illiquidity (Panel A) or State 
Relative Spread (Panel B) at quarter t+1. Independent variables are the Change in State and National 
Coincident Indexes (Change in SCI, Change in NCI, both are included in all Panels) at quarter t. All 
variables are defined in Appendix. The magnitude of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) is measured 
by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged outcome variable (W × [-Ln(Amihud)] or W × [-
Ln(spread)]). W is the row-normalized inverse-distance matrix. The impact of spatial spillover effect 
(feedback effect) on macroeconomic effects is captured by the spatial multiplier, which equals to 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . 
Direct effect largely resembles the coefficient estimates of the panel regressions. Total effect, which 
approximately equals to the product of direct effect and spatial multiplier, is reported in parallel to the direct 
effect. Quarter fixed effect is included. t-statistics are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A – Negative Ln(state Amihud illiquidity) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(Amihud)] SAR – [-Ln(Amihud)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(Amihud)] – – 
– 
-0.251 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.80 (t statistics) – – (-3.23)  
Change in SCI 1.619 *** – – 1.588 *** 1.280 *** 
(t statistics) (6.75)  – – (6.65)  (6.02)  
Change in NCI -68.478 *** – – -16.177  -12.986  
(t statistics) (-13.8)  – – (-0.46)  (-0.46)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 54% 55% 
State Fixed Effects No No 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Panel B – Negative Ln(state relative spread) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(spread)] SAR – [-Ln(spread)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W ×  [-Ln(spread)] – – 
– 
-0.332 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.75 (t statistics) – – (-4.22)  
Change in SCI 0.629 *** – – 0.606 *** 0.456 *** 
(t statistics) (6.74)  – – (6.50)  (6.01)  
Change in NCI -45.850 *** – – -181.18 *** -135.70 *** 
(t statistics) (-23.7)  – – (-10.4)  (-12.9)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 90% 90% 
State Fixed Effects No No 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Table 5: Spatial Autoregressive Model with the Change in State Coincident Indexes 
In this table, we report regression results of panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. 
The dependent variable is the negative natural logarithm of State Amihud Illiquidity (Panel A) or State 
Relative Spread (Panel B) at quarter t+1. Independent variables are the Change in State Coincident Indexes 
(Change in SCI is included in all Panels) at quarter t. All variables are defined in Appendix. The magnitude 
of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) is measured by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged 
outcome variable (W × [-Ln(Amihud)] or W × [-Ln(spread)]). W is the row-normalized inverse-distance 
matrix. The impact of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) on macroeconomic effects is captured by the 
spatial multiplier, which equals to 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . Direct effect largely resembles the coefficient estimates of 
the panel regressions. Total effect, which approximately equals to the product of direct effect and spatial 
multiplier, is reported in parallel to the direct effect. State and quarter fixed effects are included. t-statistics 
are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the 
coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A – Negative Ln(state Amihud illiquidity) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(Amihud)] SAR – [-Ln(Amihud)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(Amihud)] – – 
– 
-0.244 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.80 (t statistics) – – (-3.14)  
Change in SCI 1.631 *** – – 1.601 *** 1.289 *** 
(t statistics) (6.80)  – – (6.73)  (6.14)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 54% 55% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Panel B – Negative Ln(state relative spread) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(spread)] SAR – [-Ln(spread)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(spread)] – – 
– 
-0.328 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.75 (t statistics) – – (-4.18)  
Change in SCI 0.637 *** – – 0.613 *** 0.461 *** 
(t statistics) (6.82)  – – (6.61)  (6.10)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 90% 90% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Table 6: Channel Effect – Spatial Autoregressive Model with the Change in State Coincident 
Indexes 
In this table, we report regression results of panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. 
The dependent variable is the negative natural logarithm of State Amihud Illiquidity (Panel A, C) or State 
Relative Spread (Panel B, D) at quarter t+1. Independent variables are the Change in State Coincident 
Indexes (Change in SCI is included in all Panels) and State Coverage Ratio at quarter t; we include State 
Coverage Ratio to examine the liquidity channel effect documented by Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009, 
and Glascock and Lu-Andrews, 2014). Change in National Coincident Index (Change in NCI) is excluded 
in Panel C and D because of the inclusion of state fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix. The 
magnitude of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) is measured by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the 
spatial lagged outcome variable (W × [-Ln(Amihud)] or W × [-Ln(spread)]). W is the row-normalized 
inverse-distance matrix. The impact of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) on macroeconomic effects 
is captured by the spatial multiplier, which equals to 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . Direct effect largely resembles the 
coefficient estimates of the panel regressions. Total effect, which approximately equals to the product of 
direct effect and spatial multiplier, is reported in parallel to the direct effect. State and quarter fixed effects 
are included. t-statistics are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A – Channel Effect – Negative Ln(state Amihud illiquidity) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(Amihud)] SAR – [-Ln(Amihud)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(Amihud)] – – 
– 
-0.246 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.80 (t statistics) – – (-3.17)  
State coverage ratio 0.102 *** – – 0.096 ** 0.077 ** 
(t statistics) (2.71)  – – (2.56)  (2.52)  
Change in SCI 1.567 *** – – 1.521 *** 1.225 *** 
(t statistics) (6.52)  – – (6.75)  (6.10)  
Change in NCI -68.325 *** – – -12.522  -9.841  
(t statistics) (-13.8)  – – (-0.36)  (-0.35)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 55% 55% 
State Fixed Effects No No 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Panel B – Channel Effect – Negative Ln(state relative spread) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(spread)] SAR – [-Ln(spread)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(spread)] – – 
– 
-0.324 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.76 (t statistics) – – (-4.13)  
State coverage ratio 0.062 *** – – 0.060 *** 0.045 *** 
(t statistics) (4.25)  – – (4.11)  (3.98)  
Change in SCI 0.597 *** – – 0.568 *** 0.430 *** 
(t statistics) (6.42)  – – (6.48)  (5.93)  
Change in NCI -45.758 *** – – -178.49 *** -134.60 *** 
(t statistics) (-23.8)  – – (-10.3)  (-18.8)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 90% 90% 
State Fixed Effects No No 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Panel C – Channel Effect – Negative Ln(state Amihud illiquidity) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(Amihud)] SAR – [-Ln(Amihud)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(Amihud)] – – 
– 
-0.239 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.81 (t statistics) – – (-3.08)  
State coverage ratio 0.102 *** – – 0.095 ** 0.078 ** 
(t statistics) (2.69)  – – (2.55)  (2.52)  
Change in SCI 1.578 *** – – 1.533 *** 1.248 *** 
(t statistics) (6.57)  – – (6.84)  (6.11)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 55% 55% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Panel D – Channel Effect – Negative Ln(state relative spread) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(spread)] SAR – [-Ln(spread)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(spread)] – – 
– 
-0.320 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.76 (t statistics) – – (-4.09)  
State coverage ratio 0.062 *** – – 0.059 *** 0.045 *** 
(t statistics) (4.20)  – – (4.08)  (3.94)  
Change in SCI 0.605 *** – – 0.575 *** 0.438 *** 
(t statistics) (6.49)  – – (6.60)  (6.04)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 90% 90% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Table 7 – Regional Inflation and Local Liquidity Spillover Effects 
In this table, we report regression results of panel regressions and Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model. 
The dependent variable is the negative natural logarithm of State Amihud Illiquidity (Panel A, C) or State 
Relative Spread (Panel B, D) at quarter t+1. Independent variables are the state, regional, and national 
macroeconomic variables (state, regional, and national macroeconomic variables are included in all Panels) 
and State Coverage Ratio (Panel C, D); we include State Coverage Ratio to examine the liquidity channel 
effect documented by Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009, and Glascock and Lu-Andrews, 2014) at quarter 
t. State macroeconomic variables include Log(Unemployment rate), Gross State Product Growth, State 
Personal Income Growth, Log(State Mortgage Deduction), and State House Price Index Growth. Regional 
macroeconomic variable is Log(Regional CPI), which is a proxy for local inflation. All variables are defined 
in Appendix. The magnitude of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) is measured by the coefficient 
estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged outcome variable (W × [-Ln(Amihud)] or W × [-Ln(spread)]). W is the 
row-normalized inverse-distance matrix. The impact of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) on 
macroeconomic effects is captured by the spatial multiplier, which equals to 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . Direct effect 
largely resembles the coefficient estimates of the panel regressions. Total effect, which approximately 
equals to the product of direct effect and spatial multiplier, is reported in parallel to the direct effect. State 
and quarter fixed effects are included. t-statistics are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A – Negative Ln(state Amihud illiquidity) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(Amihud)] SAR – [-Ln(Amihud)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(Amihud)] – – 
– 
-0.372 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.73 (t statistics) – – (-4.58)  
Log(Unemployment rate) -0.035  – – 0.030  0.022  
(t statistics) (-0.12)  – – (0.10)  (0.10)  
Gross State Product Growth 0.104 *** – – 0.099 *** 0.073 *** 
(t statistics) (4.66)  – – (4.78)  (4.39)  
State Personal Income Growth -0.001  – – 0.007  0.005  
(t statistics) (-0.01)  – – (0.16)  (0.16)  
Log(State Mortgage Deduction) 0.088  – – 0.101  0.073  
(t statistics) (0.71)  – – (0.87)  (0.87)  
State House Price Index Growth 0.083 *** – – 0.083 *** 0.060 *** 
(t statistics) (2.94)  – – (3.16)  (3.08)  
Log(Regional CPI) -27.347 *** – – -30.135 *** -21.936 *** 
(t statistics) (-7.52)  – – (-8.39)  (-7.68)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 57% 57% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Panel B – Negative Ln(state relative spread) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(spread)] SAR – [-Ln(spread)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(Amihud)] – – 
– 
-0.479 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.68 (t statistics) – – (-5.93)  
Log(Unemployment rate) 0.065  – – 0.038  0.026  
(t statistics) (0.57)  – – (0.34)  (0.34)  
Gross State Product Growth 0.039 *** – – 0.035 *** 0.024 *** 
(t statistics) (4.49)  – – (4.42)  (4.14)  
State Personal Income Growth 0.009  – – 0.012  0.008  
(t statistics) (0.48)  – – (0.68)  (0.68)  
Log(State Mortgage Deduction) -0.012  – – -0.009  -0.006  
(t statistics) (-0.26)  – – (-0.20)  (-0.21)  
State House Price Index Growth 0.038 *** – – 0.038 *** 0.025 *** 
(t statistics) (3.50)  – – (3.76)  (3.63)  
Log(Regional CPI) -13.752 *** – – -15.130 *** -10.146 *** 
(t statistics) (-9.82)  – – (-10.9)  (-9.80)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 90% 90% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Panel C – Channel Effect – Negative Ln(state Amihud illiquidity) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(Amihud)] SAR – [-Ln(Amihud)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(Amihud)] – – 
– 
-0.369 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.73 (t statistics) – – (-4.55)  
State coverage ratio 0.102 *** – – 0.102 *** 0.074 *** 
(t statistics) (2.77)  – – (2.77)  (2.73)  
Log(Unemployment rate) 0.031  – – 0.073  0.053  
(t statistics) (0.10)  – – (0.27)  (0.26)  
Gross State Product Growth 0.101 *** – – 0.098 *** 0.072 *** 
(t statistics) (4.50)  – – (4.76)  (4.52)  
State Personal Income Growth -0.001  – – -0.002  -0.001  
(t statistics) (-0.03)  – – (-0.03)  (-0.04)  
Log(State Mortgage Deduction) 0.093  – – 0.107  0.077  
(t statistics) (0.75)  – – (0.92)  (0.92)  
State House Price Index Growth 0.083 *** – – 0.083 *** 0.060 *** 
(t statistics) (2.94)  – – (3.13)  (3.04)  
Log(Regional CPI) -27.530 *** – – -30.516 *** -22.205 *** 
(t statistics) (-7.58)  – – (-8.11)  (-8.36)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 57% 57% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Panel D – Channel Effect – Negative Ln(state relative spread) 
Model GLS – [-Ln(spread)] SAR – [-Ln(spread)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(spread)] – – 
– 
-0.472 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.68 (t statistics) – – (-5.86)  
State coverage ratio 0.064 *** – – 0.063 *** 0.043 *** 
(t statistics) (4.53)  – – (4.50)  (4.35)  
Log(Unemployment rate) 0.106  – – 0.071  0.048  
(t statistics) (0.94)  – – (0.67)  (0.67)  
Gross State Product Growth 0.036 *** – – 0.034 *** 0.023 *** 
(t statistics) (4.23)  – – (4.31)  (4.13)  
State Personal Income Growth 0.008  – – 0.008  0.005  
(t statistics) (0.41)  – – (0.46)  (0.46)  
Log(State Mortgage Deduction) -0.009  – – -0.006  -0.004  
(t statistics) (-0.20)  – – (-0.13)  (-0.13)  
State House Price Index Growth 0.038 *** – – 0.038 *** 0.025 *** 
(t statistics) (3.51)  – – (3.72)  (3.61)  
Log(Regional CPI) -13.867 *** – – -15.306 *** -10.300 *** 
(t statistics) (-9.96)  – – (-10.6)  (-10.7)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 90% 90% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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Table 8 – Spatial Durbin’s Model (SDM) – Only Direct Effects Are Reported.  
In this table, we report regression results of Spatial Durbin’s (SDM) model. The dependent variable is the negative natural logarithm of State Amihud 
Illiquidity or State Relative Spread at quarter t+1. Independent variables are the Change in State Coincident Index (Change in SCI), Change in 
National Coincident Index (Change in NCI), and State Coverage Ratio at quarter t; we include State Coverage Ratio to examine the liquidity channel 
effect documented by Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009, and Glascock and Lu-Andrews, 2014). We re-estimate Table 4 – 6, but assuming spatial 
dependence of state-level variables, i.e., State Coverage Ratio (W × Coverage), Δ SCI (same as Change in SCI, W × Δ SCI). All variables are defined 
in Appendix. The magnitude of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) is measured by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged outcome 
variable (W × Dep. Var.). W is the row-normalized inverse-distance matrix. Only direct effect is reported in this table. Quarter fixed effect is always 
included. t-statistics are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels. 
Dep. Var. W × Dep. Var. Coverage W × Coverage Δ SCI W × Δ SCI Δ NCI State FE. 𝑅2 
-Ln(Amihud) -0.247*** – – 1.460*** -2.450* -16.691 No 55% 
(t-statistics) (-3.17) – – (6.09) (-1.83) (-0.46) – – 
-Ln(Amihud) -0.242*** 0.083** -0.139 1.417*** -2.270* -15.321 No 56% 
(t-statistics) (-3.12) (2.18) (-0.83) (5.91) (-1.69) (-0.42) – – 
-Ln(Amihud) -0.240*** – – 1.472*** -2.449* – Yes 55% 
(t-statistics) (-3.09) – – (6.18) (-1.83) – – – 
-Ln(Amihud) -0.235*** 0.082** -0.138 1.430*** -2.269* – Yes 56% 
(t-statistics) (-3.03) (2.18) (-0.83) (5.99) (-1.70) – – – 
-Ln(Spread) -0.325*** – – 0.563*** -0.774 -178.8*** No 90% 
(t-statistics) (-4.14) – – (6.04) (-1.48) (-10.2) – – 
-Ln(Spread) -0.318*** 0.057*** -0.023 0.536*** -0.696 -178.2*** No 90% 
(t-statistics) (-4.05) (3.85) (-0.36) (5.76) (-1.33) (-10.1) – – 
-Ln(Spread) -0.322*** – – 0.570*** -0.763 – Yes 90% 
(t-statistics) (-4.09) – – (6.15) (-1.46) – – – 
-Ln(Spread) -0.314*** 0.056*** -0.022 0.543*** -0.685 – Yes 90% 
(t-statistics) (-4.01) (3.83) (-0.34) (5.87) (-1.32) – – – 
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Table 9 – Subperiod Analysis 
In this table, we report regression results of Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model for different subperiods. The dependent variable is the negative 
natural logarithm of State Amihud Illiquidity at quarter t+1. Independent variables are the Change in State Coincident Index (Change in SCI), Change 
in National Coincident Index (Change in NCI), and State Coverage Ratio at quarter t; we include State Coverage Ratio to examine the liquidity 
channel effect documented by Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009, and Glascock and Lu-Andrews, 2014). We re-estimate Table 4 for each five or 
ten-year subperiods over a 20-year period (1994Q1–2013Q4). All variables are defined in Appendix. The magnitude of spatial spillover effect 
(feedback effect) is measured by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged outcome variable (W × Dep. Var.). W is the row-normalized 
inverse-distance matrix. Direct and total effects are reported in this table. Quarter fixed effect is always included. t-statistics are reported 
beneath/parallel to the coefficient estimates in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Dependent Variable: Negative Ln(state Amihud illiquidity) 
Subperiod W × Dep. Var. Effect Coverage t-statistics Δ SCI t-statistics Δ NCI t-statistics State FE. 𝑅2 
5-year subperiods 
1994Q1 – 
1998Q4 
-0.520*** Direct – – 0.736** 1.96 10.962 0.46 No 56% 
(-3.33) Total – – 0.487* 1.90 7.116 0.45 – – 
1999Q1 – 
2003Q4 
-0.333** Direct – – -0.237 -0.50 5.051 1.58 No 11% 
(-1.97) Total – – -0.180 -0.49 3.811 1.55 – – 
2004Q1 – 
2008Q4 
-0.496*** Direct – – 1.423*** 3.62 -2.365* -1.70 No 24% 
(-3.07) Total – – 0.942*** 3.29 -1.567 -1.63 – – 
2009Q1 – 
2013Q4 
-0.386** Direct – – 0.535 1.63 -284.7* -1.81 No 40% 
(-2.29) Total – – 0.393 1.58 -205.0* -1.81 – – 
1994Q1 – 
1998Q4 
-0.510*** Direct 0.051** 2.12 0.676* 1.93 15.615 0.66 No 56% 
(-3.28) Total 0.034** 2.07 0.445* 1.85 10.337 0.65 – – 
1999Q1 – 
2003Q4 
-0.386** Direct 0.508*** 5.02 -0.329 -0.76 5.611* 1.82 No 16% 
(-2.26) Total 0.365*** 4.59 -0.237 -0.75 4.004* 1.80 – – 
2004Q1 – 
2008Q4 
-0.502*** Direct 0.112 1.32 1.354*** 3.65 -2.194 -1.61 No 24% 
(-3.10) Total 0.073 1.30 0.894*** 3.30 -1.456 -1.55 – – 
2009Q1 – 
2013Q4 
-0.387** Direct -0.090 -1.02 0.531* 1.71 -265.4* -1.70 No 40% 
(-2.29) Total -0.066 -1.01 0.387 1.64 -187.8* -1.72 – – 
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10-year subperiods 
1994Q1 – 
2003Q4 
-0.541*** Direct – – 0.936** 2.50 4.966 1.39 No 27% 
(-4.25) Total – – 0.606** 2.43 3.188 1.39 – – 
2004Q1 – 
2013Q4 
-0.486*** Direct – – 0.871*** 3.37 -299.6* -1.74 No 35% 
(-4.16) Total – – 0.584*** 3.25 -199.8* -1.73 – – 
1994Q1 – 
2003Q4 
-0.535*** Direct 0.131*** 3.35 0.814** 2.32 5.518 1.57 No 28% 
(-4.22) Total 0.084*** 3.20 0.526** 2.23 3.549 1.56 – – 
2004Q1 – 
2013Q4 
-0.487*** Direct 0.179*** 2.67 0.807*** 3.33 -269.1 1.58 No 36% 
(-4.17) Total 0.119*** 2.60 0.539*** 3.20 -177.6 1.59 – – 
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Table 10 – Financial Crisis – NBER Definition 
In this table, we report regression results of Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model for the most recent recession period (Dec, 2007–Jun, 2009) defined 
by NBER website. The dependent variable is the negative natural logarithm of State Amihud Illiquidity at quarter t+1. Independent variables are the 
Change in State Coincident Index (Change in SCI), Change in National Coincident Index (Change in NCI), and State Coverage Ratio at quarter t; 
we include State Coverage Ratio to examine the liquidity channel effect documented by Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009, and Glascock and Lu-
Andrews, 2014). We re-estimate Table 4 for the most recent recession period which lasts for 6 quarters (2008Q1–2009Q2). All variables are defined 
in Appendix. The magnitude of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) is measured by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the spatial lagged outcome 
variable (W × Dep. Var.). W is the row-normalized inverse-distance matrix. Direct and total effects are reported in this table. Quarter fixed effect is 
always included. t-statistics are reported beneath/parallel to the coefficient estimates in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance for the 
coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Dependent Variable: Negative Ln(state Amihud illiquidity) 
Subperiod W × Dep. Var. Effect Coverage t-statistics Δ SCI t-statistics Δ NCI t-statistics State FE. 𝑅2 
2008Q1 – 
2009Q2 
-0.838*** Direct – – -0.114 -0.22 4.770* 1.77 No 17% 
(-2.89) Total – – -0.052 -0.18 2.436* 1.84 – – 
2008Q1 – 
2009Q2 
-0.838*** Direct -0.011 -0.12 -0.153 -0.31 5.256** 1.98 No 17% 
(-2.88) Total -0.005 -0.10 -0.076 -0.28 2.729** 2.04 – – 
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Table 11: Channel Effect –Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Analysis 
In this table, we present the two-stage least squares estimation based on panel regressions and Spatial 
Autoregressive (SAR) model. The dependent variable is the Stage Coverage Ratio in stage 1, and negative 
natural logarithm of State Amihud Illiquidity in stage 2. Independent variables are the Change in State 
Coincident Indexes (Change in SCI is included in all Panels) and Governor, a dummy variable that equals 
to 1 if the state governor is republican, and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined in Appendix. The 
magnitude of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) is measured by the coefficient estimates, 𝜌,  of the 
spatial lagged outcome variable (W × Stage Coverage Ratio or W × [-Ln(spread)]). W is the row-normalized 
inverse-distance matrix. The impact of spatial spillover effect (feedback effect) on macroeconomic effects 
is captured by the spatial multiplier, which equals to 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ . Direct effect largely resembles the 
coefficient estimates of the panel regressions. Total effect, which approximately equals to the product of 
direct effect and spatial multiplier, is reported in parallel to the direct effect. State and quarter fixed effects 
are included. t-statistics are reported beneath the coefficient estimates in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance for the coefficient at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Panel A – Stage 1 
Model GLS – State coverage ratio SAR – State coverage ratio 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × State coverage ratio – – 
– 
-0.596 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.63 (t statistics) – – (-8.14)  
Change in SCI 0.521 *** – – 0.572 *** 0.349 ** 
(t statistics) (3.32)   – – (3.74)  (3.63)  
Governor -0.043  – – -0.031  -0.019  
(t statistics) (-0.92)   – – (-0.73)  (-0.73)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 18% 19% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Panel B – Stage 2 
Model GLS – [-Ln(Amihud)] SAR – [-Ln(Amihud)] 
Variable Direct Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Total Effect 
W × [-Ln(Amihud)] – – 
– 
-0.241 *** Multiplier ≈ 
0.81 (t statistics) – – (-3.11)  
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜̂  5.029 ** – – 5.016 ** 4.076 ** 
(t statistics) (2.47)  – – (2.47)  (2.45)  
Change in SCI -1.297  – – -1.327  -1.078  
(t statistics) (-1.08)  – – (-1.10)  (-1.11)  
 
Number of Obs 1743 1743 
Spatial Weighting Matrix No Inverse-distance matrix 
R Squared 55% 55% 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
